Problems of Communism

JULY-AUGUST 1971

The 24th CPSU Congress

Leonard Schapiro
Myron Rush
Darrell P. Hammer
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Soviet Economic Reform

Gertrude E. Schroeder

Exit Gomulka

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THE 24th CPSU CONGRESS

EDITORS' NOTE: After a year's delay, the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union finally met in Moscow from March 30 to April 9. It was a meeting convened to demonstrate the success of the current leadership's endeavors "to close the ranks and present an appearance of unity," as Leonard Schapiro points out in his essay on the Congress proceedings. Yet, despite all the efforts that were exerted to create an aura of harmony and unanimity, many contentious issues remained unresolved and smoldering beneath the surface. Thus, the struggle for supremacy in the party, pitting General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev against his fellow oligarchs in the Politburo, has by no means been decided by Brezhnev's attainment of his current status as undisputed primus: Mr. Rush's analysis cites evidence that the battle for the succession continues undiminished, with far-reaching implications for the distribution of political power in the party.

Another issue fraught with potential for conflict was pointed up by the Congress decision to revoke current party membership cards and require members to apply for new ones. Mr. Hammer points out in the third of our series of articles on the Congress that this move lays the groundwork for an administrative purge of the party membership and may also be indicative of a growing concern on the part of the leadership over the impact of the party's dynamic numerical growth. Finally, Mr. Devlin examines the uneasy relationships between the CPSU and other CPs as reflected at the Congress and in the reactions of the latter parties to its proceedings.

In forthcoming issues of our journal, we shall devote studies to other problems which surfaced at the Congress session, including the thorny future of Soviet agriculture, the question of Soviet investment policy, and developments in the party apparatus at the republic level.

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Keynote--Compromise

By Leonard Schapiro

The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which met from March 30 to April 9, 1971, produced no surprises. Its proceedings were as bland, uneventful, colorless and smooth as a play being performed on the stage for the third year running. In particular, there were no outward indications of the serious policy disputes which are believed to have been going on within the top Soviet leadership since the Central Committee Plenum of December 1969, whose proceedings were only fragmentarily reported at the time and still remain shrouded in a great deal of mystery.[1]

The subject matter of these disputes necessarily continues to be conjectural, but two broad areas of conflict can safely be identified. One centers on questions of general industrial management policy—in particular, the best ways to increase production. Should greater emphasis be placed on discipline, dirigisme, and stern control from the center; or, on the contrary, should greater stress be laid on material incentives, on economic and market price indicators (rather than superplanning), and on decentralization of control over individual enterprises? The second major area of dispute concerns broad economic priorities. Should heavy industry take absolute priority over consumer goods; or should some concessions be made to the long-suffering Soviet consumer even at the expense of heavy industry?

By and large, the views that favor discipline, centralized controls, and absolute priority for heavy industry can be regarded as those of the party apparatus, while the views that look toward greater reliance on material incentives, increased application of market principles, decentralization of industrial controls, and higher priority for consumer goods can be identified with the government apparatus, including the planners and managers. Thus, the policy conflicts are inextricably tied in with the whole question of the balance between the party and government-administrative apparatuses, and this in turn reduces itself, in actual Soviet conditions, to a struggle within the collective leadership between the man who symbolizes the party, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and the man who stands for the technocratic machine, Premier Aleksei Kosygin. It is not necessarily—indeed, not even primarily—a personal struggle, but in Soviet conditions it tends to become personalized. Viewed in this light, the 24th Congress outwardly appeared in many ways, as will be seen later, to mark the personal ascendancy of Brezhnev, but the proceedings shed little light on the implications of this for future policy.

Differences Submerged

Certainly, no signs of any policy disagreement cropped up during the Congress proceedings. The voting, of course, was unanimous—there would have been something seriously wrong with the machinery of party management had it been otherwise. But not even a hint of any differences of outlook could be gleaned from the speeches of the principal actors. Kosygin, dealing with economic policy some days

[1] General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the December 15, 1969, session of the Plenum was never published, and the official communique issued following the Plenum omitted the usual statement that the Central Committee's approval of Politburo policies had been "unanimous." See Sidney L. Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), May-June, 1970, pp. 10-11.

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after it had already been fully expounded by Brezhnev in the Central Committee's report,[2] gave no sign of any concern whatever over the fact that the policy of economic decentralization with which he was closely associated was as dead as the dodo.[3] He endorsed Brezhnev's emphasis on discipline, dirigisme, and technical efficiency as the keys to increased production. Yet, the debates which had undoubtedly taken place within the leadership on this issue (among others) in advance of the Congress must have been sufficiently furious to necessitate the postponement of the Congress session until March 1971—even though Brezhnev himself had announced last July that it would be held in 1970,[4] and even though the postponement meant sacrificing the opportunity, so dear to Communist hearts, to associate the occasion with the centenary of Lenin's birth.

Again, if there had been any behind-the-scenes controversy over the issue of "guns versus butter" in the months preceding the Congress, no visible signs of it appeared at the session. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin placed equal stress on concern for the consumer, and the Congress formally endorsed the draft directives on the new Five-Year Plan (published on February 14, 1971), which envisage what would appear to be substantial concessions to consumers.[5] How far these promises by both party and government leaders will be fulfilled, however, only time will tell. For the moment, it is necessary to bear in mind, first, that the great bulk of capital available for investment is to go into heavy industry, and second, that the promised rise in the standard of living, according to Kosygin, is dependent on a rise in labor productivity as compared with the last (eighth) Five-Year Plan. "In the ninth Five-Year Plan period," he told the Congress, "we have to derive 80-85 percent of the whole increase in material income from increased productivity of labor." This would seem to be an ambitious hope, since increased productivity is in turn to be dependent upon improved discipline, better management and direction, and technological advance.

This cursory glance at the economic background is necessary in order to understand what appears to have been the main political result of the Congress: namely, general acquiescence to increased party ascendancy within the collective leadership. There were, of course, other equally important factors involved. Outside events may well have made all the leaders more anxious for compromise, peace and harmony at home. Events in Czechoslovakia, in particular, showed how quickly economic reform could lead to demands for political reform and hence to a diminution of the party's stranglehold over national life—and no doubt every type of Soviet leader, whether a party boss or a government bureaucrat, has now persuaded himself that to diminish the party's monopoly of power is to invite counterrevolution. More recently, the events in Poland showed that the working class was prepared even to use force (and risk savage repression) if its standards of living remained too far below its expectations. It is against this background, then, that the changes formalized by the Congress in the leadership and role of the party must be seen.

Party Statistics

Before looking at the new party leadership, however, it may be useful to summarize the general information on the party made available at the Congress.[6] The total strength of the party is now given as 14,455,321, of whom 13,810,089 are full members, and 645,232, probationary members. (According to Brezhnev, the total figure represents nine percent of the adult population.) The annual rate of growth of the party since 1966 has been between 2.6 and 3.9 percent, according to the latest published statistics. The same statistics show that the rate of growth in the period 1961-65 was substantially higher, ranging between 5 and 6.1 percent.[7]

It would appear that there has been a continuation of the stress, apparent since the Khrushchev era, on recruiting new members from the working class. Officially, the composition of the party membership by social status is now given as: workers, 40.1 percent; peasants, 15.1 percent; and employees (non-manual salaried workers), 44.8 percent. (Of the three million admitted to the party since the last Congress, over half are placed in the workers' category, and the proportion is said to have been higher in the main industrial areas.) The percentage of party members described as workers had already risen during the period from 1956 to 1967

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 31, 1971, pp. 2-10.
[3] *Ibid.*, April 7, 1971, pp. 2-7.
[4] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1970, p. 3.
[5] *Ibid.*, April 11, 1971, p. 1.
[6] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1971, p. 9.
[7] Percentages of annual growth based on membership figures in *Partiinoe stroitelstvo—uchebnoe posobie* (Party Building—A Textbook), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970; and *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, 1971.

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from 32 to 38.1.[8] (Naturally, however, all these figures have to be treated with caution, since those described as "workers" in past party statistics have often turned out to be foremen or other persons in white-collar positions of authority.) According to the data announced at the Congress, there has also been an increase in the number of women party members, who now number "over three millions," or between 22 and 24 percent of total membership[9] as compared with 20.9 percent in 1967, the last published statistic.[10]

On the all-important matter of the age and seniority of party members, the information given out at the Congress was confined to the 4,963 Congress delegates.[11] Of these, 4,740 were voting delegates, each representing 2,900 party members, and the remaining 223 were non-voting delegates, representing the 645,232 probationary (or candidate) members. These delegates may be described as the aristocracy of the party rather than a true cross-section of the party rank and file. Indeed, the presence of only 1,195 "worker" and 879 "peasant" delegates left some 58 percent of the delegates representing the party, state, army and police apparatuses and the intellectuals (it should be noted in passing that only very orthodox conformists from the intellectual community were allowed to attend this Congress, marking a shift away from Khrushchev's more tolerant attitude). Of the preponderant group of "white collar" delegates, a very large number—1,698 in all—were secretaries from all levels of the party apparatus. The age and seniority figures released concerning the delegates provide an interesting comparison with the most recent corresponding data (1967) for the party as a whole.[12] The figures show that nearly three-fourths of the delegates to the Congress joined the party after 1946, which closely approximates the corresponding situation in the party as a whole as of 1967. On the other hand, 88.2 percent of the delegates were over 40 (and 26.6 percent over 50)—a substantial deviation from the age composition of the party as a whole in 1967, when over half of all party members were under 40. This tends to support evidence available from other sources indicating that the party apparatus down to and including the regional (*oblast*) level, is now in the hands of the over-fifties, and below that, of the over-forties. Certainly there was no sign at the 24th Congress that there is any intention to change this age pattern in the near future.

Some other items of interest were disclosed at the Congress. For example, it is useful to know—since the subject has been shrouded in so much mystery—that two-thirds of the party's budget expenditures are now met out of members' dues.[13] Of still greater interest is the information that in the five years between the 23rd and 24th Congresses, 200,000 party secretaries, heads of departments (of party committees), and editors of party newspapers at all levels were sent to refresher courses in party schools.[14] This means that an average of about 40,000 members of the apparatus were absent from their jobs in each of these years. Obviously, no precise figure for the total size of the party apparatus can be inferred from these statistics, but they do suggest that an estimate of around 250,000 for the apparatus as a whole may be nearer the mark than the estimates of 180,000, and even 100,000, which some writers have advanced. One in six absent on a refresher course during each year makes sense; one in three, or even one in four, would seem to make no sense at all.

Strengthening of Party Control

So far the picture is one of stability, conservatism, and an absence of substantial change. But there were some disclosures at the Congress which seemed to indicate new trends. A minor item was Brezhnev's disclosure that the Secretariat, like the Politburo, only meets weekly; under Khrushchev it certainly met much more frequently.[15] A more significant item was the announcement that there is to be a recall and exchange of party cards.[16] Since the issuance of a new card involves an inquiry into the record of the holder, an exchange of cards usually presages a relatively mild purge of the party membership. This apparently projected purge, or quasi-purge, would be fully in line with the demand for greater party discipline and effort which was a key theme of the speeches delivered at the Congress. (Brezhnev revealed incidentally that the last exchange of party cards took place in 1954.)

[8] T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-67*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 325.
[9] *Pravda*, April 3, 1971.
[10] *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 7, 1967, p. 8, and No. 19, 1967, p. 15.
[11] *Pravda*, April 3, 1971, p. 4.
[12] Rigby, *op. cit.*, p. 354.
[13] *Pravda*, April 1, 1971.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1971, p. 9.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

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The greatest interest of all attaches to the changes in the party rules adopted at the Congress.[17] All-Union Party Congresses are now to meet every five years instead of every four; Union-Republican Congresses, "at least" once in five years; and lower-level party conferences, at intervals of two to three years. This change is probably consistent with actual practice and with the growth of the party; and it also correlates the holding of all-Union Congresses with the Five-Year Plan periods. At the same time, there is nothing in the new rules to indicate that party democracy will be strengthened either by requiring the holding of all-Union party conferences between all-Union Congresses, or even by providing for more frequent Central Committee plenary meetings.

A more important change in the rules illustrates the enhanced role which the party organizations evidently are now intended to play in directing the whole life of the country. The "control" authority of the primary party organizations has been considerably extended. Hitherto such "control"—which in Russian (as in French) means "supervision" and in practice signifies responsibility for policy as well as its implementation, with all the powers of interference that this responsibility entails—has been confined to economic organizations. Now the power of control is to be extended to the primary party organizations of "drafting organizations, design bureaus, institutes engaged in scientific research, educational establishments, and establishments engaged in cultural and enlightenment work and in medical care." [18]

This is a formidable list and no doubt reflects a growing concern on the part of the party leadership over the emergence of dissent, particularly among the all-important scientists. The inclusion of establishments concerned with health could well be a consequence of the fact that both the Academy of Sciences and—in one instance at any rate—the medical profession have displayed opposition to the increasingly frequent official practice of using certification of lunacy as a method of repressing dissenters. No one at the Congress—not even the normally voluble and intemperate Mikhail Sholokhov—had anything to say directly on the subject of dissent, except to imply that certain intellectuals are worthy only of contempt. However, this change in the party rules seemed to provide a more concrete indication of the future direction of policy on this subject.

"Control" by the primary party organizations has been strengthened, though in somewhat vague terms, in state bodies as well. Hitherto, the primary party organizations in government departments, state committees and the like had no right of "control," but merely the right to complain to higher party authorities if they disagreed with the policy being pursued. Under the new rules, however, they are to exercise "control" to the extent of ensuring "that directives of the party and government and observance of the law are carried out" [19]—which, in Soviet practice, is likely to provide quite a large opening for party interference in state administrative operations. Brezhnev did make it clear that the "control" to be exercised by the primary party organization of a state ministry will not extend to individual enterprises subordinate to the ministry. (Enterprises will, of course, remain subject, as hitherto, to "control" by their own primary party organizations.)

The New Politburo

As was to be expected, this increase in the power of the party apparatus in relation to a sphere of activity in which the government apparatus had enjoyed relative independence since the fall of Khrushchev in late 1964 is reflected in the new Politburo named by the 24th Congress. Headed by Brezhnev as General Secretary, the full members have been increased in number to fifteen. There were no demotions or expulsions. A curious practice which had first been employed at the time of the 23rd Congress in 1966 was again followed in announcing the new roster of Politburo members. When the list of those elected was first broadcast over the radio,[20] it was not in alphabetical order but in what must have been some kind of order of ranking, or of importance of function. However, when the proceedings of the Congress were reported in the press the following day (April 10),[21] the names were listed alphabetically. (It was, perhaps, just a happy chance that Brezhnev placed first in both versions, but one might speculate that KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov's chances of being elevated from the status of candidate member to full member of the Politburo may possibly have been adversely affected by the fact that alphabetically he would have ranked ahead of Brezhnev if promoted!)

[17] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1971, p. 10; and *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 9, 1971, pp. 10-12.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Radio Moscow broadcast, April 9, 1971.
[21] *Pravda*, April 10, 1971, p. 1.

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The names of the full Politburo members, in the order of the initial broadcast, were as follows: L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgorny, A. N. Kosygin, M. A. Suslov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pelshe, K. T. Mazurov, D. S. Poliansky, P. Ye. Shelest, G. I. Voronov, A. N. Shelepin, V. V. Grishin, D. A. Kunaev, V. V. Shcherbitsky, F. D. Kulakov. (The last four are the new members who have been added to the previous incumbents, all of whom remain.) The most important changes in ranking from the last Congress were Kosygin's demotion from second to third place, below Podgorny, and the relegation of Shelepin—whose rivalry with Brezhnev has been the subject of many rumors (no doubt often inspired)—to last place before the new members. Of the new members, Kulakov, the party secretary responsible for agriculture, was elected to full membership without having previously served as a candidate, while the remaining three had all been candidate members. No new candidate members were elected.

The new makeup of the Politburo illustrates the enhanced position of Brezhnev in several ways. Three of the four new members—Kulakov, Kunaev and Shcherbitsky—are known to be his close supporters, although the position of Grishin is less certain. This reinforcement of Brezhnev's position, moreover, has not been balanced by the elevation of anyone who can be regarded as more likely to support the views and interests of the government side of the hierarchy. There is, for example, no military member of the Politburo. Moreover, D. F. Ustinov, whose position as the party's "controller" of the armaments industry alone would logically entitle him to full membership, remains only a candidate memmer, while three of his former fellow candidate members have been promoted over his head. (Ustinov is also believed to head the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee Secretariat, which controls the KGB, the army, the judiciary and the procuracy.) At the same time, the elevation of Kulakov to full membership strengthens the representation of the Secretariat on the Politburo.

In spite of all this, it still appears quite premature to talk of the end of collective leadership or—notwithstanding Brezhnev's inordinate vanity—of a new "cult of personality." There can be no doubt that Brezhnev has increased his support within the Politburo, but he is still not the undisputed master of that body. Nor is he the single master of the KGB, which remains subordinate to the whole party leadership. He has increased his influence over the government hierarchy and therefore over the army, since it is administratively subordinate to the Ministry of Defense; and he may well be Chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, although clear information on this is lacking. Nevertheless, both the state machine and the army remain powerful organizations which still retain a good measure of independence and influence. Indeed, insofar as the new Politburo is concerned, all indications are that the action of the Congress embodied a compromise—even if it was a compromise in which Brezhnev has come out best.

The New Central Committee

The new Central Committee also reveals some slight evidence of compromise. The Central Committee has, of course, lost a good deal of status in past years and apparently no longer plays an important part in decision-making. Nevertheless, its membership represents the party aristocracy, and its composition at least provides an index of the way in which influence is distributed among different segments of the Soviet elite.

The Central Committee elected by the Congress consists of 241 full members and 155 candidate members, as compared with 195 and 165, respectively, elected in 1966. (Eighty-one members were also elected to the CPSU Central Auditing Commission.) The stability which characterizes the new Politburo is also evident in the Central Committee, certainly among the full members, 63.9 percent of whom were reelected from among the members of the old Committee. In addition, 15.7 and 1.7 percent of the new full members were elected from among the old candidate members and members of the Auditing Commission, respectively. In both these latter categories, which constitute the next two lower tiers of the party "aristocracy," the turnover was, as usual, somewhat higher. Thus, of the new candidate members, 45.8 percent were reelected from among the old, while 11 percent were promoted from the old Auditing Commission; and in the new Auditing Commission, 39.5 percent of the members are reelected holdovers, while 3.7 percent are former full Central Committee members who have now been demoted to the Auditing Commission.[22] Interestingly enough, these latter appear to be mostly persons whose careers have associated them with Shelepin—a fact which provides further evidence that he has fallen from grace. At the same time, it illustrates that the consequences of such a fall from grace were

[22] *Ibid.*, April 9, 1966, and April 10, 1971.

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relatively mild at this Congress by comparison with the past.

There are several other features about the new Central Committee which are worth noting. One is that the total number of military members of the three tiers of the Central Committee remains the same as in 1966—*i.e.*, 36. In percentage, however, their representation has been somewhat reduced (from 8.2 to 7.5 percent) as a consequence of the increased size of the new Committee. On the other hand, the KGB has very slightly—one might almost say, symbolically—increased its representation on the Committee. This increase is not among the full members, where the Chairman alone appears; but three deputy chairmen of the KGB have now reached the lower levels—two as candidate members, and one as a member of the Auditing Commission. There has also been a notable increase in the number of heads of Central Committee Departments—the most senior "civil servants" of the CPSU apparatus—elected to the Central Committee: five of them are now full members, and seven are candidate members, as compared with two and three, respectively, on the preceding Central Committee.

One further development in the new Central Committee merits special attention: namely, the emergence among the full members of 12 regional party first secretaries of a new and markedly different type. It need hardly be emphasized that the regional (oblast) first secretaries are among the most powerful men in the land. The Politburo may decide and order, but it is the first secretaries of the regions who can made or break policies. The fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 was, at least in part, due to the fact that he had tried to curb the authority of the regional first secretaries by introducing his short-lived reform dividing the oblast party committees into two separate committees for industry and agriculture, which had the effect (or would have had the effect, had it been fully implemented) of substantially reducing the first secretaries' powers. The dozen regional first secretaries who have now become full members of the Central Committee were all appointed to their regional posts, which traditionally carry full Central Committee membership, within a few months preceding the Congress, replacing men in their early sixties who have apparently been retired. They are all young—in their forties, as against the average of fifty—and what is most important, they have all had long and extensive technical experience rather than just some technical training, while on the other hand their experience in the party apparatus has been slight or even, in some cases, non-existent. This development *could* be the beginning of an important change in party-state relations. If, as is apparently intended, the party is now to be licensed to interfere more and more in technical matters, it may conceivably sugar the pill if the interference is practiced by men who know the job as well, or almost as well, as the managers and experts whom the party apparatus proposes to "control." The fact that these regional appointments were made just prior to the 24th Congress suggests the possibility that they may have been part of a compromise arrangement between Brezhnev and Kosygin.

External Relations

So far as international relations are concerned, it is scarcely worth dwelling on the views expressed at the Congress with respect to Soviet policy vis-a-vis the "imperialist" powers, NATO, or national liberation struggles. Very familiar propositions were reiterated which add nothing to our assessment of Soviet foreign policy: full support for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their struggle against "US aggression"; full support for the Arab peoples against aggression by Israel "encouraged by American imperialism" and for a peace settlement assuring Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories, for the right of any Middle Eastern nation to independent existence and for satisfaction of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine; convocation of a conference to discuss security and cooperation in Europe; a new European security system based on "recognition of the territorial and political realities which emerged as the result of the Second World War"; and peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries.

The picture that emerged at the Congress of relations between the CPSU and other Communist parties was rather more interesting. For one thing, the proceedings revealed the extent to which the CPSU had succeeded in improving its relations with many foreign parties as compared with the state of those relations at the time of the Budapest meeting of Communist parties in February-March 1968 to prepare for a world Communist conference. Then, the issue of China had predominated. There was widespread apprehension that the Soviet Union would try to mobilize the other Communist parties against China, and Brezhnev's attacks on Peking in violation of his assurance that he would refrain from such action led to serious dissension. A number

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of major Asian parties did not attend the Budapest meeting at all. By contrast, most of them—except, of course, China—sent delegates to the 24th Congress. The representative of North Vietnam, Le Duan, who in the past had usually been so careful to preserve an even balance between Moscow and Peking, was fulsome in his praise of Soviet support while making only a passing reference to mainland China.[23]

The issue of Czechoslovakia appeared about dead. The "Brezhnev doctrine" affirming the right of one socialist country to intervene by force in another where socialism is threatened was in effect approved as the Czechoslovak delegate, First Secretary Gustav Husak, fully embraced the Soviet line on the events of August 1968.[24] The fraternal delegates of some parties noted for their insistence on the right of independence, such as the Italian CP, spoke in relatively muted terms. The most outspoken on the subject was the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu, but his speech was still a long way from the walkout he had staged at Budapest in 1968. The fraternal delegate from East Germany, Walter Ulbricht, revealed none of the apprehensions he is known to entertain on the question of the as yet unratified Soviet treaty of friendship with West Germany.

This relative harmony in the international Communist movement does not mean that the issues dividing Moscow and many of the other Communist parties are dead. The conflict between Moscow and Peking, if somewhat less intense than a few years ago, is no nearer to resolution. Apprehension over possible Soviet interference is still strong in some of the European Communist parties, the Yugoslav party in particular, as well as in those of Italy and Romania. There are important economic differences which have been the subject of heated debates in Comecon and elsewhere in the recent past. Nevertheless, it would seem that the months preceding the Congress—the months gained by its postponement, in fact—were put to good use for the purpose of securing at least an appearance of unity. The events of December 1970 in Poland may well have spurred the desire of the party leaders to reestablish unity. So far as two of the foreign parties are concerned, there is evidence that their criticism of Soviet policy at the Moscow Congress was deliberately muted in the interests of unity. These are the Communist parties of France and Italy, both of which face electoral problems at home and, after years of discreditable sycophancy vis-a-vis Moscow, now feel constrained to display a critical attitude toward the CPSU on such issues as the subjugation of Czechoslovakia or the hounding of Soviet intellectuals like Solzhenitsyn. It is therefore of particular interest that, shortly after the 24th Congress, both the PCF delegate to the Congress and the Italian Communist journal *L'Unita* felt it necessary to make public statements regarding what had taken place at the Moscow gathering. Both statements pointed out, in effect, that in the interests of unity certain criticisms of the CPSU at the Congress had been softened, but that this did not mean that there were no longer any serious issues on which the French and Italian parties disagreed with Soviet policy.

Thus, both at home and in relation to the foreign Communist parties (except the Chinese), Brezhnev must be credited with having scored a large measure of success at the 24th Congress. The year that the Congress was delayed beyond its statutory date was obviously not wasted. Outwardly at least, harmony and stability prevailed. This certainly does not mean that all the outstanding economic and political problems facing the Soviet Union and its foreign partners have been solved, but it does suggest that both within the Soviet Union and outside, the Communists have made a determined and substantially successful effort to close their ranks and present an appearance of unity. It would be beyond the purpose of this article to predict whether or how long this apparent unity will be preserved.

[23] *Ibid.*, April 1, 1971, p. 6.
[24] *Ibid.*, April 2, 1971, pp. 6-7.

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Brezhnev and the Succession Issue

By Myron Rush

After Nikita Khrushchev's political demise, just as after Stalin's death and Lenin's mortal illness, a collective leadership centered in the Presidium (now the Politburo) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party assumed power in the USSR. By the time the 24th Party Congress met in March-April 1971, this collective leadership, or oligarchy, had maintained a seemingly stable rule for more than six years. In the successions to Lenin and Stalin, several years also passed without the clear ascendancy of a single leader and without major changes in the oligarchy's membership. Observers then concluded that the succession question had been resolved by the effective transfer of power from a personal ruler to a stable oligarchy. They were wrong: within six years of Lenin's fatal stroke, Stalin overthrew the ruling oligarchy; four years after Stalin's death, Khrushchev did the same. Now, a little more than six years after Khrushchev's fall, in the aftermath of the 24th Party Congress, it appears that the oligarchy that replaced Khrushchev has been slowly subverted and may be about to suffer the fate of its predecessors. Like previous oligarchies in the USSR, the post-Khrushchev oligarchy has been vulnerable to the bid for power of one of its members. Although formidable obstacles remain, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, seems close to achieving personal rule.

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How does one distinguish in the Soviet (or any other Communist) context between personal rule and oligarchy? Failure to clarify this distinction underlay part of the persistent controversy among Sovietologists about the extent of Khrushchev's power during the period 1957-64. In anticipation of a new round of controversy about Brezhnev's power, I want to specify what I understand by these two terms in the context of Soviet politics.[1]

Oligarchy and Personal Rule

Oligarchy. The decisive feature is the incapacity of any individual to prevent the adoption of policies to which he may be opposed. Thus far, Soviet oligarchs, with few exceptions, have first entered the Politburo under the patronage of a personal ruler and have then been confirmed in it by mutual agreement when the Politburo has constituted itself the sovereign body during the crisis of succession. In the oligarchical phase, membership in the Politburo is normally stable, although changing alignments in the Politburo, as well as outside it in the larger political arena, tend to make oligarchical politics relatively fluid.

While the focus of political struggle is the Politburo, there is a tendency for the struggle to expand to wider arenas, particularly to the Central Committee. When such expansion occurs, interests that are represented in the Central Committee but not in the Politburo may become highly activated

[1] Actually, a third term is needed, for Soviet politics up to now have had three phases: oligarchy; limited personal rule; and despotic personal rule. I have omitted the last from the present discussion because, in my view, it is not currently a live option.

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politically.[2] Their support is sought, and they may acquire a strong influence on decisions pertaining to their sphere of responsibility.

The aims of individuals engaged in political struggle in an oligarchy are to influence party and state decisions on policy and personnel; to strengthen one's own faction and to prevent the primacy of any other faction; to strengthen one's own position within a faction and, if possible, to keep any other individual from becoming dominant in it. To date, oligarchy has been the operative mode of rule in the USSR only in periods of succession, after the death or political demise of the personal ruler. Conceivably, it could become the prevailing mode of rule, but such a development would probably lead in time to fundamental changes in the Soviet system. There have been three periods of oligarchy: after Lenin's illness, December 1922 to about July 1928; after Stalin's death, 1953-57; and after Khrushchev's removal, 1964 to the present (although the end may be near). While the defining characteristics were present in each instance, the condition of society was radically different in the three periods, and the style of rule varied greatly.

Limited Personal Rule. The decisive feature in this phase of Soviet politics is that major policies *cannot* be adopted against the will of the leader. He largely determines the membership of the chief organ of rule, the Politburo, and the consolidation of his power may be traced by the changes he makes in that body. Beginning with Stalin, the ruler has had to achieve mastery over the Secretariat before he could win decisive authority in the Politburo. In the central arena of political struggle during periods of limited personal rule, the ruler is dominant but not absolute. He must consult with the Politburo regularly, particularly when proposing major policy innovations. He may be opposed on particular questions by individuals or *ad hoc* factions, and this opposition may bring about substantial modification of his proposals before their final adoption or even, on occasion, outright rejection of them. Such opposition is permitted and is not of itself taken as a challenge to his position as ruler. However, an individual who goes too far in opposition can be removed from the Politburo by the leader, though at the possible cost of antagonizing other Politburo members, who may feel the security of their own positions jeopardized by such action. Since he cannot employ terror, the limited ruler frequently shifts his subordinates from position to position in order to preserve their sense of dependence on him and in order to prevent them from forming "family circles" which might become *foci* of resistance to his will, and this practice results in a substantial rate of turnover in the leading bodies, the Politburo and the Central Committee. But in using such means to maintain his authority, the limited ruler must be concerned with how they affect the morale of his lieutenants and the loyalty of these lieutenants to him.

The aims of politics among the second-echelon leaders under a limited ruler are to influence the limited ruler, directly or indirectly, on key questions of policy and personnel; to strengthen the faction of which one is a member and one's own position in it; to limit the power of the personal ruler at its margins, so that it does not grow. The circle of subordinates seeks to assure that the forms of consultation on major policy questions are observed, and it attempts to discourage frequent use of political sanctions against dissident leaders and especially to keep the ruler from resorting to non-political sanctions (police harrassment, threats of prosecution, imprisonment, etc.).[3] To the extent that the lieutenants are able to place constraints on the ruler's power, they limit the means available to him to protect his position. As a result, he may be deprived of it secretly—by conspiracy or, if the basis of his personal rule has been severely eroded, even by open political attack. The latter situation has not yet occurred in the USSR, but it did happen in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1967, when an open campaign against Antonin Novotny culminated in his ouster by the Central Committee.

Three periods of limited personal rule can be discerned:

(1) Lenin's rule in the first years of the regime (1917-22), which was a continuation of his dominance of the Bolshevik Party (1903-17). The basis of his authority was his prestige as founder of the party and maker of the revolution that installed it in power. Nevertheless, he encountered resistance on many questions (not least the 1918 peace treaty with Germany) in the Politburo and Central Committee.

(2) Stalin's rule for roughly a decade after 1928. The foundation of his position was his control of the party apparatus, which was largely his own creation.

[2] These interests include not only institutional entities like the army, the political police, the cultural establishment, and the scientific establishment, but also sectional groupings like the party apparatus at the *oblast* (regional) level, the economic bureaucracy at the ministerial level, etc.

[3] Among the lieutenants, however, there are always some who encourage the ruler to extend his authority in the hope that they will benefit.

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He replaced the old Politburo with his own men and also replaced, as necessary, some of the new men. However, factions within the Politburo and Central Committee opposed some of his policies and resisted his efforts to extend his power through the initiation of blood purges, although they made no attempt to force him from office.

(3) Khrushchev's rule during 1957-64. If one applies the distinction between oligarchy and limited personal rule to the known facts of Soviet politics in the period 1957-64, I believe that the evidence supports the conclusion that Khrushchev was in fact a personal ruler.[4] Except for Anastas Mikoyan and Khrushchev himself, all the members of the 10-man Politburo (then called the Presidium) that had inherited Stalin's power were replaced. Subsequently, seven of the new members (A. B. Aristov, N. I. Beliaev, N. G. Ignatov, Ye. A. Furtseva, A. I. Kirichenko, N. A. Mukhitdinov, and G. K. Zhukov) were themselves removed. Perhaps the most striking evidence of Khrushchev's capacity to change the composition of the leading bodies is the nature of the Central Committee elected at the 22nd Party Congress (1961). The majority of voting members (around 60 percent) were newly promoted; moreover, about half the candidate members from the previous Central Committee failed to win re-election. Khrushchev dominated the proceedings at Central Committee plenums, frequently bullying the speakers —even Politburo members. He was a great innovator, and while some of his schemes were successfully resisted, it is remarkable how many of his innovations actually were enacted (including some highly disruptive ones) and how much his successors found necessary to repeal.

Brezhnev's Rise

If Khrushchev was a limited personal ruler, the leadership that followed him was unquestionably an oligarchy. Of the 12-man Politburo that took over in the months after his removal, none has been demoted,[5] and ten still remain. Yet this oligarchy, as I have noted, is now threatened by Brezhnev's power.

How did Brezhnev manage to subvert the oligarchy and bring his bid for personal rule close to success? His strategy has been the same that Stalin employed in the 1920's and Khrushchev in the 1950's. That it has succeeded so well a third time is indeed remarkable. In its essentials, the strategy is simple; it involves: (a) using the post of senior secretary to gain primacy in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, (b) using the Secretariat to win control over the party apparatus throughout the country at large, and (c) using the party apparatus to establish dominance over the other institutions of the regime. Parallel to this organizational strategy is an interconnected strategy for obtaining control of the regime's formal policymaking bodies, the Central Committee and its elected organ, the Politburo. This is accomplished by bringing supporters into the Central Committee and purging opponents from that body, and then employing that increased influence in the Central Committee to change the composition of the Politburo—that is, to add partisans and (what is more difficult) remove opponents.

While the basic strategy is still the same, this time the tactics, style, and timing have had to be tailored to Brezhnev's special circumstances. In applying a time-worn strategy whose required maneuvers are familiar to his opponents, Brezhnev has generally moved slowly and cautiously. Beginning in the spring of 1965, his rise to power has proceeded by a series of small steps forward, with relatively few setbacks.

Unlike Stalin and Khrushchev, each of whom enjoyed the initial advantage of being the only Politburo member in the Secretariat, Brezhnev at the outset had to deal with four powerful secretaries who were also on the Politburo: M. A. Suslov, A. P. Kirilenko, N. V. Podgorny, and A. N. Shelepin. In the first weeks after Khrushchev's downfall, several of them evidently combined forces, particularly at the December 1964 Central Committee Plenum, to prevent Brezhnev from exercising paramount power as First Secretary. By the end of 1965, however, Brezhnev had isolated and removed Podgorny from the Secretariat; subsequently, in the wake of the Middle East crisis of mid-1967, he managed to expel Shelepin from the Secretariat and to oust Shelepin's partisans from leading positions. Kirilenko and Suslov remain in the Secretariat and are potential opponents, but the first may be a temporary ally and the aging Suslov has for the present either been neutralized or been won over by Brezhnev. Only with the passage of time, then, did Brezhnev succeed in eliminating his most dangerous colleagues from the Secretariat and neutralizing or gaining the support of the rest. On

[4] This is not the prevalent view among Soviet specialists, although the debate has been somewhat confused because of the failure of many to distinguish between despotic and limited personal rule. I have argued the case at length in *Political Succession in the USSR*, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1968, Chap. V.

[5] Mikoyan and N. M. Shvernik were retired in 1966, ostensibly because of age, although there may well have been additional reasons in Mikoyan's case.

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the other hand, since the Secretariat was already powerful and authoritative when Khrushchev was forced from power, Brezhnev has not had to fight some of the early battles that Khrushchev waged to make it so. The presence of several Politburo members in the Secretariat gave this body from the beginning a prominence and authority second only to the Politburo itself. (The Council of Ministers, while more authoritative than before, probably was not a serious competitor.)

Much criticism of the "cult of personality" and frequent injunctions to observe "collective leadership" accompanied Khrushchev's removal; consequently, Brezhnev has generally advanced his own cult by modest increments. One of his few bold moves was to have the title "General Secretary" (instead of First Secretary) of the Central Committee conferred on himself in 1966. This title was the one under which Stalin had exercised authority during the period of his limited personal rule, from 1928 to 1937.

Initially, Brezhnev also faced difficulties in advancing his own men to key positions. Stalin and Khrushchev both profited from the personnel practices of the oligarchies that they were subverting. The post-Lenin oligarchy undertook to expand the party organization, while the post-Stalin oligarchy decided to replace the most loyal partisans of Stalin and of Beria. In each instance, the party secretary made good use of the numerous places to be filled. But the watchword of the post-Khrushchev oligarchy was "confidence in cadres." Khrushchev's method of rotating leaders and shaking up middle-level personnel in order to breed a sense of insecurity and of dependence on his good opinion had led to widespread dissatisfaction. Brezhnev alluded to this discontent in his report to the 23rd Party Congress:

The frequent reorganizations of party, government and economic bodies that have taken place in recent years [i.e., under Khrushchev] have had an adverse effect on the . . . selection, promotion and training of cadres. As a rule, these changes were accompanied by an unjustified shifting and changing of officials, and this resulted in a lack of confidence among them, prevented them from making full use of their abilities, and gave grounds for irresponsibility.[6]

To restore morale and win support, the post-Khrushchev oligarchy found it expedient to express confidence in the middle ranks of the party and to give assurances that officials would not be replaced without good cause. (Indeed, the turnover of cadres was reduced to a point where the bureaucracy began to be less responsive to the leadership.) Hence, Brezhnev had to move slowly in the crucial area of appointments to policymaking bodies in the provinces and at the center. Not until the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum was he able to renew demands for *discipline* and *exactingness* on the part of officials and to step up the replacement of unsatisfactory ones. The latter process culminated at the 24th Party Congress, when 47 members of the previous Central Committee were replaced by newcomers. Those individuals who were returned to the Central Committee also suffered a dilution of their power because of the designation of 46 additional members. Thus, of the 241 members in the Central Committee chosen at the 24th Congress, 93 were newly elected. This figure means that the Committee numbers roughly four new members for every seven old members. The opportunity existed for Brezhnev to expand his influence in the Central Committee considerably, and there is indirect evidence that he did so.

While the Congress was still in session, the Central Committee met to elect its executive organs, including a new Politburo. Although all the incumbents won re-election, their ranks were expanded by the promotion of three candidate members (V. V. Grishin, D. A. Kunaev, and V. V. Shcherbitsky) and a party secretary not hitherto a candidate member (F. D. Kulakov) to full membership—an increase from 11 to 15. During the last 45 years, the size of the Politburo has normally run between 9 and 12; its present size makes it easier for Brezhnev to manipulate. At least three of the new members (Kunaev, Shcherbitsky, and Kulakov) are his partisans, and probably the fourth (Grishin) as well. Thus, Brezhnev's influence now appears to be preeminent in the Politburo.

It should be mentioned that on previous occasions when the Politburo has had more than 12 members —in 1952 and 1957—this state of affairs set the stage for a purge. Stalin's death in early 1953 prevented the fruition of the one that looked to be in the works at that time, but one did ensue not long after the enlargement of the Politburo in 1957. The removal of four of the re-elected members of the present Politburo in the months ahead would restore the Politburo to its customary size (11) and make the ratio of new members to old ones four to seven—about the same as in the current Central Committee.

[6] *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

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In announcing its decisions to the Congress, the Central Committee also violated precedent by listing the re-election of Brezhnev as General Secretary of the Central Committee before specifying the composition of the new Politburo. This ordering implied that the General Secretary, whose office had become statutory for the first time in 1966 (though Stalin had carried the title for several decades), was superior to the Politburo, which has been the *de facto* ruler since 1964. Significantly, Brezhnev's report to the Congress did not speak of the Politburo as "the supreme political body of our party" as had his report to the 23rd Congress in 1966.[7] His 1971 report referred only once to the Politburo, and in that instance, it imparted that the Politburo and the Secretariat hold regular meetings [*zasedaniia*] once a week. In coupling the Politburo with the Secretariat, Brezhnev tended to diminish the Politburo's importance as the organ of collective leadership.

This method of denigrating the Politburo, it should be underscored, was not novel. In 1968, for example, an authoritative work on party affairs prepared under Brezhnev's general aegis had implied the Secretariat's equality with the Politburo in treating of "the highest leading organs of the Party":

The Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by the Political Bureau and the Secretariat, is the theoretical, political and organizational headquarters of the Party. . . . The Politburo and the Secretariat adopt many decisions of the CC in its name.[8]

Khrushchev, be it noted, had employed the same tactic against the oligarchy in his rise to power.[9]

Some Implications

The course of the Khrushchev succession to date, since it resembles the Lenin and Stalin successions so closely, might be thought to afford no surprises. Yet this very correspondence has run counter to the expectations of a number of serious observers who questioned whether, in the changed circumstances in which the Soviet leadership now operates, one man could concentrate authority in his own hands. They did not suppose that the USSR would become democratic, but they did believe that it would be ruled by a stable oligarchy or collective leadership. They felt that such a development had been facilitated by the evolution of Soviet society, which was no longer the relatively inert mass that it had been in the years after the October Revolution and again after the trauma of Stalin's several revolutions from above. In short, Soviet society's increasing differentiation—with middle strata made up of the technical intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, the managers, and the creative intellectuals—would effectively counter the tendency for power to concentrate in the hands of a single leader.[10]

This factor does make unlikely the emergence of a new autocrat like Stalin, before whom each individual, group, and stratum of society stood naked as before the elements. It does not, however, provide much in the way of confirmation of the proposition that under present Soviet conditions oligarchy (which presumably enjoys at least the qualified favor of most of these new strata) is more stable than limited personal rule (which, one takes it, is opposed by the same strata). Indeed, what limited evidence there is to be gleaned from the Soviet leadership struggles since 1964 suggests that societal support for either oligarchy or limited personal leadership makes little difference one way or another. In this connection, the outside observer is struck by the efficiency with which the Khrushchev succession crisis has been insulated from public scrutiny and concern. Unlike other, more open political processes in the Soviet Union, this most important struggle for power has been virtually closed to anyone outside the inner circle; and its perturbations have been even less manifest than those of the Stalin succession. Soviet society is no longer inert, but its impact on the Khrushchev succession hardly sustains the view that the structure of Soviet politics must inevitably accommodate to it.

No doubt Brezhnev, in arrogating to himself such a high degree of personal power, has found it necessary to appeal to particular institutions and to broad social groups. The shift in economic priorities to satisfy consumer demand reflects in part this impera-

[7] *Ibid.*, and *Pravda*, March 31, 1971. While Brezhnev observed in 1971 that local party committees "operate as organs of collective leadership," he did not say this explicitly of the Politburo. Despite the oligarchical character of the leadership, incidentally, there was little stress on collective leadership in speeches before or at the 24th Congress.

[8] D. Bakhshiev, *Marksistko-leninskie osnovy stroitelstva i deiatelnosti* KPSS (Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the Construction and Activity of the CPSU), Moscow, 1968, p. 119.

[9] For instance, Bakhshiev performed the identical service for Khrushchev in 1954 that he did for Brezhnev in 1968. See Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev*, Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1958, pp. 33-34.

[10] See, for example, T. H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership: Towards a Self-Stabilizing Oligarchy?," *Soviet Studies*, October, 1970; and Jerome M. Gilison, "New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership," *World Politics*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, 1967.

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tive. Nevertheless, the party apparatus had once again proved to be the sovereign institution, just as it did in the 1920's when it carried Stalin to power and in the 1950's when it served as Krushchev's chosen vehicle. The men of the party apparatus, whether currently active in it or recently transferred to government positions, retain the virtual monopoly on serious politics that Khrushchev conferred upon them. Only a career in the party apparatus gives an ambitious young man grounds for confidence that if he is able and hardworking, he may rise into the top leadership.

Major functional groups and the institutions in which they are represented have succeeded in winning significant concessions from the party, including a measure of independence, during the Khrushchev succession. But they have once again failed to forge the kind of political alliance that could deprive the party apparatus of decisive control. It is difficult not to be impressed by the *apparat's* staying power. Up to now, the only force that has succeeded in bringing it to its knees has been the secret police under the command of Stalin, and this is a threat which the *apparat* no longer has to fear. Where then, if anywhere, may challenges to the *apparat's* hegemony arise?

Two potential threats are worth noting. One is an economic crisis so severe that it compels recognition of the need for a new system of administrative controls over industrial enterprises. It is true, as some Western observers agrue,[11] that the *apparat* performs important economic functions in the Soviet system; but this fact does not assure its continued hegemony. On the other hand, the *apparat's* relative inefficiency in performing those functions does not necessarily place it in jeopardy. So long as the economy functions well enough to furnish the resources needed for priority objectives, the *apparat* may not be subject to serious challenge by other groups or institutions. Here, as in some other tight situations, sufficiency, rather than superiority, may be all that is required. Yet, as the list of priority objectives grows to include a substantial measure of satisfaction of consumer demand, what is needed for sufficiency may yet prove more than the *apparat* can provide.

Perhaps the greater potential threat to the *apparat's* supremacy in the near future lies in the possibility that Brezhnev's drive for personal power might falter and there might be a return to genuine collective leadership. Collective leadership facilitates the efforts of other institutions to increase their independence of the *apparat* because the competing leaders and factions need outside support in the struggle to maintain and increase their power. By contrast, the rise of the limited personal ruler has tended to advance the fortunes of the *apparat* (while absolute personal rule requires the subordination of the *apparat).*[12] In recent years, the *apparat's* preeminence at the time of Khrushchev's fall has facilitated Brezhnev's acquisition of growing authority, and he in turn has helped the apparat to combat the attempts of other institutions to win greater autonomy.

Brezhnev's Prospects

Therefore, the *apparat's* immediate prospects would appear to depend heavily on Brezhnev's chances of consolidating his position. One can obviously not dismiss out of hand the possibility that he might fail to do so, for accomplishing such an end will by no means be a simple matter. He will, above all, have to purge the Politburo of his rivals. At present, he seems to possess sufficient control over the new 15-man Politburo to keep it from acting against his wishes in most instances, but so long as his opponents remain in the body, they may prevent the adoption of major measures he favors, may deprive his existing programs of the resources needed for success, or may even on occasion bring about policy decisions of which he disapproves. They may also endanger his primacy by capitalizing on crises to attack his vulnerable points. Yet the evidence suggests that there is a compact whereby members of the Politburo retain their positions as long as they do not employ proscribed means in the leadership struggle.[13] Hence, Brezhnev may have to resort to provocations to get his rivals to violate that agreement.

Efforts to oust his opponents from the Politburo through subtle provocation or simply through strong actions against them will entail major risks for Brezhnev. While Stalin carried off the feat in 1927 and Khrushchev did the same in 1957, these prece-

[11] See, for example, Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

[12] Actually, the *apparat's* clearest ascendancy has been during the period when the personal ruler has been engaged in augmenting his power; once he has secured his position, he has tended to balance the *apparat's* power and that of other institutions.

[13] See Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, pp. 31-32, 235-36. Since 1967, this compact may have been extended to cover the Secretariat as well.

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dents do not assure Brezhnev of success. He might wind up alarming those members of the Politburo not fully in his corner and thus might face an adverse vote in that body. The outcome of an appeal to the Central Committee would hinge upon just how much support he had managed to build up in institutions other than the party *apparat* by that time. If Brezhnev launches an attack on his rivals and fails to dislodge them, a new leadership crisis will almost assuredly ensue, and the victorious faction will doubtless seek to restore the Politburo's supremacy over the Secretariat and to prevent the rise of a personal ruler.

Nonetheless, the odds are strong that Brezhnev will succeed in firming up his position. To minimize the risks involved in trying to reshape the Politburo, he might move against only those leaders who are most likely to oppose him and who are most vulnerable to an assault. These probably would be Podgorny, Shelepin, P. Ye. Shelest, and G. I. Voronov.

Without doubt Brezhnev also aspires to Aleksei Kosygin's post as head of government, for it would give him direct control over the economic ministries, as well as the constitutional authority needed to deal effectively with world statesmen. But he could obtain it without eliminating Kosygin from the Politburo—by "promoting" Kosygin to Podgorny's largely honorific position as head of state (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). Here, it is true, Brezhnev confronts a key obstacle, for since 1964 "collective leadership" has been taken to mean that no single leader may simultaneously head the party and the government. Still, the obstacle is hardly an insuperable one.

What really renders Brezhnev's chances of success highly favorable, however, is the potential of the office of General Secretary as a base for achieving preeminent personal authority. Lenin discovered this potential to his amazement ("Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated enormous power in his hands" [14]), and Khrushchev demonstrated it a second time. Why, knowing it, Brezhnev's fellow oligarchs have not been able to stop him from subverting their power remains a bit of a mystery. But unless they can devise means of limiting the power of the General Secretary so that it does not greatly exceed that of the rest of the oligarchy, Brezhnev will continue to bolster his dominance of the Politburo; moreover, he will probably, in accordance with general precedence, use his supremacy to maintain the party *apparat's* hegemony. Men of the *apparat* are well aware of this likelihood—which goes part way to account for Brezhnev's pronounced ability to accumulate personal power during recent years.

[14] Lenin's "Testament" (note dictated on December 25, 1922), published in *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1956, pp. 16-17.

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The Dilemma of Party Growth

By Darrell P. Hammer

The concluding resolution of the 24th Congress of the CPSU fills two full pages of *Pravda* and covers the whole spectrum of foreign policy, economic policy, and internal party affairs. But the average party member is likely to be most interested in one specific matter covered by the resolution—namely, the decision that all Soviet Communists must turn in their party cards and apply for new ones. This decision lays the groundwork for an administrative purge of the party membership. Interestingly enough, the regime that came to power with the death of Stalin began its rule with much the same action in May 1953,[1] and the purge that followed caused the total party membership to drop by half of one percent. The decline, however, was short-lived and marked the last time that the CPSU experienced a drop in membership.

Rapid growth in the numerical strength of the party was, indeed, one of the most important—if least remembered—features of the Khrushchev era, the membership increasing by more than 70 percent between 1954 and 1964, the longest period of sustained growth in the party's history (see Table 1). This growth had far-reaching consequences for the character of the party, and it therefore seems appropriate to look at those consequences more closely and to explore the significance of the 24th Congress decision as a clue to a possible shift of policy on the part of the present CPSU leadership regarding future expansion of the party.

[1] On the May 1953 decree, see *Partiinoe stroitelstvo—uchebnoe posobie* (Party Building—A Textbook), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 244.

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The Effects of Growth

To begin with, the rapid growth in membership during the Khrushchev years brought with it a change in the social composition of the party, because the highest levels of growth occurred in those sections of Soviet society which had been most poorly represented in the party before 1953—*i.e.*, among the workers, minority nationalities, and technically-trained people. Table 2 shows the increase in the number of workers in the party during the Khrushchev era. Comparable data on nationality representation are lacking for the period before 1961 but are available for the period from mid-1961 until 1964 (see Table 3). The figures reveal significant increases among the smaller nationalities, especially those from the western regions of the USSR: in percentage terms, the number of Moldavians in the party increased by 50.9 percent; of Lithuanians, by 43.7 percent; of Estonians, by 39 percent; and of Belorussians, by 34.5 percent. The Uzbeks of Central Asia also showed a sizable increase of 35.7 percent.[2] Overall, the CPSU grew by only 22 percent during this same period of time. All these nationalities remain, even today, underrepresented in the party on the basis of their total numbers, but the rapid increase in their representation could portend significant changes in the future.

[2] Except where otherwise noted, the statistics presented here are taken from *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 1, 1962, and No. 10, 1965; and from *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 15, 1967.

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Parallel with the shifts in the composition of the party, there was also a rise in the educational level of party members under Khrushchev. In 1956, only 800,000 members had a complete higher education; by 1965, this figure had grown to 1.76 million. This was an increase of more than 100 percent over a period during which the CPSU as a whole grew by only about 60 percent.

The CPSU has never aspired to be a mass party. But as T. H. Rigby has pointed out, ever since it came to power there have been pressures to open its ranks to new members.[3] As a matter of deliberate policy, the party has tried to attract the "best people" from all walks of life, so that all parts of Soviet society would be represented—or perhaps so that the party would be represented all through the society. Of course, the party has remained predominantly an organization of bureaucrats and managers, with a strong (and doubtless influential) minority of military professionals. But the great influx of workers, well-educated people, and individuals from the national minorities during the Khrushchev years meant that when L. I. Brezhnev took over as First Secretary in 1964, he found himself at the head of a party which was not merely larger but significantly different from what it had been in 1953.

The very fact that the party, as of 1964, was in a period of strong and sustained growth also changed its character. Overall since 1917, the party's growth curve had been highly erratic, but the long-range trend was one of almost exponential growth, at an annual rate of about 6.5 percent. This trend, moreover, became more pronounced after 1954—which is to say that the curve became smoother and continued to climb steadily upward. The party had obviously come a long way from Lenin's original conception of a small and disciplined group of professional revolutionaries. It still aspires to be the "militant vanguard" or the "more advanced and politically conscious" part of Soviet society,[4] but if the party is to be the vanguard of the working class,

[3] *Communist Party Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 510 ff.

[4] From the definition in the CPSU Statute (*ustav*).

Table 1: Party Membership Since World War II

	Full Members	Candidate Members	Total	Rate of Growth (%)
1945	3,965,530	1,794,839	5,760,369	17.1
1946	4,127,689	1,383,173	5,510,862	— 4.3
1947	4,774,886	1,277,015	6,051,901	9.8
1948	5,181,199	1,209,082	6,390,281	5.6
1949	5,334,811	1,017,761	6,352,572	— 0.6
1950	5,510,787	829,396	6,340,183	— 0.2
1951	5,658,577	804,398	6,462,975	1.9
1952	5,853,200	854,339	6,707,539	3.8
1953	6,067,027	830,197	6,897,224	2.8
1954	6,402,284	462,579	6,864,863	— 0.5
1955	6,610,238	346,867	6,957,105	1.3
1956	6,767,644	405,877	7,173,521	3.1
1957	7,001,114	493,459	7,494,573	4.5
1958	7,296,559	546,637	7,843,196	4.7
1959	7,622,356	616,775	8,239,131	5.0
1960	8,017,249	691,418	8,708,667	5.7
1961	8,472,396	803,430	9,275,826	6.5
1962	9,051,934	839,134	9,891,068	6.6
1963	9,581,149	806,047	10,387,196	5.0
1964	10,182,916	839,453	11,022,369	6.1
1965	10,811,443	946,726	11,758,169	6.7
1966	11,548,287	809,021	12,357,308	5.1
1967	12,135,103	549,030	12,684,133	2.6
1968	12,484,836	695,389	13,180,225	3.9
1969	12,958,303	681,588	13,639,891	3.5
1970	13,395,253	616,531	14,011,784	2.7
1971	13,810,089	645,232	14,455,321	3.1

SOURCES: Partiinoe stroitelstvo—uchebnoe posobie (Party Building—A Textbook) Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 54; *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, 1971, p 73..

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

SOURCES: Based on party membership data from 1917 to 1969 contained in *Partiinoe stroitelstvo—uchebnoe posobie* (Party Building—A Textbook), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp. 53-54; and Brezhnev's report to the 24th Congress, *Pravda*, March 31, 1971.

then, as Lenin wrote in 1904, it must not be confused with the working class itself.[5] There must be some distance between the party and the class, and perhaps a certain *mystique* about the party membership itself. But if the recent trend of growth continues, then this concept of the party will certainly be jeopardized. Sustained growth can have a snowball effect. Unchecked growth could undermine the party's self-image as a highly selective organization and could raise undesirable expectations of open recruitment throughout Soviet society.

In view of the party's past history, it is somewhat surprising that the membership curve continues to rise after 1965, even if at a diminished rate. Hitherto periods of growth had always been followed by periods of retrenchment. As the accompanying graph shows, there have been three such periods of retrenchment over the past 50 years: 1) the early years of the NEP; 2) the period of the great purges of the mid-1930's; and 3) a brief period after the end of World War II. As of 1965, there had been a decade of unusually precipitous growth, and the logic of history would have suggested the likelihood of a new retrenchment via a purge of the membership. It is noteworthy that a recent Soviet textbook on party organization hints that periodic purges[6] are a normal phenomenon. In listing the factors which determine the size of the party, this source gives first place to recruitment policy, placing it ahead of other "objective" factors.[7]

Shift in Policy

The present regime did, in fact, begin an attempt in 1965 to reverse or slow down the party growth of the Khrushchev period. In that year, the Kharkov regional party organization was sharply criticized in a Central Committee decree for pursuing a too-liberal recruitment policy. The decree flatly stated that "growth in numbers is not an end in itself." [8] This was clearly intended as a warning to other party organizations as well, and the warning has since been periodically repeated.[9]

The decisions announced at the 23rd CPSU Congress of March-April 1966 definitely confirmed that there had been a fundamental change in recruitment policy. Amendments to the party Statute approved by the Congress not only made it more difficult for new members to get into the CPSU but at the same time made it easier for party organizations to expel their members, by laying down a broad legal basis for expulsion. The latter amendment provided that this "supreme penalty" (*vysshaia mera partiinovo nakazaniia*) would be applicable to members who violated the party Program or Statute or "who compromise, by their conduct, the lofty title of Communist." [10]

[5] *Shag vpered, dva shaga nazad* (One Step Forward, Two Steps Back), republished in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., Vol. 8, Moscow, Politizdat, p. 244.

[6] It should be pointed out that in its original meaning a "purge" (*chistka*) was simply a "cleansing." The word was used in the sense of weeding out undesirable elements and did not have the connotation of mass terror. Lenin used the term in this sense (see his "O chistke partii" [On Cleansing the Party], in *ibid.*, Vol. 44, p. 122).

[7] *Partiinoe stroitelstvo* (*cit. supra*) cites the following factors (p. 53): 1) recruitment policy; 2) level of development of the working class; 3) the party's ties with the masses; 4) domestic and foreign situation; and 5) the objectives pursued by the party at a particular moment.

[8] Central Committee decree of July 20, 1965, "O serioznykh nedostatkakh v rabote kharkovskoi oblastnoi partiinoi organizatsii po priemu v partiiu i vospitaniiu molodykh komrnunistov" (On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Kharkov Regional Party Organization in Party Recruitment and Education of Young Communists), in *Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1966, p. 383.

[9] See, *e.g.*, *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 17, 1965, p. 6; No. 17, 1969, p. 4; No. 17, 1970, p. 6. (All these issues appeared in September, coinciding with the annual election meetings of primary party organizations.)

[10] Resolution of the 23rd Party Congress on partial changes in the CPSU Statute, in *XXIII sezd KPSS*, Vol. III, Moscow, Politizdat, pp. 318-19.

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These measures had the effect of reducing the annual growth rate from about five percent under the Khrushchev regime to about three percent at the present time. To put it another way, if the recruitment policies and associated growth level of the Khrushchev period had been sustained after 1964, the CPSU today would be larger by about 1.3 million members. Brezhnev voiced explicit satisfaction with the reduced rate of membership growth when he stated in his report to the 24th Congress on March 30, 1971:

It must be noted that party organizations have begun to pay greater attention to admissions to the party and have been more exacting toward those who would enter its ranks. As a result the number of persons recruited into the CPSU has been somewhat reduced. While, during the period between the 22nd and 23rd Congresses, an average of 760,000 persons were admitted each year as candidate members, during the period between the 23rd and 24th Congresses the average has been 600,000.

In this connection it should be emphasized once again that the most important concern of the party must continue to be a qualitative improvement in membership. An excessive enthusiasm for the admission of new members and lack of care in this matter, which unfortunately are still encountered in some organizations, are in violation of the Leninist principles of party organization. We must exercise a regulatory influence on the growth of the party's ranks and fill these ranks on the basis of individual selection of the best representatives of the working class, the collective-farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia. . . . The party cleanses [ochishchaet] *its ranks of persons who violate the Program and the Statute of the CPSU. It must be said that party organizations drew the correct conclusions from the instructions of the 23rd Congress and have been more resolute in freeing themselves from those who violate party and state discipline and abuse their authority, or who by their conduct bring shame on the title of Communist. . . . Concern about the purity of the party's ranks is the duty of all party organizations and of every Communist. (Applause)*[11]

It was clear, however, that Brezhnev was not entirely satisfied with the results achieved in the last five years. His report showed some concern about the state of the party, and his words could be interpreted as calling for more expulsions, although he gave no details on this subject. In fact, his only specific reference to it came in a rather odd statement in his concluding speech to the Congress on April 9, when he reported that a number of expelled members had applied for readmission. This statement was reported in a Moscow Radio domestic broadcast the same day but was deleted from the text of the speech as reported in *Pravda* on April 10.

By way of background, it should be noted here that the number of expulsions of party members increased significantly between 1964 and 1966, though it fell somewhat in 1967 (see Table 4). The party did, however, maintain careful control over the expulsion process. The decision of a primary organization to expel a member is not final until reviewed by a local (city or district) party committee. In the first two years after the 23rd Congress, these local committees reversed the decision in 12 percent of the cases of expulsion. Moreover, even after this automatic review by the local committee, the excluded party member can appeal to higher levels. In 1967, about six percent of all expulsions were reversed through this appeal process.[12]

It is in the light of the recent history of party

[11] *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1971, p. 73.
[12] *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 7, 1967, p. 8; and No. 7, 1968, p. 27.

Table 2: Social Composition of the CPSU

	1957	1964	1971	Average annual rate of increase 1957-64	1964-71
Workers	2,398,263 (32.0%)	4,111,344 (37.3%)	5,796,584 (40.1%)	10.2%	5.9%
Peasants	1,296,561 (17.3)	1,818,691 (16.5)	2,182,753 (15.1)	5.8	2.9
White-collar and others	3,799,749 (50.7)	5,092,334 (46.2)	6,475,984 (44.8)	4.9	3.9
Total CPSU	7,494,573	11,022,369	14,455,321	6.7%	4.5%

SOURCES: *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 10, 1965, p. 11; *Kommunist*, No. 15, 1967, p. 95; *Pravda* (Moscow), March 31, 1971.

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growth that we must consider the significance of the decision announced at the 24th Congress to re-register party members. Brezhnev proposed this action in a rather offhand way toward the end of his main Congress report. Although the Congress then devoted five full days to a discussion of the report, only two speakers referred again to the proposed exchange of party cards,[13] but the final Congress resolution authorized the measure.[14] The resolution, like Brezhnev's speech, used language which may have been drawn from a party document of 1935:[15] the exchange was not to be just an administrative procedure but an "important organizational-political measure" whose purpose is to "aid in further strengthening" the ranks of the party.

Does all this presage another purge in the CPSU?

Certainly an *administrative* purge will be effected through the reregistration of party members, and very possibly admissions of new members will be suspended until this process has been completed. In the past, such an exchange of membership documents has almost always meant a net reduction in the size of the party. (The only apparent exception was the exchange of 1927, when the party continued to grow but at a low rate.) Consequently we may well see a slight decline in the size of the party over the next year.

On the other hand, there is no sign that the party is preparing to carry out a massive purge like those of the 1930's. The timing of the reregistration has been under consideration for some time,[16] and in 1968 an authoritative article in *Partiinaia zhizn* sought to quiet fears of an extensive purge. The article pointed out that the 18th Congress had rejected the method of mass purges and that the party's ranks could be kept wholesome through self-purges (*samoochishcheniia*) within the primary organizations.[17]

The real problem which now faces the party leadership is not so much how far to carry the impending administrative cleansing of the membership ranks as it is what recruitment policy to follow after the purge is over. No purge in the past has succeeded in slowing down the rate of growth for more than a temporary period, and it will certainly require more than the reregistration of members to reverse the long-range growth trend. Even if the new purge

[13] These speakers were N. I. Maslennikov and A. V. Georgiev, party first secretaries of the Gorkii oblast and Altai krai, respectively (see *Pravda*, April 1 and 4, 1971).

[14] *Pravda*, April 10, 1971.

[15] Central Committee resolution of December 25, 1935, "Itogi proverki partiinykh dokumentov" (Results of the Screening of Party Documents), in *VKP(b) v rezoliutsiiakh*, 6th ed., Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1941, Vol. II, p. 637.

[16] It should be pointed out that reregistration is dictated, in part, by very practical considerations. The party documents issued in 1954 were intended to expire in 1969 or 1970 as there would be no more space left in them after that time for recording payments of dues. In 1968 extra pages were issued which would extend the documents for an additional four years (see *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 20, 1968, p. 10), but the documents would in any case have to be turned in sooner or later for new ones.

[17] A. Kravchenko, "Leninskie printsipy chlenstva v partii" (Leninist Principles of Party Membership), *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 24, 1968, pp. 25-26.

Table 3: Nationalities in the Party
(in thousands)

	1961	1964	1969	Average annual rate of increase 1961-64	1964-69
Russians	6,116.7	7,335.2	8,389.9	5.7%	3.6%
Ukrainians	1,412.2	1,813.4	2,154.3	8.1	4.7
Belorussians	287.0	386.0	464.4	9.9	5.1
Uzbeks	142.7	193.6	245.4	10.2	6.7
Kazakhs	149.2	181.3	219.6	6.1	5.3
Georgians	170.4	194.3	224.6	4.0	3.9
Azerbaidzhani	106.1	141.9	181.2	9.6	6.9
Lithuanians	42.8	61.5	80.7	12.5	7.8
Moldavians	26.7	40.3	51.6	14.6	7.0
Latvians	33.9	44.3	54.8	8.8	5.9
Kirgizians	27.3	35.0	41.6	8.1	4.7
Tadzhiks	32.7	41.9	51.2	8.0	5.5
Armenians	161.2	187.9	211.9	4.7	3.2
Turkmen	27.3	32.4	39.0	5.3	5.1
Estonians	24.4	33.9	41.2	11.1	5.4

SOURCES: *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 1, 1962, p. 49, and No. 10, 1965, p. 12; *Partiinoe stroitelstvo* . . . (see Table 1 sources), p. 65.

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Table 4: Party Expulsions and Withdrawals, 1962-67

	Expulsions		Withdrawals		Expulsions & Withdrawals	
	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate
1962	31,370	3.17	13,614	1.38	44,984	4.55
1963	34,045	3.28	14,422	1.39	48,467	4.67
1964	30,763	2.79	15,877	1.44	46,640	4.23
1965	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
1966	62,868	5.08	17,244	1.40	80,112	6.48
1967	53,226	4.20	12,038	0.95	65,264	5.15

NOTE: "Expulsions" includes both candidates and full members expelled from their party organizations. "Withdrawals" includes those dropped from the rolls as having "lost contact" with the party. The withdrawal data given here do not include candidates who have been dropped because they failed to advance to full membership. The rate is calculated per 1000 party members.
SOURCE: Partiinaia zhizn, No. 10, 1965, p. 10; No. 7, 1967, p. 8; and No. 7, 1968, p. 27.

were to reduce the size of the CPSU by one percent (which would be double the reduction of 1953), moreover, the party would still have more than 14 million members. Thus, the real question remains: How large can the CPSU grow and still continue to be a Leninist party? The present three-percent growth rate is by no means insignificant and is considerably larger than the projected growth rate for the population as a whole. *If the trends of the past five years are projected into the future, the party will within a decade have more than 20 million members, and a majority of the membership will be workers.*

The Party's Dilemma

A projection like this must raise in the minds of the CPSU leadership the specter of Czechoslovakia. Before 1968 the Czechoslovak Communist Party had become (in proportion to population) the largest Communist party in the world, a distinction which it achieved by recruiting large numbers of workers as well as Slovaks. In the Soviet view, the CPCS expanded beyond its ability to educate its new members, and the end result was the unhealthy trend of events of early 1968. But, for Moscow, Czechoslovakia is not the only model of what is to be avoided. The Soviet leaders are just as anxious to avoid the experience of the Chinese party in Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Two theoretical articles on the role of the party, published in the wake of the Czech crisis, displayed just as much concern about Chinese Communist policy, as about the Czechoslovak or Yugoslav deviations.[18] It is perhaps partly because of Czechoslovakia that we no longer hear any talk from Moscow about a "party of the whole people," and because of China that we are unlikely to hear any talk of a "purge" as the Soviet party prepares to reregister its membership.

In any event, it is clear that the present Soviet party leadership has tried to slow down the party's growth rate of the Khrushchev era and that it has been only partially successful in this effort. The leadership has at its disposal several administrative methods for controlling the influx of new members—such as changing the rules, visibly raising admission standards, and calling in membership cards. But the history of the past fifty years suggests that growth in party membership is a dynamic process which is not entirely within the party leaders' own control. They could conceivably reverse the process for a time by resorting to a massive purge. Not only, however, would this carry with it great political risks, but in all probability it would achieve only a short-term decline which might well be followed by a new spurt in membership. The aim of the leadership is very probably limited to bringing the growth rate down to a more acceptable level, perhaps between one and two percent per year (which, measured in proportion to the population, would be nearly a zero level of growth). But even to do this successfully over an indefinite period of time will require great administrative finesse. It may also require tighter control over the territorial apparatus of the party, which has operational responsibility for recruitment. In any case, it is far from certain that the CPSU organization has the power and flexibility to accomplish this apparent aim.

[18] V. Stepanov, "V. I. Lenin o rukovodiashchei roli partii v kommunisticheskom stroitelstve" (V. I. Lenin on the Leading Role of the Party in Building Communism), *ibid.*, No. 18, 1968, pp. 111-23; and N. Lomakin, *"O rukovodiashchei roli kommunisticheskoi partii v* stroitelstve sotsializma" (On the Leading Role of the Communist Party in Building Socialism), *Pravda,* Sept. 19, 1968.

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Interparty Relations: Limits of "Normalization"

By Kevin Devlin

Summing up his impressions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Giuseppe Boffa, of the Italian Communist Party, spoke of "an effort at continuity and stability." [1] On the level of Soviet domestic affairs, the description is apt. On the level of interparty relations, one might convey much the same general impression by using a term fraught with recent historical significance: this was a congress of "normalization"—at least in intention. But intention is one thing, and achievement another. It is quite clear after the 24th Congress that what normalization was achieved still falls well short of the hopes of the Soviet leadership.

To reach this conclusion, one must examine the Congress and its background more closely, for a casual survey would offer considerable evidence to support the triumphal claims of Soviet publicists. Take, for example, the attendance figures. A total of 101 foreign delegations from 90 countries were present at the 24th Congress, compared with 88 at the 23rd Congress in 1966 and 83 at the 22nd Congress in 1961. The increase seems impressive—until one notes that it is almost entirely accounted for by a greater number of *non-Communist* delegations: 22 of them this time, as against 12 at the 23rd Congress and only three at Khrushchev's 22nd Congress.[2]

As far as Communist party delegations are concerned, Nikolai Podgorny listed 72 of them in his opening address, and the late arrival of Paul Verges, representing the Communist party of the small French island of Reunion, near Madagascar, would presumably have brought the figure to 73, or one less than the total number of delegations at the 1969 Moscow conference of Communist parties. In addition, however, six participating delegations were left unidentified, and it seems probable that all of these were Communist. One can even venture a tentative identification of five of them—namely, the Communist parties of Nepal,[3] Morocco,[4] Algeria, Nigeria, and Lesotho—based on the fact that the first four were all represented at the 23rd Congress in 1966, and the last four at the 1969 Moscow conference. If this surmise is accurate, the number of foreign Communist delegations attending the Congress would have been 78 or 79, out of a total of about 90 "official" Communist parties (that is, not counting secessionist parties).[5]

[1] "Temi e prospettive del XXIV congresso," *Rinascita* (Rome), April 9, 1971.

[2] See Christian Duevel, "Balance Sheet of Foreign Parties Attending 24th CPSU Congress," Radio Liberty *Research Report*, March 31, 1971.

[3] Brezhnev mentioned the presence of a Nepalese delegation in his address of welcome to the 23rd Congress, although it was curiously omitted from *Pravda*'s list of foreign delegations.

[4] The Algerian CP was involved in a significant incident at the 23rd Congress. The delegation of the ruling Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front) walked out and returned home when they learned that a delegation of Algerian Communists—representing a party which had been formally dissolved at Khrushchev's behest in 1964—had also been invited. In 1969 the Algerian CP reappeared under the title of the Socialist Vanguard Party and took part in the 1969 Moscow conference. The FLN, though presumably invited to the 24th Congress, did not attend, while the Algerian Communists, though not identified, were presumably present.

[5] No "official" list of the world's Communist parties has been published for many years, and it would now be impossible to reach agreement on a complete list, if only because of the many secessionist parties recognized by the Chinese. Moreover, without the old Comintern system for admitting new parties, one must wait for a Moscow congress or conference to find out whether the CPSU recognizes, for example, the Nigerian Socialist Workers' and Farmers'

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That seems an impressive representation, but if one sets it against the background of Soviet aspirations and efforts, it is not so imposing after all, being little, if at all, above the levels reached at the 23rd Congress and the 1969 Moscow conference. In any case, what matters more is not how many parties were absent, but which parties they were.

The Absentees

It was of course a foregone conclusion that two of the fourteen ruling parties, China and Albania, would boycott the Congress. Desultory moves toward a *modus vivendi* on the interstate level had done nothing to reduce the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the ideological, interparty level—a fact which was underscored on the eve of the Congress by a fresh outbreak of polemics evoked by the centenary of the Paris Commune.[6] Indeed, one cannot assume that the Chinese were even invited to the Congress. As the proceedings began, one reputable Western correspondent reported that the story most widely circulated in Moscow was that the Soviets, having conducted discreet soundings, had decided against inviting the Chinese in order to avoid the certain humiliation of a refusal;[7] and it does seem probable that if the Chinese had received an invitation and refused it, they would have issued a public justification of their action. As it was, they contemptuously ignored the Congress.

The Albanians, on the other hand, had plenty to say about the Congress—indeed, from the Soviet viewpoint, far too much. The first of two major attacks came a few days before the opening, when the Albanian party organ *Zeri i Popullit* (March 25, 1971) harshly denounced what it termed "a revisionist congress for revisionist ends." The second salvo followed the Congress, in the form of a two-page editorial tantamount to a bitterly intransigent rejection of Brezhnev's *pro forma* expression of readiness (in his Congress report) to reestablish normal relations with Albania. The Soviet leader's verbal overtures to both Tirana and Peking were scornfully dismissed as "hypocritical, shallow and demagogical" and as "devilish maneuvers" which would be of no avail against the revolutionary vigilance of the Albanians. Brezhnev himself was branded as an arrogant "renegade," and the 24th Congress was said to have revealed the bankruptcy of his leadership.[8] The future, declared the editorial, belonged not to the Soviets and their followers, but to "the new Marxist-Leninist parties" which Brezhnev had slandered.

The absence at the Congress of the militantly pro-Chinese New Zealand CP was as much a foregone conclusion as that of the Albanians and Chinese. Nevertheless, a delegation from New Zealand *did* attend, and thereby hangs a tale, the significance of which seems to have been ignored in journalistic comments on the Congress. The point is that the delegation was not from the "official" Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) led by Vic Wilcox, but from the Socialist Unity Party (SUP) led by George Jackson. The SUP had been formed in early February 1966 by defectors from the CPNZ—a rare example of Soviet-encouraged secession from a recognized Communist party which had gone over to Peking. The CPSU, however, deemed it inexpedient to grant immediate recognition to the new pro-Soviet party it had fostered, as was demonstrated a few weeks after the SUP's formation when the CPSU formally invited the CPNZ (and not the SUP) to send a delegation to the 23rd Congress—an invitation which the CPNZ promptly declined. From late 1966 on, the CPSU and other European Com-

Party or the Congolese (Brazzaville) Party of Labor as Communist (yes in the first case; no in the second). It was only participation in the 1969 Moscow conference which revealed that Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party of Guyana (or at least his own leadership) had graduated to "Marxist-Leninist" status after years of fellow-traveling. A report in the Italian Communist youth organ *Vie Nuove* of April 7, 1971, gave a total of 89 Communist parties. This figure was, however, clearly based on the Leninist principle of one party for each country, whereas many countries now have two rival Communist parties, India and Brazil have three, and the Dominican Republic has a good half-dozen.

[6] The polemics began with a Soviet radio broadcast in Mandarin on March 12 claiming that the Bolsheviks had been the first to profit from the legacy of the Paris Commune in carrying out the October Revolution, overthrowing bourgeois bureaucracy, and building a socialist society. On the other hand, the broadcast called Communist China's claim to be applying the experience of the Paris Commune "an insult to the fighters of 1871" and asserted that the Peking regime, by openly violating the "basic democratic rights and freedom of the people," is actually "destroying what was gained and defended by the Paris Commune." This attack evoked a sharp reply from Peking in the form of a lengthy editorial published simultaneously in *Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung Ch'i,* and *Chieh-fang Chun Pao* on March 17. Accusing the Soviets of "talking glibly" of their "loyalty to the principles of the Paris Commune," the editorial charged that the "Soviet state founded by Lenin and defended by Stalin has changed its political color" under the leadership of "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique," which has "turned the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and put social-imperialism and social fascism into force."

[7] Alain Jacob in *Le Monde* (Paris), March 31, 1971.

[8] "Congress of Capitalist Restoration and of Social-Imperialism," *ibid.*, April 17, 1971. See also Radio Free Europe *Research Paper* No. 0988, "Tirana's Latest Unequivocal 'No' to Moscow," April 27, 1971.

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munist parties developed ties with the SUP in a number of ways short of formal recognition of the latter as the official Communist party of New Zealand.[9] Yet the Soviets still felt unable to invite the SUP to the Moscow conference of 1969 and had to "waste" the New Zealand invitation on the intransigent CPNZ.

A party congress is, of course, a different matter, and it was not surprising that the CPSU invited the SUP to send delegates (Secretary Jackson and Chairman Drennan) to the 24th Congress. What *was* surprising, however, was the status accorded to them. In his opening address, Podgorny placed the SUP delegation not in the second part of his list, embracing the representatives of national-democratic and left-socialist parties, but in the first part reserved for the delegates of officially-recognized Communist parties. This meant, in effect, that the Soviet leaders for the first time accorded full fraternal recognition to what they themselves, in other contexts, would call an "anti-party group"—an action which raises interparty issues of a seriousness altogether out of proportion to the political weight of the minuscule New Zealand party.

The other absentees at the 24th Congress can be dealt with more briefly. Nobody, of course, could have expected the pro-Chinese parties of Southeast Asia (the Thai, Burmese and Malaysian CPs) to attend, but it may be worth noting that no representative of the divided Philippine CP was present either. Nor was there anyone to speak for the harried remnant of the once-powerful Indonesian CP, unless a PKI representative—whose credentials would have been open to challenge by Comrade Adjitorop in Peking—was among the half-dozen delegations left unidentified.

Two West European absentees—*i.e.*, the Communist parties of the Netherlands and Iceland, both of which had been represented at the 23rd Congress—fall into a different category. Both have made independence a cardinal point of policy to the extent of boycotting most international Communist occasions: both were absent from the Moscow conference of 1969 and the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow in April 1970; and in recent years both have made a practice of not attending fraternal party congresses (if invited). In the case of the Icelanders this tendency was strengthened by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which the party condemned with exceptional vigor, and has even been symbolized by a change of the party's title (for the second time) to Icelandic Labor Alliance. This new posture found practical expression in the months preceding the 24th Congress in some sharp criticisms of the CPSU, notably with regard to the Solzhenitsyn case and the Leningrad trial.[10]

The case of the Netherlands party, on the other hand, contained an element of paradox. When the CPN sent a second-rank delegate to deliver a bland speech at the 23rd CPSU Congress five years ago, the party had already (since 1963-64) assumed a firm posture of independence which was approaching isolation and had strong anti-Soviet overtones. In 1967, however, veteran party leader Paul de Groot was replaced by Henk Hoekstra, and the party thereafter began showing gradual signs of readiness to modify its isolation and improve relations with the CPSU. The CPN, to be sure, kept to its recent practice of not attending fraternal congresses,[11] but when invited to the 24th Congress, it responded with a message thanking the CPSU for the invitation and expressing polite regret that the CPN could not accept it "because of the internal political situation in our country." This was a flimsy pretext relating to impending elections in the Netherlands (in which the "independent" CPN made modest gains), but it at least showed a readiness to avoid embarrassing the CPSU.

One other Communist party neither received nor expected to receive an invitation, even though it had been invited to the 23rd Congress in 1966—together with a rival, secessionist party. The description applies to only one party: the original Communist Party of Israel, MAKI; at the 24th Congress, as at the 1969 Moscow conference, Israeli communism was represented by MAKI's secessionist rival, RAKACH.[12] This unique case deserves some further examination. The split, which took place in 1965, was exceptional in that it was not a byproduct of Sino-Soviet polarization

[9] SUP delegates have visited Europe for interparty talks (*e.g.*, with the Italian Communists in December 1966), attended the 50th-anniversary "scientific conference" held in Moscow in November 1967, and were present at the 19th Congress of the French CP in February 1970.

[10] For example, an editorial in the Icelandic party organ *Thjodviljinn* (Dec. 31, 1970) commented on Soviet coverage of the Leningrad trial by saying: "Instead of impartial reporting, there is a flood of foul words about the accused, and the whole story smells of primitive hatred."

[11] As a corollary to this practice, the CPN did not invite any fraternal delegations to its own congresses in 1968 and 1970. Incidentally, two weeks before the Moscow gathering, the CPN boycotted another 24th Congress—that of the neighboring Belgian CP.

[12] MAKI is an acronym of the Hebrew words for Communist Party of Israel. Similarly, RAKACH is an acronym of the Hebrew for "New Communist List," the title under which the secessionist party contested the Knesset elections of 1965.

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STRAIGHTENING THE RECORD

During the days of the Congress, Soviet Communists were able to convince themselves once more of the fact that the representatives of the fraternal parties warmly approve of the Leninist course of the CPSU and the principled line that it follows in the world Communist movement.

—*Pravda* (Moscow), April 13, 1971.

At the Congress we were able to note again the existence of assessments different from ours on some important questions concerning the international workers' movement, relations between Communist parties, and the development of socialist thought. It is not only a matter of the problems posed by the Czechoslovak events, regarding which our well-known positions remain unchanged, but also of more general questions such as, for example, the need to respect fully the independence of each party, each state, and each socialist state, which remains a fundamental issue for us.

—Enrico Berlinguer, in *L'Unita* (Rome), April 8, 1971.

but was caused by interparty conflict over Zionism and the Arab-Israeli struggle. It left Israel with two Communist parties: MAKI, headed by Secretary-General Shmuel Mikunis and overwhelmingly Jewish in membership; and RAKACH, headed by Meir Wilner, with a mixed Jewish-Arab membership and a heavily Arab constituency.

The CPSU at first did its best to avert the split (which it did manage to postpone) and then made strenuous efforts to reunite the two factions, but secret tripartite talks held in Moscow in November 1965 and again in the autumn of 1966 proved fruitless. Between these attempts at mediation, the Soviets, refusing to take official cognizance of the split, simply invited the "Communist Party of Israel" to the 23rd CPSU Congress, and when separate delegations from the rival parties arrived in Moscow, they were treated as a single unit and induced by their Soviet hosts to issue an uncontroversial joint message. The June War of 1967, in which MAKI supported the Israeli government while RAKACH condemned Israeli "aggression," put an end to this unstable interim situation. The CPSU promptly condemned MAKI and henceforth recognized RAKACH as the official Communist Party of Israel. The overwhelming majority of other Communist parties followed suit, although there were some interesting exceptions among parties which had already developed independent positions. The most notable example was Romania, which broke with the East European pattern by maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel and interparty relations with MAKI. The Australian, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish Communist parties, joined later by the Yugoslavs, also maintain fraternal relations with MAKI as well as with RAKACH.

Finally, it should be noted that no invitation went to one of the politically strongest non-ruling Communist parties in the world—the Communist Party of India (Marxist). (Instead, the Soviet invitation went to the old-line pro-Soviet Communist Party of India, which was represented at the Congress by its General Secretary, Chandra Rajeshwara Rao.) The CPI(M), which broke away from the CPI in 1964 to take a pro-Chinese line, shifted a few years later to an independent-leftist position, making way in the process for the emergence of still a third Indian Communist party, the Maoist CPI(Marxist-Leninist), also known as the "Naxalites" after the area of their first serious insurrection. After the CPI(M) shifted from its pro-Chinese line, the CPSU intermittently evinced a desire to improve relations with it, particularly since the party's greatest strength lay in West Bengal, an area of distinct importance to Soviet state interests. Polemics were dropped, and Soviet spokesmen took to referring to the CPI(M) as a "parallel" Indian Communist Party—a significant neologism which suggested readiness to consider making an exception to the Leninist principle of a single Communist party for each country. If the hostility between the two major Indian Communist parties had not been so persistent and bitter (it has, if anything, been aggravated by their occasional, infelicitous attempts at collaboration), some *modus vivendi* might conceivably have been worked out along these lines.

Gains and Losses

So much for the absentees. On the other side of the ledger, were there any delegations at the 24th Congress which had not been at the 23rd? Here, the Soviet leaders could register one important success —the presence of a Japanese Communist delegation —although they had to pay a political price for it. The price was a commitment not to interfere again in the internal affairs of the JCP. As far as the Japanese were concerned, therefore, the rapprochement was conditional—a truce rather than a peace settlement. Moreover, it had taken the CPSU nearly five years to achieve even this provisional success.

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To review the background briefly, the JCP had taken a neutralist position in the early stages of the Sino-Soviet conflict, but had then shifted toward substantial alignment with Peking in 1963-64. As it did so, there emerged a pro-Soviet faction which in December 1964 became the secessionist "Japanese Communist Party (Voice of Japan)." The split had been openly encouraged by Khrushchev, and the secessionist group continued to receive support, though more indirect and spasmodic, from his successors. By late 1964 the official JCP had in effect severed relations with the CPSU. But it had not rejected the hegemony of the Soviets to accept that of the Chinese. In the spring of 1966, the JCP took strong exception to the Peking regime's refusal to countenance "unity of action" with the Soviet and other fraternal parties in support of the North Vietnamese. Amidst an exchange of polemics, the Chinese—repeating the Soviet mistake—openly began supporting Maoist groups in Japan.[13]

Beginning in June 1966, the CPSU made intermittent efforts to exploit this development by restoring normal relations with the JCP, but the Japanese response to these approaches was distinctly wary. Not until February 1968 did interparty talks take place in Tokyo, and all that CPSU special envoy Mikhail Suslov could wring from the Japanese was an agreement to continue negotiations later.[14] Renewed talks in Moscow during the first half of August 1968 were no more fruitful. One week later the Warsaw Pact armies entered Czechoslovakia, whereupon the JCP denounced the invasion and made it clear that so far as rapprochment was concerned, the Soviets were back at the starting gate.

This train of events confirmed the JCP in its position of independence, expressed not in a Romanian-type neutralism but in a vigorously critical attitude toward both the Soviet and Chinese parties, neither of which was invited to the JCP's 11th Congress in July 1970. Shortly before that Congress, the JCP reacted with exceptional vigor to a renewal of contacts between the Soviet Embassy and the "Voice of Japan" faction, and it subsequently entered into a sharp polemical exchange with the Soviet journal *Partiinaia zhizn* over this and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.[15] The Japanese party leaders were, in fact, making sure that when a normalization of relations did take place, it would be on their terms.

And so it proved. Five-day talks in Moscow in mid-March of this year produced a bland communique, issued by TASS on March 19, stating that the two parties had expressed readiness to settle the various questions that had arisen between them "on the basis of the principles of independence, equality and mutual non-interference in each other's affairs." On his return to Tokyo, the chief JCP negotiator, Tomio Nishizawa, spelt it out more explicitly. The CPSU, he said, had indeed pledged that it would henceforth refrain from maintaining any kind of relations with such anti-party elements as the "Voice of Japan" rebels, even in their capacity as officials of Japanese-Soviet organizations. Party Chairman Kenji Miyamoto made it emphatically clear, moreover, that the CPSU was on probation. Noting that the Soviets had broken a similar pledge given in 1968, he declared: "We shall maintain normal relations with the Soviet side, *provided that this promise is fulfilled*." [16]

Two other important Asian Communist parties—those of North Korea and North Vietnam—had maintained independent positions so long and so firmly that there was no question of their attendance at the 24th Congress being taken as a sign of subservience to Moscow. Nevertheless, Le Duan of North Vietnam again made his party's stand quite clear by the same gesture he had used in 1966, namely, by stopping in Peking for cordial interparty talks on his way to the Soviet Congress. As for the North Koreans, it is enough to note that the 24th Congress had scarcely ended when North Korean diplomatic representatives were expelled from Ceylon because of alleged involvement in the insurrection of the Maoist-inspired "People's Liberation Front," which the Soviets were helping the Ceylon government to suppress.

On the other hand, the CPSU could chalk up one very important success at the Congress—namely, a more cooperative attitude on the part of the Cubans. When the 23rd Congress met in 1966, Havana had become an independent center of attraction for the revolutionary militants of the world. Fidel Castro's hubristic ambitions in this direction found expression

[13] A Maoist secessionist group calling itself the "Japanese Communist Party (Liberation Front)" actually made its appearance in late 1965, before the rift between the JCP and the Chinese.

[14] Even this modest concession was balanced by the JCP's refusal to attend the Budapest preparatory meeting for the 1969 Moscow conference. The party had earlier refused to attend both the 23rd CPSU Congress and the Moscow celebrations in honor of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution.

[15] See *Akahata* (Tokyo), May 5, 1970, for a denunciation of Soviet Embassy contacts with the "Voice of Japan" faction. An article criticizing the JCP's positions appeared in *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 13, June 1970, and the JCP's reply accusing the CPSU of taking "an anti-Marxist-Leninist stand" on interparty matters appeared in *Akahata* on June 29, 1970.

[16] *Akahata*, March 27, 1971; emphasis added.

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in the Havana Tri-Continental Conference of 1966, the OLAS (Latin American Solidarity Organization) Conference of 1967, and Che Guevara's valiant but ultimately futile Bolivian guerrilla venture of the latter year. In view of Castro's massive dependence on economic and military aid from the Soviet Union since the early 1960's, it is remarkable that he was able to get away with pulling the bear's tail for so long—chiding the USSR for its opportunistic approaches to Latin American governments, mocking the Communist dogmatists who thought they had all the answers in their doctrinal catechism, and branding as "pseudo-revolutionaries" those who refused to respond to his call for *focos revolucionarios* aimed at creating "two, three, more Vietnams." At the 23rd Congress, Armando Hart spoke for this independent Cuban revolutionary center when he implicitly rebuked the Soviet Union for its failure to "take the necessary risk . . . in order to turn the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into a graveyard for US aircraft." [17]

What happened subsequently, in essence, was that the weight of Cuba's complete material dependence on Soviet aid gradually became too much to permit Castro to stick to his messianic ambitions. The change began in 1968, the year that opened with Fidel's masterly exploitation of the affair of Anibal Escalante's pro-Soviet "micro-faction"; it continued intermittently through 1969, during which Cuban attention largely shifted from revolution abroad to economic problems at home; and it was virtually completed during 1970, the "year of the 10-million-ton sugar harvest," to which Castro vainly committed his prestige. We may perhaps agree with K. S. Karol that the turning point was marked by Castro's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, when he asserted that the Warsaw Pact powers' intervention was at once necessary and (legally) unjustifiable.[18] In any event, by early 1971 the Soviet presence in Cuba—economic, technical, military and political—was decisively preponderant, and it was no wonder that Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, in his speech at the 24th Congress, duly expressed gratitude for Soviet aid and hailed the "indestructible friendship" between the two countries and their parties, giving no hint of any divergence of interests or policies.

[17] *Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Greetings from the Communist Workers' Parties*, Prague, Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1966, p. 53.

[18] As a result of Karol's disillusioned book, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution* (New York, 1970), the Polish-born Marxist, who was formerly on intimate terms with Castro, is now denounced by the Cubans as a CIA agent.

A SLIGHT MISUNDERSTANDING

Speaking in Spanish, Luis Corvalan [Chilean Communist delegate to the 24th CPSU Congress] indicated that the new Chilean government had recognized the Republic of Cuba and the People's Republic of China. The interpreter having omitted to translate these last few words, the audience generously applauded the name of Cuba. Somewhat surprised, Mr. Corvalan, who had of course not heard the Russian translation of his words, raised his eyes, wondering if Sino-Soviet relations had suddenly taken a completely new turn. To settle the matter, he repeated the phrase— which the interpreter this time translated in full, and which was met by complete silence.

—Alain Jacob in *Le Monde* (Paris), April 5, 1971.

But if the Cubans seemed to have fallen more or less into line, this was offset by the fact that the Yugoslavs were a good deal less cordial on this occasion than they had been at the time of the 23rd Congress, when Alexander Rankovic—soon to be purged by Tito—had spoken warmly of Yugoslav-Soviet solidarity and "the closeness or identity of our views on basic international issues." [19] For one thing, the Yugoslav delegation was headed this time by a second-rank leader, Mijalko Todorovic, who was well known for his particularly vigorous condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. As befitted a guest, Todorovic delivered a fairly uncontroversial speech at the Congress, but he did pointedly emphasize—as did also the Romanian, Japanese, Italian, Spanish, French, and Australian delegates—the need to base interparty relations on equality, autonomy and non-interference in the internal affairs of other fraternal parties.

In contrast to this restraint, Yugoslav press comments on the Congress provided some of the most outspoken criticism of its proceedings to come from any Communist source. Thus, Franjo Barbieri, editor of the Belgrade weekly *NIN*, noted not only that the Congress failed to make any effort to adapt old dogmas to new realities, but that "any attempt at such research was placed under preventive de-

[19] *Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU, op. cit.*, p. 78. It may be noted that no Yugoslav delegates had been present at the 19th (1952), 20th (1956), 21st (1959) and 22nd (1961) CPSU Congresses. On the other side, the CPSU has sent delegates to only one of the six postwar congresses of the Yugoslav party—the Eighth Congress in 1964.

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nunciation, with the global excommunication of 'right-wing and left-wing revisionism'." He added scornfully that the Soviet leaders had built up "an ideological syllogism, according to which all modern [ideological] research is reduced to revisionism, all revisionism is reduced to heresy, and finally heresy becomes the synonym of betrayal." [20] Again, Boris Hrzic, Radio Zagreb's Moscow correspondent, charged in one of several mordant commentaries that the Congress had shown that the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was no longer a theory but a reality: to the Soviets, the unity of the socialist camp meant "unity as a renunciation of the prerogatives of sovereignty, unity as a merger—political, ideological, economic and military—into a single entity." [21]

Polemic and Protocol

These Yugoslav comments provide an excellent illustration of a general truth that should be borne in mind: one should not judge the attitude of a foreign Communist party toward the CPSU by what its delegate said, or failed to say, at the Moscow Congress. There is, after all, a certain protocol in these matters; and a party congress is not an international conference or a bilateral *tête-à-tête.*

As another illustration of the same truth, take the interesting case of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). At the 24th Congress, CPA National Secretary Laurie Aarons delivered a completely uncontroversial address, notable only for its emphasis on Communist militancy in Indochina and aid to national liberation movements. *Pravda* (April 9) duly published the speech in full, along with Aarons' photograph. Lacking other sources of information, *Pravda's* readers would have concluded that the CPSU and the CPA were on the best of fraternal terms—and would have been completely wrong.

In the past several years, in fact, relations between the two parties have deteriorated to a point just short of a rift. Not only did the CPA vigorously condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but it has since continued to denounce the Soviet occupation and the successive stages of repressive "normalization," almost going out of its way to keep the issue alive.[23] It has opened the columns of its weekly and monthly organs to anti-Soviet statements by such prominent Communist dissidents as Roger Garaudy of France and Franz Marek of Austria, and it has itself criticized the CPSU in connection with Soviet domestic developments like the Leningrad trial and the Solzhenitsyn case. At the 1969 Moscow conference, Aarons was the first speaker to denounce the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the continued presence there of Soviet troops, and he strongly criticized the final conference declaration (like the Italian, San Marino and Reunion delegations, the Australians signed only the section dealing with anti-imperialist unity).

At the Australian party's 22nd Congress in March 1970, this independent stand was strengthened and institutionalized through the rout of the conservative, pro-Soviet forces in the party. Supported by only about a quarter of the membership, the conservatives were decisively outvoted: their alternative draft program (praised by *Pravda* on March 29) was rejected; eight of them were dropped from the party leadership; and they could do nothing to hinder the passage of two anti-Soviet resolutions, one of which condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the other deplored "errors and crimes" that had developed in the USSR and some other socialist countries, such as "the curtailment of political democracy and intellectual freedom." [23] With Soviet support, however, the conservative minority fought back by organizing factionalist meetings and publishing a pro-Soviet organ, *Australian Socialist.* In October 1970, Laurie Aarons' brother Eric contributed a hard-hitting article to the Austrian dissident Communist magazine, *Wiener Tagebuch,* in which he criticized the CPSU on a number of counts including "Soviet interference [in the affairs of the CPA] and the (often very clumsy) efforts to incite comrades against the party leadership, obviously in an attempt to overthrow them and to substitute leaders acceptable to the CPSU, a method already used against other Communist parties throughout the world." He added:

[20] Interview with *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), April 17, 1971. Barbieri also remarked in the same interview that the Congress had completely ignored "the problems of imbalances in socialist societies," and that there had been no mention whatever of "reforms and democratization."

[21] Radio Zagreb, April 6, 1971. In an earlier broadcast (April 1), Hrzic declared that all that was not fully pro-Soviet or did not accord with Soviet policy and the Soviet understanding of Marxism-Leninism was being "unilaterally defined as revisionism."

[22] Two recent examples may be cited. In late November 1970, Secretary Aarons sent an eloquent message of support to a Paris rally on Czechoslovakia organized by an international committee of dissident Communists and ignored by even the most progressive Communist party leaderships of Western Europe (*Tribune* [Sydney], Jan. 20, 1971). Again, in March 1971, the CPA's bimonthly theoretical organ *Australian Left Review* published a long, anti-Soviet, and anti-normalization interview with the now exiled Czechoslovak reformer, Jiri Pelikan.

[23] *Tribune,* April 8, 1970.

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The CPSU has refused to comment on the fully documented cases of interference which we have submitted, to discuss fundamental questions of principle with us. It hardly tries to hide its claim to the right to interfere in our affairs and to support an opposition that is loyal to it. That can only lead to further splitting and weakening of the already painfully divided and weakened world movement and is a bad omen for all those (if they still exist) who are naive enough to think that the CPSU's relations with them rest upon socialist principles and not upon the presumed interests of the Soviet Union (which of course in the Soviet view are identical with those of world socialism).[24]

An open polemic between the two parties followed a few months later. It got under way with the publication in the Soviet international magazine *New Times* (January 1, 1971) of an editorial attack which accused the CPA leaders, *inter alia,* of trying to "prove their 'independence' by making anti-Soviet statements and attacking the socialist states," of departing "from the principled positions of the international Communist movement," and of rejecting "the Leninist principles of party building." The CPA journal *Tribune* reprinted this philippic in full on January 27, and a week later published an "Open Letter" in reply. The letter (which Laurie Aarons challenged *New Times* to publish, without success) systematically refuted the Soviet arguments and reaffirmed the CPA's independent course as well as its rejection of Stalinism and of Soviet-imposed "normalization" in Czechoslovakia.

It is against this background of interparty conflict that one must assess the colorless propriety of Aarons' 24th Congress speech. The true picture of CPA-CPSU relations emerges, rather, in the restrained comments the Australian party leader made on his return to Sydney. Differences between the two parties remained, he said, and would continue to be discussed. And when asked about democracy in the USSR, he replied that material advances in the USSR had not been accompanied by a "comparable development of socialist democracy," adding that the 24th Congress "had a certain ritualistic character, lacking in depth of discussion and real debate." [25] A leader of the pro-Soviet minority faction, Pat Clancy—who had also attended the 24th Congress, but as a private guest of the CPSU seated amid the Soviet delegates—held a rival press conference, at which he offered to hold a public debate with Aarons about the Congress.

Soviet Interference

The CPA is not the only Communist party which has been subjected in recent years to Soviet pressures and factionalist intervention as part of a larger though uneven effort at "normalization" on the interparty level. In his book, *Toute la verite,* Roger Garaudy, formerly a member of the Politburo of the French CP and now a leading figure of the international dissident-Communist movement of resistance to what he calls "Stalino-Brezhnevism," gives details of such Soviet intervention in the cases of the Finnish, Austrian, British, Italian, Spanish and Greek parties.[26] He could have added at least the Swedish and Venezuelan parties, as well as his own PCF, to the list.

The methods used have varied, and so have the results. The biggest Soviet success has been in Austria where, after a bitter internal struggle lasting more than a year, the progressive Communists led by Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek were expelled from—or left—a dispirited party, which is now safely dominated by pro-Soviet conservatives—the only Communist party in the whole world movement which has officially reversed its judgment on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.[27]

Soviet pressures on the Italian and British parties were considerably less obvious. The chief results were, in Italy, the expulsion from the PCI of the *Manifesto* group in late 1969,[28] and in Britain a gradual though far from complete soft-pedaling by the party of the controversial issues raised by the Czechoslovak crisis. In Finland there was a much more complicated and serious interparty struggle between conservative, centrist and progressive tendencies—a struggle which consequently had a momentum of its own.[29] Here, despite favorable geo-

[24] Eric Aarons, "Australien: Eine autonome KP." *Wiener Tagebuch* (Vienna), October 1970, pp. 18-20. See also Kevin Devlin, "Challenge from Down Under: Australian CP Defies Soviets," Radio Free Europe *Research Report* No. 0811, Nov. 25, 1970.

[25] "The USSR Now," *Tribune,* May 12, 1971.

[26] Roger Garaudy, *Toute la verite,* Paris, 1970, pp. 177-90.

[27] For an account of the factionalist struggle within the Austrian CP up to the fall of 1969, see Kevin Devlin, "Austrian Communism After Czechoslovakia," *Survey* (London) No. 73, Autumn 1969, pp. 165-77.

[28] The Manifesto group, named after its monthly organ (*Il Manifesto*), was expelled by the PCI for sympathizing with Chinese Communist criticisms of the CPSU and for criticizing the Italian party's lack of internal democracy and renunciation of revolutionary militancy.

[29] See Kevin Devlin, "Finnish Communism," *Survey,* Nos. 74-75, Winter-Spring 1970, pp. 49-69.

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political circumstances, Soviet intervention was both more tentative and less effective than one would have expected, partly because of a divergence between Soviet ideological interests (impelling support of the conservatives) and state interests (favoring the centrist-progressive line of continued Communist participation in the Finnish government). The six-man Finnish delegation to the 24th Congress reflected this unstable compromise, being evenly divided between representatives of the three groupings.

In contrast to the Finnish case, the factional struggle within the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has been relatively uncomplicated, with the CPSU intervening in an obvious effort to bring a formerly docile but now recalcitrant party leadership back into line. (The PCE has recently been among the most outspoken Western Communist parties in its criticism of Czechoslovak "normalization" and its rejection of neo-Stalinist tendencies.) In the closing months of 1968, two Moscow-based members of the PCE leadership who had vainly opposed the party's condemnation of the Czechoslovak invasion—Eduardo Garcia and Augustin Gomez—began to organize a campaign against Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo's "revisionist, nationalist and anti-Soviet" policy, sending envoys and using Soviet mail services to disseminate polemical literature among militants both inside Spain and in East and West European exile. As a result, Garcia and Gomez were both dropped from the leadership early in 1970 and were later expelled from the party. Then, in August-September 1970, a new pro-Soviet attack was launched by the prestigious Spanish Civil War veteran, General Enrique Lister. This time, however, the PCE leadership, which had been hesitant to deal with Garcia and Gomez, was in a tougher mood, and the Central Committee promptly expelled Lister and four followers. The pro-Soviet rebels now began to produce a rival version of the party organ, *Mundo Obrero,* typographically similar to it but printed on better paper.[30] The PCE leadership refrained from raising the interesting question of where the funds for this venture had come from, but it continued to maintain positions obviously displeasing to the Kremlin—notably on Czechoslovakia—and, even more pointedly, announced that it was "making the necessary efforts to normalize its relations with the Chinese Communist Party."[31] It is against this background of divergence and factionalist intervention, again, that one must assess PCE Chairman Dolores Ibarruri's statement, in her 24th Congress speech, that the norms of interparty relations must exclude "interference from outside directed against the cohesion and unity of the Communist parties."[32]

At the other end of the Mediterranean, another clandestine party—the Communist Party of Greece (KKE)—is suffering from a more serious split. The split had its origins in a conflict which began in early 1968 within the exiled KKE leadership in Eastern Europe over strategy and tactics, but the dispute developed into a rebellion by a faction of flexible "national Communists" against dogmatism and neo-Stalinist authority, as represented by Secretary-General Kostas Koliyannis, with the result that by mid-1968 there were, in effect, two Greek Communist parties. The rival leadership of Antonis Brillakis and Mitsos Partsalides came to command the loyalties not only of the greater part of the clandestine *apparat* within Greece itself, but also of the majority of Greek Communists in Western Europe as well as the 10,000 Greek Communists living in Czechoslovakia (the second-largest and best-organized Greek exile community until the Husak regime broke up the organization at the end of 1969[33]). The Brillakis-Partsalides leadership also had the support of the Italian, Romanian, and Yugoslav Communist parties; but Koliyannis, dependably loyal to Moscow, had the backing of the Kremlin, and there was never any doubt as to which faction would speak for the KKE at the 24th Congress.

Similar divisions exist in other national Communist movements, with Soviet recognition generally going to the "official" faction, which—by no coincidence—is almost always the more conservative one. But even in the rare cases where Soviet recognition has been transferred from a legitimate party leader to a challenger—as happened when Secretary-General Oscar Creydt of the Paraguayan CP fell out of favor in 1964-65—Moscow has not hesitated to interfere on behalf of its own interests.

[30] See Kevin Devlin, "Spanish CP Expels Pro-Soviet Rebels: Czechoslovakia Key Issue," Radio Free Europe *Research Paper* No. 0781, Oct. 30, 1970; and "La lotta unitaria dei comunisti spagnoli," *Rinascita* (Rome) Oct. 23, 1970. For lengthy extracts from the PCE Central Committee's "Reply to Enrique Lister," published in *Mundo Obrero* of Nov. 27, 1970, see *Tribune* (Sydney), Jan 27, 1971, p. 9.

[31] PCE Central Committee resolution of September 1970, as cited in "La lotta unitaria dei comunisti spagnoli," *loc. cit.*

[32] *Pravda*, April 7, 1971.

[33] According to the Italian Communist organ *L'Unita* (Jan 11, 1970), the anti-Koliyannis Central Committee denounced the Czechoslovak regime's "brutal intervention in the internal affairs of the Greek party" and demanded the annulment of repressive measures which obviously had "the sole aim of providing aid and comfort to the Koliyannis group in its desperate efforts to impose its will on the Greek party by resorting to all methods, even those most unacceptable and most foreign to Marxist-Leninist principles."

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There was certainly no doubt either about the CPSU's attitude toward the serious split which occurred in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) shortly before the 24th Congress—the more so since that schism was hastened and exacerbated by blatant Soviet intervention. The Venezuelan split is of particular interest because it does not fit into the usual patterns of Communist disunity in Latin America, where intraparty rifts have been caused primarily either by Sino-Soviet polarization or by surges of revolutionary voluntarism *a la cubaine*. Instead, the divisions among the Venezuelan Communists during the past few years have been of a distinctly "European" character, extending beyond the familiar debate over guerrilla methods versus the *via pacifica* to controversy over internal democracy, the relationship of the PCV to the CPSU, the nature of the proper "Venezuelan road to socialism," and the party's relations with other national political forces. A leading part in the struggle was taken by Teodoro Petkoff, a young intellectual of Bulgarian origin and a former guerrilla leader who, as a consequence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, had become an impassioned opponent of neo-Stalinism. Petkoff caused heated debate within the Venezuelan party by publishing two provocative books—*Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Socialism* and *Socialism for Venezuela?*[34] In the second book, he offered a systematic critique of the old-guard PCV leadership, declaring in his preface that the task facing "our generation of Venezuelan Communists" was to break with the Stalinist mold of party and policy. Another key figure in the debate was Pompeyo Marquez, who had been Acting Secretary-General of the PCV for several years while Jesus Faria was in Moscow. Originally critical of many of Petkoff's positions, Marquez became increasingly concerned with maintaining the freedom of debate which had made the PCV an exception among Latin American Communist parties,[35] and as the intraparty struggle sharpened in the closing months of 1970 (partly as a result of Soviet intervention), this concern led him to shift gradually from "centrist" positions to an alliance with Petkoff and his supporters.

Soviet intervention in the struggle took the form of several published articles denouncing Petkoff as a renegade—although one may assume that the Soviet diplomats who arrived in Caracas at this time to prepare for the opening of an embassy were not idle, either. *Pravda*, on October 20, 1970, carried a long anti-Petkoff tirade written by one A. Mosinev, and lengthy extracts of the article appeared in the next issue of the PCV weekly *Tribuna Popular*[36] (under the editorship of Gustavo Machado, a leading conservative), provoking a bitter polemical exchange. Meanwhile, the Soviet magazine *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 10, 1970) published an equally destructive review of Petkoff's book, *Socialism for Venezuela?*[37] Polarization within the PCV was naturally exacerbated by this intervention and was accentuated still further by an organizational struggle over the selection of delegates to the party's Fourth Congress scheduled for early December. A last-minute attempt at compromise (including postponement of the Congress) collapsed within a week as a result of new maneuvers by the conservatives, and in mid-December a definitive split of the party took place. The conservative majority expelled the dissidents, while 22 of the 68 Central Committee members (*los renovadores*), headed by Marquez, announced the formation of a rival political force, the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS), which held its founding congress in mid-January 1971. By the time the split took place, independence from the CPSU or unswerving loyalty to it had become a key issue.[38] And although spokesmen for parties which have split generally made no reference to this fact at the 24th Congress, Jesus Faria took the floor to thank the CPSU warmly for helping the PCV to rout the "renegades" who had gone over to the enemy camp.[39]

[34] Teodoro Petkoff, *Checoeslovaquia: el socialismo como problema*, Caracas, September 1969; and *Socialismo para Venezuela?*, Caracas, June 1970.

[35] During a Central Committee plenum in February-March 1970, the "centrist" grouping led by Marquez successfully resisted demands by the old-guard leaders for disciplinary action against Petkoff and his followers.

[36] This issue (Nov. 5-11, 1970) carried not only a full translation of Mosinev's *Pravda* article but also two articles by conservative PCV leaders rejecting the charge of Soviet interference, two by progressives protesting against such interference, and one by Petkoff himself. A few weeks later, however, such a show of objectivity became impossible.

[37] The review, written by M. I. Mokhnachev and S. S. Romanov, accused Petkoff of "blackening the socialist countries, and above all the Soviet Union, in a tone of the most glaring anti-communism and anti-Sovietism," adding that his arguments on behalf of "pluralism of political parties in socialist countries, freedom of the press, the need for the Communist party to give up its directing role in the state," etc., were based on a "supraclass" approach "entirely alien to Marxism."

[38] At the stormy PCV Central Committee plenum in early December—the last one before the split—Petkoff summed up the progressives' demands for more independence and less dogmatism in these words: "I am not working for an anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese or anti-Cuban party, but for an unaligned party. That is why I have sounded the alarm against the loss of independence. . . . The Stalinists of the Communist Party . . . want a party that contemplates its navel rather than one that looks at the country." *El Nacional* (Caracas), Dec. 4, 1970.

[39] *Pravda*, April 7, 1971.

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The Venezuelan split is but one, yet a very striking example of the far-reaching changes that have taken place in the international Communist movement—if that term can still be used in any meaningful sense—since the 23rd Congress. In the spring of 1966, the secession of an independent-progressive faction from a Latin American Communist party after a prolonged and open debate was almost inconceivable. The same could be said of many other developments that have occurred since then. To list even some of them is to recognize the historical importance of this five-year period for world communism.

Five Years of Change

There was the self-imposed isolation of the Chinese Communist regime during the destructive-creative tumult of the Cultural Revolution, followed by the gradual and purposeful reemergence of the remolded China on the international and interparty scenes. There were the patient and only partially successful efforts of the Soviet leadership to reassert its influence, if not its authority, in the world Communist movement through the Moscow conference of 1969, and the Sino-Soviet frontier clashes which led to the adoption of neutralist positions by some formerly pro-Soviet parties (the Italians, Spanish, Australians, etc.) and eventually to a cautious bilateral approach by Moscow and Peking to interstate crisis-management. There was the sudden efflorescence of the Prague Spring with its promise of socialist renewal in democratic freedom, followed by the invasion which crushed that exciting venture and in the process exposed a basic divergence of interests and ideologies between Western Communist parties and Eastern regimes. There was the marginal yet significant growth of dissent and resistance within the USSR, along with a countervailing tendency to restrengthen party controls in every sphere of national life; and externally, the expansion of the Soviet economic, diplomatic, and military presence in strategically important areas of the world, combined with moves to seek an accommodation with the other superpower. There was the explosive insurrection of discontented workers in Poland's Baltic cities, which brought about the downfall of Gomulka and sent hidden shock waves spreading to the USSR and other regimes. There was all this and more . . .

No student of Communist affairs would expect such developments, however important, to be systematically assessed—let alone objectively debated—at a congress of the CPSU. This is particularly true of setbacks, which tend to disappear without trace under the waves of triumphalistic ritual characteristic of such occasions. Nevertheless, a brief examination of the way in which Congress speakers tackled, or failed to tackle, some of these issues may throw more light on the present role of the CPSU in the Communist world.

For example, although relatively little was said about them, the events of August 21, 1968, in Czechosolvakia still cast their shadow over the Congress. One detects a defensive note in Brezhnev's insistence that in response to an appeal by "party and state officials, Communists and workers of Czechoslovakia" (whom he did not identify), the Warsaw Pact allies were "obliged . . . by our class duty, loyalty to socialist internationalism, [and] concern for the interests of our states and the fate of socialism and peace in Europe" to "render Czechoslovakia internationalist assistance for the protection of socialism." [40] He was able to endorse fully the "lessons" which the now "normalized" Czechoslovak party had drawn from the crisis. Husak, in fact, went even further than Brezhnev in his fulsome expression of thanks for the intervention, in his claim that this and this alone had thwarted the attempt of anti-socialist forces allied with "right-wing opportunist and revisionist forces" within his own party to "overthrow the socialist system in Czechoslovakia," and in his reaffirmation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, under which "there is no such thing as abstract sovereignty." [41]

Husak's performance was too much for Georges Marchais of the French party, for one. Marchais, who had already made a completely uncontroversial speech before the Congress the day before, promptly put through a telephone call to Paris and gave *L'Humanite* an interview in which he stated bluntly:

Our delegation . . . did not consider it fitting to recall, in its salutation to the Congress of a fraternal party of which it is the guest, the well-known—and unchanged—position of the French Communist Party on the military intervention in . . . Czechoslovakia.

Obviously, each delegation speaks as it wishes to do. However, our delegation considers it regrettable that the delegation of the Czechoslovak CP should have thought it necessary to devote the main part of its message of greetings to a statement of its position on this question . . . .[42]

[40] *Pravda*, March 31, 1971.
[41] Radio Moscow broadcast (in Slovak), April 1, 1971.
[42] *L'Humanite*, April 2, 1971.

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As Roger Garaudy was quick to point out, however, Marchais' reaction was both limited and inspired by an obvious political calculation. "Marchais," he wrote, "keeps silent after the blow delivered by Brezhnev [against Czechoslovak sovereignty] and feigns indignation after the speech of Husak, which was its logical consequence. Thus, while clearing himself politically [*se dedouanant*] in France, he did not do the least harm to Brezhnev, for the 5,000 Congress delegates and the Soviet people will remain in ignorance of the fact that the French Communists maintain their condemnation of 1968." [43]

The fact is that Marchais' calculated move illustrates the recurrent dilemma of a strong Communist party with a leadership of traditionalist temper, operating in a pluralistic Western environment, and moving sometimes jerkily between two axes of policy: on the one hand, loyalty to the CPSU, axiomatic in the past; and on the other, response to its own political interests. Thus, as the 24th Congress opened to the accompaniment of enthusiastic French Communist coverage, it was considered politic to have a veteran party spokesman, Andre Wurmser, loudly proclaim—in the French press—"our right to criticize the Soviet Union." [44]

On this point, the contrast between French and Italian Communist attitudes is illuminating. Husak's version of the Brezhnev Doctrine was not merely regretted but openly repudiated—and not just once but repeatedly—by spokesmen for the PCI,[45] and most of them, unlike Marchais, went on to a forthright discussion of the serious ideological issues involved. For example, the Moscow correspondent of *L'Unita,* Adriano Guerra, wrote (April 5) that Husak, in dealing with the question of the national sovereignty of socialist countries, had used "formulations that appeared even graver and more unacceptable than those contained in previous expositions of [the Czechoslovak] position." Guerra then proceeded to link this comment with a general criticism of the attitudes, implicit or explicit, of Congress delegates with regard to "relations within the international revolutionary movement":

Almost always there appeared to be a prevalence of the orientation which seeks to reduce discussion of differences . . . to the subject of ideological struggle against right-wing and left-wing revisionism, against nationalism, and in the final analysis, against the plurality of roads to socialism.

An objective underestimation of the growth of the revolutionary movement throughout the world . . . was thus not infrequently accompanied by a certain dramatization of the ability of imperialism to "penetrate" the socialist world with its ideology. From this came the polemics against pluralism as a possible articulation of socialist societies, against tendencies in the cultural field to deal critically with the ideas of the past, and from this came also the frequent appeals for "ideological vigilance," etc.

Giuseppe Boffa was equally outspoken:

Finally, there is Czechoslovakia. With the passage of time there is no longer talk of Novotny, or of "January," or of the origins of the crisis, or of what the official positions of the Czechoslovak CP were, but only of counterrevolution and of an imperialist attempt to throw back socialism throughout Europe. The blame is placed on "right-wing revisionism," which by its abandonment of "Marxism-Leninism" opens the way to bourgeois ideology. Consequently the armed intervention of August 1968 no longer appears as an exceptional drama imposed by unique circumstances, but as a question of principle, the application of a correct norm in relations between socialist countries.[46]

Another revealing aspect of the 24th Congress proceedings was the attitude of the various delegations toward the Sino-Soviet conflict—or, more precisely, toward the Chinese Communist regime. Brezhnev himself was relatively moderate in his rather brief reference to the Chinese, although he deplored their "anti-Soviet line," placed the onus for further normalization of interstate relations on Peking, and asserted that the ideological and political positions of the Chinese party were "incompatible with Leninism." The most vehement voices in the distinctly ragged anti-Chinese chorus were those of the Mongolian leader, Tsedenbal, and some regional secretaries of the CPSU. More significant was the number of delegates who declined to join the chorus at all, even with moderate criticism. They

[43] "La ligne du XXIVe congres," *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), April 12, 1971, p. 30.

[44] "Le 24e congres et nous," *France nouvelle* (Paris), March 24, 1971, p. 32.

[45] The official PCI reaction to Husak's speech was expressed in an unsigned statement published in *L'Unita* of April 3, 1971, under the title, "A Profound Disagreement Which Persists." Declaring that Husak's line on sovereignty was unacceptable, it added that various delegations at the Moscow Congress, including the Italian, had shown their reactions by not applauding "these concepts and the speech as a whole."

[46] Boffa, *loc. cit.* (fn. 1). See also Alessandro Natta's editorial, "La nostra autonomia," in the same issue of *Rinascita.*

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included the North Vietnamese and North Koreans, of course; the Romanians and Yugoslavs; and the Italians, French, Spanish and Australians, among others. Unexpectedly, even Walter Ulbricht of East Germany also was silent on this subject. Not that there was any doubt about the anti-Chinese sentiments of the great majority of foreign delegates or—despite Brezhnev's moderation—of the Soviets themselves. Nevertheless, some observers of the Congress may be left with an impression of widespread uncertainty among the delegates about how to deal with the "new" China, now moving into deliberate action on the interstate and interparty levels with a disconcerting flexibility and self-assurance.

A Congress of De-Khrushchevization

Another central issue of direct concern to foreign Communist parties was the whole complex of Soviet domestic policy options which could be summed up in the question: What attitude would the 24th Congress adopt toward Stalin? As in the period preceding the 23rd Congress, there had been indications that more conservative forces within the Soviet *apparat* were, indeed, pressing for a reassessment, if not a rehabilitation, of the dead dictator's role in Soviet history—a reassessment which would, of course, have profound contemporary implications. Western Communist leaderships must have been particularly disturbed by reports of a speech in which one Starikov, a secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Prague, attacked "Khrushchevism" as "a poison in the arteries of the [Communist] movement," adding that by rejecting Stalin's correct thesis of the sharpening of the class struggle under socialism, "the 20th Congress prepared for the penetration of the enemy into the ranks of the Communist parties. The 24th Congress must change that." [47] When similar statements had been made shortly before the 23rd Congress by a Georgian party leader, the Italian Communist Party had issued a public warning that any move to soften the negative judgment of the 20th Congress on Stalin would be unacceptable. Giuseppe Boffa, who delivered the warning, added that he was speaking not only for the PCI but also for "many other parties, at least in Western Europe." [48]

This time, according to the well-informed Roger Garaudy, the French CP and several other Western Communist parties sent delegations to Moscow to warn that they would publicly oppose any Soviet move toward the rehabilitation of Stalin.[49] Such warnings may well have been conveyed, but in fact it was never likely that the cautious leadership of the CPSU would take such a controversial step as disowning the action of the 20th Congress. Here, as in other matters, the gray centrism of Leonid Brezhnev —the prudent balancing of "on the one hand" by "on the other"—prevailed. Thus, on the one hand, the campaign to "overcome the consequences of the personality cult" (no mention of Stalin) had been beneficial; but on the other hand, the CPSU had also had to overcome "subjectivist errors" (no mention of Khrushchev); and anyhow both struggles were now successfully over and done with. Similarly, Brezhnev had criticism both for certain writers who emphasized "problems that have irrevocably become a matter of the past" and for certain others who tried to "whitewash past phenomena"—again, no names. There would be tighter party control but no reign of terror. In short, this was not a congress of restalinization, although it might plausibly be termed a congress of de-Khrushchevization.

Even this de-Khrushchevization, however, is disturbing to certain foreign Communist parties. It appears to them that the Brezhnev leadership—faced with the daunting task of trying to combine economic modernization with the preservation of *partiinost,* irritated by the persistence of political dissent, shaken by the crises of Czechoslovakia and Poland (both of which in different ways represented a threat to the *raison d'être* of the Soviet regime)—has come to harbor an obsessive dread of "subversive" ideas, including those expounded by many Western Communists.

Brezhnev himself, in his address of March 30, emphasized the need for continuing struggle against "right-wing and left-wing revisionism [and] against nationalism," attacking in particular "such renegades as Garaudy in France, Fischer in Austria, Petkoff in Venezuela, and members of the *Manifesto* group in Italy"; but he gave the fraternal party *leaderships* no cause for complaint. Other, more conservative Soviet spokesman went further. The most outspoken, perhaps, was the Belorussian party leader, P. M. Masherov, who accused the right-wing revisionists of forming alliances with "openly anti-Communist

[47] Reported in *Le Monde* (Paris), Jan. 12, 1971.

[48] "Quello di Stalin e un problema ancora aperta?" *L'Unita,* March 27, 1966.

[49] Garaudy made this assertion in an article in *France-Soir* (Paris) of March 7-8, 1971, and repeated the story in an interview with the West German news weekly *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), published May 11, 1971.

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and anti-Soviet elements" and of engaging in "pseudo-scientific discussions about a certain 'rejuvenation' of Marxism, in sorry efforts to represent Leninism as a limited, local phenomenon, in talk about the so-called pluralism of Marxism, the plurality of national models of socialism, and so forth." [50] The Italian Communists, who gave a stinging reply to Masherov in Giuseppe Boffa's *Rinascita* article of April 9, had no doubts as to the Belorussian's target. Neither had the Yugoslav Tanjug news agency, which commented:

Masherov gave no names, but observers conclude that he meant not only the Italian Communist Party but also all other Western Communist parties which reject a blind and unconditional support of Soviet policy.[51]

In the Soviet power structure, Masherov is not alone in this nostalgia for the Manichean simplicities of the Stalinist era, and this has an obvious bearing on relationships between the CPSU and certain foreign Communist parties. The Soviet leadership in general seems to be more disturbed by the unorthodox theorizing of the Italian or Yugoslav Communists than by the organizational independence of the Romanians—and with good reason since such unorthodox ideas could have a profoundly disruptive effect on the Soviet system if the citizenry obtained access to them. Just before the 24th Congress, the theorist S. M. Kovalev—who deserves a footnote in the history of communism as the man who in September 1968 first formulated the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty—contributed to the monthly *Znamia* (February and March 1971) a two-part article in which he criticized unidentified Western Communist parties for suggesting that "the parties in power in socialist countries should adapt their political practice" to the view that socialism is compatible with certain bourgeois political institutions, "particularly the right of activity for opposition parties." He added bluntly: "To give free play to all political forces in the socialist countries in the present atmosphere would mean the suicide of socialism." [52]

Kovalev's article is only one expression of the divergence of political interests and ideology which imposes a recurrent strain on the relations between the Communist regimes and many (but not all) of the non-ruling Communist parties striving to make electoral headway in advanced pluralistic societies. It is, however, important to note that there are limits to the divergence just as there are limits to the "normalization" of interparty relations. Just as the Soviet leaders must justify *Realpolitik* in terms of a universally valid ideology, welcoming the support of the most insignificant Communist leaderships, so the most independent foreign Communists, coping with their own crisis of identity, must insist that criticism of Soviet positions does not constitute "anti-Sovietism."

The factors tending to limit change in either direction will continue to operate as the Communist world undergoes the slow and fitful process of post-Stalinist transformation. For a final comment on those factors, we may turn to one who combines the perception of the insider with the objectivity of the outsider—Yakov Silber, of the Israeli (MAKI) party leadership:

[The] Soviet leadership is interested in a Communist movement that supports it. It needs this support to maintain its ideological image in the Soviet Union and abroad. A country that seeks "two-power rule" with the United States needs more than ever a public image that only a world Communist movement can provide. . . .

The Communist parties respond to some extent to this trend, because the link with the Soviet Union grants them an international importance that enhances their status compared with other workers' parties, turns them into factors of national importance (in regimes that want to tighten their ties with the Soviet Union, as happened in the Sudan and Ceylon), and also protects their internal stability; whereas conflicts with the Soviet leadership are apt to inflict upon a Communist party sanctions, attempts at a split from outside and inside, and disintegration.

These reciprocal relations explain why the Soviet leadership makes such extensive efforts to gain the support of the leaders of every party, however small, . . . and why almost all parties do their best, in spite of everything, to find a modus vivendi *with the Soviet leadership.*[53]

[50] *Pravda*, April 1, 1971.

[51] Radio Belgrade, citing a Tanjug dispatch from Moscow, March 31, 1971.

[52] See Richard Rockingham Gill, "Kovalev on Nonviolent Roads to Socialism and Ever-increasing Impoverishment," Radio Free Europe *Research Report* No. 0979, April 20, 1971.

[53] Report to MAKI Central Committee on "The Situation in the Communist Movement and the Chances of MAKI," *Information Bulletin* of MAKI (Tel Aviv), April 1971, pp. 13-14.

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Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse

By Gertrude E. Schroeder

The deliberations of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan published in *Pravda* of April 11, 1971, clearly indicate that the Soviet party leadership intends to continue the economic reform initiated in 1965 essentially as now constituted. What is not so clear to the casual observer is that the reform in its present form is a much attenuated version of the program launched with great fanfare five and a half years ago by the then-new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. At that time, the reform was deemed to rank in importance with Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy) and Stalin's introduction of five-year plans.[1] It will be the purpose of this study to examine briefly the promise of 1965 and to document the withering away of this program, step by step, until it now virtually melts into the familiar, still flourishing landscape of the centralized Soviet command system.

While the economic reform was not the result of an overt economic crisis, it was born in a time of troubles for the Soviet economy. The rate of economic growth had slowed from seven percent per annum in 1950-58 to five percent per annum in 1959-64.[2] Capital-output ratios had increased by more than 50 percent during the latter period, and agricultural output and productivity were stagnating. The distribution system functioned poorly, quality of output was low, and there were long delays in the commissioning of new plants. Khrushchev's multitudinous "hare-brained schemes" and reorganizations of party and state had failed to get the economy moving. His successors inherited two fundamental facts of economic life: first, termination of the Seven-Year Plan in 1965 marked the completion of a long historical period of "extensive" growth and brought the need to initiate a new era of "intensive" development in which efficiency would have to replace massive inputs of capital and labor as the main source of economic growth; and second, the Soviet Union (with the exception of the military) was not adequately participating in the postwar technological revolution.

In contrast to the radical and essentially simple nature of the NEP or the early five-year plans, the Brezhnev-Kosygin reform was conservative and complex. While pledging continued adherence to the Leninist concepts of planned economic development and democratic centralism, it placed new emphasis on Lenin's own warning against "establishment of uniformity from above."[3] Nevertheless, the reform did portend significant changes in established ways of doing things for economic administrators and managers at all levels—from Gosplan (State Planning Commission) down to the enterprises. In place of "administrative methods" (the central issuance of directives) the reform proposed to substitute the radical concept of "economic levers"—prices, profits, capital charges, and incentive funds—to regulate and control the economy. The reform implied devolution of considerable decision-making authority to lower levels in the hierarchy, which would, in turn, respond independently and spon-

[1] *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 12, 1965, p. 194.

[2] Stanley H. Cohn, *Economic Development in the Soviet Union*, Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath, 1970, p. 61.

[3] See *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 7, 1970, pp. 45-46.

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taneously to the economic stimuli provided by these "levers."

As spelled out by Premier Kosygin in September 1965, the reform comprised: 1) an administrative reorganization of the bureaucracy; 2) some decentralization of planning and decision-making functions to enterprises; 3) a change in success criteria for enterprises; 4) a revision of wholesale prices, including allowance for an interest charge on capital stock; and 5) a reform of the industrial supply system.[4] The administrative reorganization was carried out with dispatch. It was a centralizing move that restored the system of industrial ministries that had existed prior to Khrushchev's establishment of regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) in 1957. Gosplan recovered major powers, and separate new functional bureaucracies were created to set prices (State Price Committee), distribute industrial supplies (State Committee for Material-Technical Supply—Gossnab), and coordinate a drive for technological progress (State Committee for Science and Technology).

The task of implementing the remaining parts of the reform was turned over to the new bureaucracy, a fact which led most Western observers to predict—correctly as things turned out—that the measures would work little improvement in the long run.[5] It was foreseen that projected implementation of the program by graduated phases would give vested interests the time and opportunity to sabotage the reforms and turn them into one more timid adjustment in the system of administrative planning, that creeping recentralization would occur, and that the inconsistencies and contradictions in the rules of the reform would render it largely ineffective. Now, after five years of implementation, the reform does appear, in fact, to have failed to fulfill even its limited promise of devolution of decision-making authority and the encouragement of local initiative, much less its announced objectives of improving economic efficiency and overcoming such chronic problems of the Soviet economy as poor quality of goods, malfunctioning of the distribution system for producer goods, resistance to new technology, and long delays in commissioning and utilizing new plant facilities.

In carrying out the reform, the bureaucracy has effectively subverted such purposes, mainly by proceeding to administer in ever greater detail the new "economic levers" which were supposed to have operated automatically to promote efficiency and spontaneous adherence to the planners' wishes at the enterprise level. The bureaucracy could accomplish this result because excess demand (a seller's market) continued to prevail, a situation that deprived buyers and sellers of any real choice. Despite lip service to market mechanisms, the reform actually eschewed the use of such techniques. Instead, the Soviet Union has greatly extended the bureaucratization of economic life which Oskar Lange regarded as the greatest danger inherent in socialism.[6] These changes had a major impact on the size of the bureaucracy. After remaining essentially stable in numbers for a decade, employment in state administration grew each year during 1964-70, for a total increase of some 516,000, or 38 percent.[7] In addition, the new supply arrangements led to an estimated 15-percent increase in supply workers from 1964 to 1969, an expansion which was particularly pronounced in 1966-67.[8] Further "progress" in this direction is likely to occur, moreover, if current plans for "improving" and "intensifying" the new system of economic management are carried out.

Tactics of Obstruction

By what tactics has the bureaucracy reduced the reform to impotence? Merely by doing what comes naturally to large, entrenched bureaucracies anywhere when they are threatened with change— that is, procrastinating, assimilating, complicating, and regulating. Each of these tactics will be examined in turn, focusing on the industrial sector where the principal application of the reform to date has occurred.

[4] *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 28, 1965.

[5] See for example: Rush V. Greenslade, "The Soviet Economy in Transition," in Joint Economic Committee, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1966, Part I, pp. 1-18; Gregory Grossman, "Economic Reforms: A Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1966, pp. 43-55; Eugene Zaleski, *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962-1966*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967, pp. 140-92; and Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Economic 'Reforms'—A Study in Contradictions," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1968, pp. 1-21.

[6] Oskar Lange, "On the Economic Theory of Socialism," in Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 109.

[7] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1969), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, p. 531, and *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1970 godu* (USSR in Figures in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 173.

[8] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1969 godu*, pp. 530 and 619. This pertains to the statistical category "Supply, sales, and procurement." Probably the increase in supply alone was greater.

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MANAGERS' COMPLAINTS

What were the main difficulties which you encountered in connection with the transfer of your enterprise to the new operating conditions?

[*Main*] *responses*	% *of those polled*
Unsatisfactory material-technical supply	48
Insufficient size of incentive funds	43
Insufficient enterprise independence; violation by higher organizations of the Enterprise Statute	34
The persistent practice of "willful" planning from above	26
Low selling prices	24
Instability of the plan; lack of coordination among its sections	19
Absence of help from higher organizations and of methodological, instructional materials on transfer to the new operating conditions	18

—From a survey of 241 directors of enterprises in Siberia and the Soviet Far East dealing with the impact of the economic reform, in *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1970, pp. 101-07.

In contrast to the speedy reorganization of the economic bureaucracy, the other parts of the economic reform have been introduced piecemeal, an approach which has been rationalized by repeated reference to the complexity of the new ways of doing things and the importance of avoiding mistakes. Announced time schedules for completing one or another aspect of the reform have been repeatedly violated. As a result, both the old and the new systems have operated side by side. The ensuing confusion not only has increased the need for administrative command (in order to avoid performance shortfalls), but also has made it hard to assess the real effects of the reform. Slowness in implementing the various parts of the economic reform has been accompanied, and perhaps even abetted, by voluminous discussion of all aspects of the projected new arrangements both in the Soviet press and at a plethora of conferences, notably the All-Union Conference on Improved Planning and Economic Management held in May 1968 and the All-Union Conference on Improving Price-Fixing of February 1969. Let us examine the track record of this bureaucratic foot-dragging in implementing various aspects of the reform.

Planning and Incentives. In the area of planning and incentives, the reform (1) reduced the former 38 to 40 centrally-set plan indicators to a modest 8 or 9; (2) broadened the decision-making authority of enterprises with respect to planning, employment, wages, and upgrading of production technology; (3) established profits (or sales) and profitability as success indicators for enterprises in place of gross value of output and/or costs; (4) provided for setting up three incentive funds out of profits, from which bonuses were to be paid and limited kinds of investment could be financed; (5) required payment of a charge for state-provided capital. Application of these new rules was to be carried out enterprise by enterprise upon a decision by the supervising ministry that a firm's economic condition would permit it to operate successfully under the new arrangements. The first transferees to the reform program were firms that had operated most profitably under the old rules; they were also given preferential treatment in regard to supply.

The original timetable called for putting all industrial enterprises under the new rules by the end of 1968 and all other state enterprises (except agricultural) by the end of 1970. The actual pace of conversion of industrial enterprises, however, was much slower, as illustrated below.[9]

Transfer of Industrial Enterprises

By the End of	No. Converted	Accounting for Percent of Total Ent.	Output	Employees	Profits
1966	704	1	8	8	16
1967	7,248	15	37	32	50
1968	26,850	54	72	71	81
1969	36,049	72	84	81	91
1970	44,300	90	92	(?)	95

In 1966 and 1967 there was experimentation in various other economic areas, particularly transportation, where the reform was completed in 1968. Experiments also continued in agriculture, construction and the service sector. At the outset of 1970, some 3,800 state farms (roughly one-third of the

[9] *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1969, p. 89; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu*, p. 144; *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 5, 1970, p. 3; and *Pravda*, Feb. 4, 1971.

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total) were under the reform,[10] and broad application of the reform in construction was called for in a June 1969 decree.[11]

As originally planned, the new incentive arrangements, with their emphasis on *khozraschiot* (*i.e.*, covering expenses with receipts), evidently were to apply not only to enterprises but also to the ministries and their principal subdivisions (*glavki*—main administrations). This would change the latter from agencies financed out of the state budget into self-financed "enterprises," in effect converting the 50-odd industrial ministries into giant holding companies and their *glavki* into subordinate trusts managing enterprises producing similar products. Shades of the Corporate State! Bureaucratic resistance to such a radical innovation has so far contained this experiment to one ministry and a handful of *glavki*. Also, little has been done to implement still another provision of the reform—the grouping of enterprises into production associations (*obedineniia*).

Prices. The shift to profits as a success criterion for producers necessitated an adjustment of state-fixed product prices in order to permit enterprises to pay the new capital charge and still show a profit. This requirement further delayed the long overdue general revision of industrial wholesale prices, which had been in the planning stage since at least 1961. New price lists were finally promulgated for products of the light and food industries as of October 1, 1966, and January 1, 1967, and for products of heavy industry effective July 1, 1967. This sweeping revision, the first since 1955, resulted in an increase of 8 percent in the general level of wholesale prices (15 percent in heavy industry).[12] Based on costs in 1964-65, the new prices were obsolescent as reflectors of "socially-necessary labor costs" even when they were introduced, necessitating further revisions on January 1, 1969, and January 1, 1970.[13] More important, prices failed to achieve their stated purpose—to act as "levers" to stimulate improvement in product quality, to induce the introduction of new products and modern technology, and to effect discontinuance of obsolescent product lines. Despite two new decrees on price fixing, one dealing with pricing of new products and the other with prices for one-time orders,[14] progress in this area has been virtually nil.

[10] *Pravda*, Jan. 25, 1970.
[11] *Ibid.*, June 27, 1969.
[12] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 7, 1967, pp. 13-18.
[13] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 11, 1970, pp. 5-6.
[14] *Ibid.*, No. 1, 1969, pp. 24-25, and No. 31, 1969, p. 11.

Supply. Aside from the expeditious creation of a large and sprawling new administrative apparatus under Gossnab, the various facets of the reform of industrial supply practices have proceeded at a snail's pace. The changes, as spelled out by Kosygin in 1965, were to be: extension of direct and stable producer-consumer ties throughout the economy, gradual extension of "wholesale trade in the means of production" (*i.e.*, sale of producer goods and raw materials to producers without bureaucratic control of the movement of goods by use of special allocation certificates); and adoption by the new supply organs of a system of incentives similar to that in industry.

It is clear that establishment of direct ties between producer and consumer has proceeded "with all deliberate speed." In 1966, a total of 1,263 customers were assigned to producers, with the number reportedly increasing threefold in 1967 and another fivefold by the beginning of 1969, when some 800 products were reportedly affected.[15] This is merely a drop in the bucket, for there are in the industrial sector alone some 50,000 enterprises and hundreds of thousands of products. Despite a decree targeting "general" completion of this development in 1969, it was reported in October 1969 that direct ties accounted for only one-fifth of shipments of ferrous metal, 54 percent for nonferrous metals, 30 percent for cement, and 24 percent for chemicals and industrial rubber.[16]

As for the transition to wholesale trade in producer goods, it was reported in late 1969 that there were 460 small wholesale stores in operation with a total turnover of 800 million rubles—less than one per-

[15] *Ibid.*, No. 40, 1969, p. 13.
[16] *Ibid.*

ALL FOR NOUGHT?

Can you notice any improvement in material-technical supply of your enterprise after transfer to the new operating conditions?

Response	*% of those polled*
Substantially improved	2
Improved insignificantly	19
No changes occurred	79

—From survey of enterprise directors, in *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1970.

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cent of total wholesale trade in producer goods.[17] A successful but limited experiment in the wholesale marketing of petroleum products in several regions has also been reported. The slow progress on this front of the reform is no surprise, for its complete implementation would be tantamount to abolition of the central physical rationing of producer goods and with it, of the *raison d'être* of most of the cumbersome supply apparatus. Even without bureaucratic resistance, however, the persistent, forced state of tautness in the economy makes derationing of producer goods difficult to accomplish.

Adoption of revised incentive arrangements for supply organizations also has been slow. In 1966, eight units were experimentally placed under the new rules, and only in the first quarter of 1969 were another 88 units transferred.[18] Spurred by the evident foot-dragging in the reform of supply and the persistent shortcomings of the system, the Council of Ministers in April 1969 decreed expeditious corrections,[19] without any discernible impact as yet.

Routinizing the "Economic Levers"

The original concept of the reform envisaged the use of "economic levers"—prices, the capital charge, profits, return on capital (profitability), and incentive funds—as the principal devices for stimulating the desired economic behavior at the enterprise level. It was argued that proper prices, coupled with profit and sales as the success indicators, would induce managers to produce new products and upgrade output quality; that profit incentives and the capital charge would encourage economizing of raw materials, labor, and capital; and that profits and appropriate prices would lead managers to replace obsolescent machines and equipment with new technology. These "levers" were to function largely automatically and to take precedence over administrative, directive methods, which, in the words of the CPSU Central Committee resolution launching the reform, had constituted "a serious shortcoming in the management of the economy." [20]

However, as noted above, the documents establishing the reform made it clear that economic methods were to be used within the framework of continued central planning of major economic aggregates and centralized management of the various sectors of the economy by the industrial ministries. And, in truth, Gosplan and the ministries diligently set about the task of fitting the new rules into the established routine. Success in this endeavor was guaranteed in advance by the fact that the new enterprise success indicators themselves were tied to plans. The new incentive funds—for bonuses, social welfare, and investment—were to be formed from profit, using ministry-set norms relating to fulfillment and overfulfillment of plans for sales (or profits) and profitability. Gosplan's interdepartmental Commission (charged with reform implementation) in 1966 issued two lengthy Methodological Instructions spelling out in detail how the new indices were to be calculated and fitted into the annual plans at all levels.[21] The instructions were amended from time to time during 1967-69 and eventually republished.[22] Detailed instructions were issued concerning bonuses, capital charges, operation of enterprises with planned losses, and the rights and duties of enterprises and of ministries.[23]

Integration of the various economic instrumentalities into the planning routine was codified in 1969 in a new set of planning guidelines.[24] Thus, the new indices, like their predecessors, have become subject to the traditional vagaries of the planning process—pressure from the center for taut plans, plan-setting contests between enterprises and supervisory agencies, frequent changes in plans ordered from above, and "control" over fulfillment exercised by a host of agencies. As a concomitant, the new indicators were integrated into the statistical reporting system, and some aggregate data with respect to them have already been published.[25]

Beginning with the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) and the 1971 economic plan, product prices have become integrated into the planning routine in a manner and to a degree of detail hitherto unknown in Soviet practice. Both plans are supposed

[17] *Materialno-teknicheskoe snabzhenie* (Moscow), No. 12, 1969, p. 72.

[18] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 40, 1969, p. 14.

[19] *Izvestia* (Moscow), May 20, 1969.

[20] *Pravda*, Oct. 1, 1965.

[21] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 6, 1966, pp. 31-35, and No. 50, 1966, pp. 21-28.

[22] A. F. Rumiantsev, *et al.*, Eds., *Khoziaistvennaia reforma v SSSR* (Economic Reform in the USSR), Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Pravda," 1969, pp. 235-67.

[23] For the relevant instructions see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 8, 1967, pp. 9-10; No. 17, 1966, p. 32, and No. 11, 1967, pp. 12-13; No. 22, 1967, pp. 7-9; No. 42, 1965, pp. 25-29; and No. 34, 1967, pp. 7-9.

[24] USSR Gosplan, *Metodicheskie ukazaniia k sostavleniiu gosudarstvennovo plana razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR* (Methodological Instructions for Formulating the State Plan for Development of the USSR National Economy), Moscow, 1969.

[25] See for example *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 7, 1970, p. 94, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1968), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, pp. 771-73.

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

"TSUNAMI!" (Tidal wave). "What's that?" "The valued instructions of our ministry!" (The Russian phrase permits a play on words: TSennye Ukazaniia NAshevo MInisterstva). Labels on wave "Orders, directions, decrees, instructions."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 34, December 1970, p. 12.

to set specific indices by industry branch and product group, targeting price changes to be effected during the plan period.[26] Enterprises are required to reflect these anticipated changes when planning for costs and output. In still another effort to plan and routinize price-setting, the State Price Committee is seeking to devise a system of graduated prices for machinery that will change automatically within fixed ranges, by specified amounts, on specified dates. The Soviet economic press has carried a vigorous debate on how to pull off this neat trick.[27] Enterprise-level planners will also be governed by norms established by ministries to control deductions into enterprise incentive funds, norms which are *supposed* to remain unaltered during the given plan period.[28]

Aspects of the new rules that affect government finance (the state budget and activities of the state bank) have also been integrated into the appropriate routines. Enterprise plans include planned payments into the budget in the form of rent payments, the capital charge, and remittance of profit residuals. Planned budget receipts reflect these categories of income. Under the reform, enterprises are supposed to finance an increased part of planned capital investment from internal funds and long-term bank credits. Budget, bank and enterprise plans are devised accordingly.

Most of the new "levers" have been easily fitted into the planning routine for the very reason that they are quite compatible with the established bureaucratic *modus operandi*. One set of plan variables is upgraded, and other sets (*e.g.*, gross value of output) recede into the background. Yet the latter do not disappear—plans with respect to them continue to be made at some level, and enterprises must still formulate statistical reports on them. Change in the indices also does not of itself signify any change in the ways in which superior organizations deal with enterprises. Plan fulfillment is still the goal of both. On the other hand, those facets of the reform which do threaten the bureaucratic routine have not been absorbed into customary procedure. Instead, they are resisted and delayed, as in the case of measures to establish free trade in producer goods or to effectively implement a partial decentralization of investment.

The Curse of Complexity

The bewildering complexity of the economic reform is another factor that plays to the bureaucracy's strength. A prime source of this complexity was the clear ambivalence of the party leadership concerning such issues as balancing managerial initiative against state interest, or economic levers against the principle of centralized planning. Each successive change in the rules has only added to the complexity and confusion, thereby enhancing the role to be played by the central authorities. This may be seen clearly from the example of the incentive system.

[26] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 11, 1970, pp. 5-6.

[27] *Ibid.*, No. 20, 1970, p. 6; No. 22, 1970, pp. 5-6; and No. 24, 1970, p. 10.

[28] *Ibid.*, No. 24, 1969, p. 11.

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There are now several priority success indicators —sales, profits, profitability—in place of the former single indicator—gross value of output. Allocations of profits to the three new incentive funds are based on these indicators and, like the managerial bonuses, are conditional upon meeting the product-assortment plan and other ministry-imposed obligations. The ministries establish norms for the formation of these funds based on a complicated set of formulas.[29] Although standard and stable norms were supposed to be fixed for various categories of enterprises, the ministries have in the main fixed separate norms for each enterprise and changed them at least annually.[30]

Despite repeated pleas for simplication of these intricate rules, the various changes made during 1967-70 have had just the opposite result. For example, (1) complicated formulas punish managers for permitting average wages to rise faster than labor productivity; (2) limitations are now placed on the amounts that may be paid out in bonuses to white-collar workers; (3) profits from producing substandard goods revert automatically to the budget; (4) beginning in 1970 and extending into 1971-75, deductions into incentive funds and the payment of bonuses were to take into account performance with respect to labor productivity, using one of three rather involved methods of calculation.[31]

The new incentive system directly links the size of bonus funds to the size of the wage fund, thus giving managers little incentive to economize on labor. Rather than attacking this problem by correcting the reform rules, however, the planners have complicated the rules even more by resorting to the time-honored method of promoting "socialist emulation" of a "progressive" experiment—this time one carried out by the Shchekino Chemical Combine. The Shchekino scheme—itself quite complicated—increases bonus funds for those workers retained by drawing upon the money saved by laying off redundant labor. The party endorsed the scheme in October 1969,[32] and in late 1970 the Council of Ministers issued a decree on the subject, followed by regulations detailing procedures for applying Shchekino-type incentive arrangements to individual enterprises.[33] The procedures are reminiscent of those used to implement the general economic reform, and they require each enterprise which proposes to institute the system to adopt higher targets for labor productivity and reduction of employment than those originally included in the 1971-75 enterprise plan. The scheme embraced 30 enterprises and 250,000 employees by the end of 1969, and by December 1970 it covered 107 enterprises with an unspecified total number of workers.[34]

The incentive structure that confronts enterprises under the reform is complicated further by the fact that various other special-purpose bonus systems set up over the years were left in force. Over 30 separate bonus arrangements were in effect in 1968.[35]

Likewise contributing to the reform's complexity was the decision to make prices serve more than a passive accounting function. In the past, prices were based on industry-wide average costs plus a small profit markup, and they remained fixed for long periods. Under the reform, the new State Price Committee is to transform prices into a major "economic lever" influencing enterprise decision-making—specifically, "to increase the role of prices in stimulating production, improving the product mix and raising the quality, durability, and reliability of products," and "to raise the role of prices in promoting technological progress in all its many-sided aspects."[36]

Armed with this mandate, the price-fixers set to work. The revised wholesale prices fixed in 1966-67 provided an extensive system of markups differentiated with respect to product quality, and others have since been added. Intricate pricing arrangements are being devised to encourage the use of modern machinery and equipment and the discard of obsolete technology. A major effort is aimed at devising prices which would decline automatically over time in accordance with planned reductions in costs or estimated product obsolescence. Long-range price forecasting, too, is in vogue: Gosplan's Economic Research Institute has prepared 10-year price forecasts for 22 economic branches, and the State Price Committee's Research Institute for Price-Setting is working on forecasts for 500 products.[37]

The very complexity of all these price manipulations and regulations has apparently afforded enterprise managers greater opportunities to finagle with

[29] For a discussion of these rules, see Gertude E. Schroeder, *loc. cit.*

[30] *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), No. 8, 1968, p. 12; *Izvestia*, Sept. 17, 1969; and *Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1970.

[31] *Khoziaistvennaia reforma v SSSR*, pp. 235-67, and *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1970.

[32] *Pravda*, Oct. 9, 1969.

[33] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 1, 1971, p. 8.

[34] *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* (Moscow), Jan. 24, 1970, and *Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1970.

[35] *Pravda*, Oct. 1, 1968.

[36] *Finansy SSSR* (Moscow), No. 11, 1965, p. 9.

[37] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 51, 1970, p. 15.

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prices so as to increase profits (a major success indicator). In so doing, they allegedly "violate" product-mix plans, set high prices for "new" products which are really old ones with minor modifications, and include huge profit markups in prices of genuinely new products. Such "initiative" is not the sort which the economic reform was designed to encourage. The press has been rife with complaints about "violations of price discipline," and one detects a note of desperation in a recent discussion of pricing distortions by the chairman of the State Price Committee.[38]

Proliferation of Controls

"The "perverse" behavior of the managers in the matter of pricing, and the resulting attempts by the bureaucracy to tighten central controls are symptomatic of one of the major dilemmas facing the reform. Both the original reform resolution and the statute on the rights of enterprises granted enterprise managers increased freedom of maneuver—particularly in the handling of manpower and capital assets—to the end of stimulating greater initiative and efficiency in industrial operations. Yet the central authorities have been unwilling to implement the reform wholeheartedly and have responded to various negative phenomena by once again circumscribing enterprise prerogatives with new directives, rules and norms.

Enterprise managers are clearly dissatisfied with the meager measure of freedom afforded them under the reform. In a survey of opinions among plant managers concerning various aspects of the reform, published in early 1970, over half the respondents replied that the extension of independence to the enterprises was inconsiderable, and over three-fourths singled out wages as the area in which greater leeway was most needed.[39] Ministries and *glavki* have continued to exercise "petty tutelage" over the enterprises, to change plan assignments frequently, and to take other arbitrary actions that have effectively nullified much of the new freedom of the enterprises. Numerous amendments of the rules of the reform by higher authorities have had the same impact.

In the initial concept of the reform, the managers were to be allowed to develop their own plans for the size and composition of the work force, for labor productivity, and for the average wage—constrained only by centrally-fixed totals for the wage fund and centrally-determined rates for a given job. When managers actually began to adjust enterprise staffing, the central authorities detected "undesired" results (particularly, a rapid expansion of office staffs) and, in turn, imposed plan targets for cutting administrative and managerial staffs and costs, revised labor utilization norms of all kinds, and "recommended" standard staffing patterns.[40] When enterprise plans failed to set the desired targets, they were "corrected"—*e.g.*, enterprises under the reform *planned* to increase labor productivity by 2.7 percent in 1968, but, in fact, they achieved 6.1 percent—more in line with the six percent target of the state economic plan for the year.[41]

The freedom of managers to determine average wages and to use incentive funds as they see fit has been curtailed in a number of ways, as evidenced by the fact that only half of such funds accumulated in 1967 and 1968 were spent in those years.[42] Concerned over the fact that wage outlays were growing faster than productivity and that white-collar workers were benefiting disproportionately from bonus payments, the bureaucracy imposed increasingly complex restrictions and limitations on the use of incentive funds. In 1968 the rules were amended to require that part of the incentive fund be set aside for future use or be transferred to other purposes if average wages grew faster than labor productivity.[43] In 1969 another amendment limited wage increases

[38] *Pravda*, July 10, 1970.

[39] *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk) No. 1, 1970, p. 104.

[40] *Sotsialisticheskii trud* (Moscow) No. 12, 1970, p. 107.

[41] See *Khoziaistvennaia reforma v SSSR*, p. 26, and *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 1, 1968, p. 22.

[42] *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 7, 1970, p. 94, and *Finansy SSSR*, No. 6, 1970, p. 37.

[43] *Khoziaistvennaia reforma v SSSR*, p. 240.

ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY?

Do you consider that the economic reform expands the independence of the enterprise and the rights of its director?

Response	*% of those polled*
Expands significantly	44
Expands insignificantly	56

—From a survey of enterprise directors, in *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1970.

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for white-collar workers to the rate of increase of the total incentive fund.[44] An additional government decree, apparently issued in late 1969 or early 1970, imposed actual ceilings on the size of individual bonuses.[45] The Ninth Five-Year Plan is supposed to establish incentive fund totals based on "norms," the importance of the industry, and other objective characteristics, within the total planned for the economy as a whole." [46] While the planners may be justified in their concern about the rapid rise in average earnings in enterprises under the reform, such severe limitation of the bonus funds surely negates the supposed usefulness of such funds as incentives to heightened productivity and efficiency.

With respect to investment, the enterprise manager was supposed to utilize the new "production-development" fund—formed from a portion of amortization charges, from profits, and from receipts generated by the sale of surplus equipment—to finance major capital repairs, plant modernization, and other improvements in production technology. Such decentralized investments were ultimately to comprise a fifth of total industrial investment.[47] Enterprises have complained that the total sums in the funds are small relative to needs, and that their expenditure is unduly restricted by bureaucratic red tape, with unspent funds apparently reverting to the state budget—a practice forbidden under reform rules. The utility of the funds is further reduced by the fact that state economic plans do not provide adequate materials and construction facilities for such decentralized investment, and ministries redirect the funds to other purposes(a practice of plant managers also, it should be noted).

The Modest Impact of Reform

What then has been accomplished by this half-hearted, halting, harassed economic reform? Despite official hopes for significant improvement in industrial performance, gains for the 1966-70 quinquennium have been modest at best. The average annual rate of output growth reported by the Soviet Union for 1966-70 was 8.4 percent, actually a slight decline from the 8.6-percent growth rate reported for 1961-65.[48] Western measurements detect a comparable deceleration in Soviet civilian industrial production—during 1966-69 this sector's output grew at 6.2 percent annually compared with 6.8 percent in 1961-65 (far below the nearly 10-percent rate of the 1950's).[49]

What of efficiency? According to the same Western calculations, overall factor productivity in those branches of Soviet industry producing materials and consumer goods grew only 0.8 percent annually in 1966-69 compared with 1.6 percent in 1961-65.[50] Addition of the machinery sector and results for the year 1970 might alter our impression of a continued deterioration in factor productivity. In fact, Soviet data show an annual increase in labor productivity of 5.7 percent for 1966-70 compared with 4.6 percent in the previous five-year period,[51] and a Soviet source alleges an overall 3.4-percent increase in the return on capital in 1966-70, against a 13-percent drop in 1961-65.[52] Indices of Soviet output and investment computed in the West tend to support the latter claim.[53]

Are we to attribute this modest improvement in industrial productivity to efficiency generated by the economic reform? The reform probably did generate some one-shot gains in productivity. Enterprises going under the reform were required to assume extra assignments for output and profits, over and above originally targeted gains.[54] Improvements in capital productivity also reflected abnormal write-offs of capital stock, drawdown of excess inventories, and sale of unneeded equipment—all to the end of reducing enterprise liability in the face of the new capital charge. Interestingly, the Soviets themselves have candidly admitted that the performance of enterprises under the reform has deteriorated over time (*i.e.*, once the initial commitments had been met or the possibilities of sizable write-offs had been exhausted).[55]

However, other factors were also important to the growth in Soviet productivity in the last five years, although there is no way to ascribe weights to such factors. First, the years 1966-70 included four years of average or better-than-average weather for agriculture, a fact which ensured a greater supply of

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[45] *Sotsialisticheskii trud* (Moscow), No. 12, 1970, pp. 131-34.
[46] *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1970.
[47] *Dengi i kredit* (Moscow), No. 4, 1967, p. 70.
[48] Calculated from data in *Pravda*, Feb. 4, 1971, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu*, p. 144.
[49] Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 18.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[51] Calculated from data in *Pravda*, Feb. 4, 1971, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu*, p. 168.
[52] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 8, 1971, p. 17.
[53] JEC, *Economic Performance . . .*, pp. 18 and 53.
[54] *Khoziaistvennaia reforma v SSSR*, p. 38.
[55] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 2, 1970, pp. 62-63.

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agricultural raw materials to industry than during 1961-65. Second, the years 1967 and 1970 were "anniversary years" (the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the centenary of Lenin's birth), in which unusually great propaganda pressures were applied to the population for overfulfilling plans and raising labor productivity. Finally, 1966-70 witnessed organizational stability, in sharp contrast to 1961-65.

Although the CPSU leadership is not as ready as some Soviet economists to admit that the economic reform as now constituted is a failure,[56] it did manifest its concern with the state of the economy dramatically at the December 1969 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Numerous speeches at this meeting were highly critical of economic performance, and a still-unpublished letter to economic leaders engaged them in a major new campaign to generate efficiency, technological advances and thrift throughout the economy.[57] Party and trade union organizations were mobilized, socialist competitions launched, pledges of increased output and productivity solicited and duly obtained from individual work collectives, and an all-Union "inspection" announced.

Time-Honored Responses

This latest campaign represents a reversion to the party's traditional problem-solving techniques—political pressure, socialist emulation and competition, and stress on "moral" incentives and discipline. One can cite numerous examples of this tendency. The reform did not remove the perennial obstacles to innovation; so a "campaign" for technological progress was launched. The reform failed to encourage economical use of labor; so the Shchekino emulation drive was undertaken. The "economic levers" failed to improve product quality; so new socialist competitions were contrived,[58] and elaborate new procedures were established for awarding a "State Seal of Quality" to products and for enforcing production standards.[59] The impact of material incentives has proved marginal; so there is increased use of "moral" incentives and punitive measures to ensure "disciplined" behavior by workers and managers alike. The proliferation of the bureaucracy under the reform produces another in the endless train of campaigns to reduce administrative staffs.[60]

In a concomitant move, reflecting its penchant for seeking solutions to economic problems by making organizational changes, the party is now pushing the amalgamation of enterprises into production associations (*obedineniia*).[61] These are vertical trusts or horizontal combines of enterprises producing similar products. A common rationale forwarded by Soviet advocates of the *obedineniia* is that such units permit inefficient small enterprises to pool their resources in order to take better advantage of the rights and freedoms granted enterprises under the reform.[62] However, it does not require too much imagination to see that the industrial associations can just as easily serve as a more convenient means to exercise central control over the numerous smaller enterprises.

What can we learn about the future of economic reform from the proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress and the published Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan? The Directives state that the new planning and incentive arrangements will apply to all *khozraschiot* enterprises and organizations by the end of 1975.[63] There is talk of improving the reform measures and making planning "more scientific"—with greater emphasis on long-range plans and forecasts. Enterprises are to adopt "optimal" plans, and to reach their heightened output targets in existing facilities and without increasing employment. There are also innocuous commitments to develop ties between producers and consumers "in a planned manner"; to improve and extend wholesale trade in producer goods through territorial supply organs; etc. Even in the matter of production associations, Kosygin equivocated, urging caution and consideration of a variety of forms,[64] and the Directives called for adapting the forms of associations to the particular conditions in each branch, which doubtless will complicate and delay matters.

Judging from the Congress speeches and the content of the Directives, one would not expect major new initiatives in the reform in the near future.

[56] See for example: A. Birman in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 7, 1970, p. 10, and P. Bunich in *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1970.

[57] This letter has been alluded to numerous times in the Soviet press, first in *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 6, 1970, p. 3.

[58] *Trud* (Moscow), Aug. 15, 1970.

[59] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 42, 1969, pp. 1-8, and *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1970.

[60] *Pravda*, Oct. 24, 1969.

[61] The CPSU sponsored an All-Union Seminar on the experience of associations, attended by over 800 party and economic functionaries (*Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, Aug. 18, 1970).

[62] *Ekonomicheskaia reforma v SSSR*, p. 19.

[63] *Pravda*, April 11, 1971.

[64] *Ibid.*, April 7, 1971.

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Instead, one might anticipate minor tinkering with existing organizations and rules, with most changes tending to enhance the role of directive targets of all kinds, with concomitant restriction of enterprise autonomy. For example, the instructions for formulating enterprise plans for 1971-75 add two more targets to the list determined for the enterprise at the center: indices of product quality and targets for reduction of important inputs of fuels and materials.[65] In his speech Kosygin flatly declared that centralized, directive planning was the guiding and determining force in the USSR's socialist economic system and that market relationships must be used to "strengthen" central planning, not to replace it.

In conclusion, the old ways of doing things still hold sway, and the bureaucracy is stronger than ever. The attempt to seek micro-efficiency via prices, profits, and bonuses, *i.e.*, by introducing a degree of automaticity and decentralized decision-making, has led instead to greater "bureaucratization of economic life" and "creeping recentralization." This particular attempt at reform clearly reveals the dilemma that faces a centrally-administered economy—a kind of vicious spiral. Its scenario is this: automaticity leads to diversity and perversity of individual action at the periphery; rules have to be adopted to curb these tendencies so that the purposes of the planners are not sacrificed to individual gain; the more numerous and complex the rules, the greater the need and incentive to get around them; and the more successful this effort, the greater the need for more rules, penalties, investigations, and controls, *i.e.*, the more work for bureaucrats. The purposes of the reform are thus effectively subverted, and the economic problems remain as acute as before. And so, as a corollary, the party resumes its historic role. It mobilizes all hands to uncover "hidden reserves"; it cajoles, wheedles and threatens; and, above all, it points the way. This induced activity (*aktivnost*) is a harmonious counterpart for bureaucratic sluggishness. In this critical respect the interest of the party and the bureaucracy merge in opposition to automaticity.

But the pressures for efficiency and performance are still severe. The Plan Directives for 1971-75 target a 37- to 40-percent increase in national income, of which 80 to 85 percent is to be provided by increased labor productivity. Comparable figures for the industrial sector aim at 42- to 46-percent growth in output, with 87 to 90 percent generated by labor productivity gains. The productivity target exceeds the achievements reported for 1966-70 and will be difficult to meet. Another pressure on the Soviet economy will be the acute technological lag behind the West in the civilian economy, a lag which is highly visible and presumably growing.[66] Aside from the need to raise productivity, pressure for change will also come from the increasingly affluent and sophisticated Soviet consumer. If the "improved" reforms in planning and management fail to yield significant gains in efficiency—as seems probable—pressure for further institutional change likely will build up again. What changes will be made to accommodate these pressures, and when, cannot be forecast.

[65] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 5, 1971, p. 13. Already in 1969 it was noted that Gosplan had approved new methodological instructions by which ministries were to determine norms for outlays of fuel, power, and raw materials for standard units of output throughout industry and construction, apparently in an attempt to tighten control over these critical variables in production plans (*Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 8, 1969, pp. 47-52).

[66] Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Technology: System vs. Progress," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1970, pp. 19-29.

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Women in the USSR

By Lotta Lennon

Everywhere women feel dissatisfaction with their unequal lot, and there is general agreement among observers that, in fact, much remains to be done to achieve equal status for women in all societies—whether underdeveloped or developed, Communist or non-Communist. It is against this reality that one must assess the claim of the Soviet Union that its women have actually achieved genuine equality with men. We shall examine this claim not with the purpose of making invidious comparisons (for women in the USSR have doubtless made significant strides) but in order to clarify the true situation of Soviet women which underlies the official myth.

Let us first examine briefly the myth. The official Soviet position on female equality has varied little since Lenin boasted in 1919 that "except for Soviet Russia, there is not a single country in the world in which there is complete equality between men and women. . . ." [1] Article 122 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 solemnly proclaims that "Women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men . . . the possibility of exercising these rights is ensured by women being accorded an equal right with men to work, to payment for work, and to rest and leisure. . . ." [2] Premier Khrushchev asserted in 1958 that "Soviet women are held in great esteem. . . . They have, not merely in words but also in fact, equal rights with men in all areas of social and political life, as well as in production." [3]

The Soviet Union is quick to point to the position of women in its society as a sign of its superiority over the capitalist societies of the West. For example, a 1969 Soviet publication proudly claimed that 425 of the 1,517 deputies then serving in the USSR Supreme Soviet were women (28 percent), compared with only 26 women then serving in the British House of Commons, 12 women in the 90th US Congress, and 33 women in the Italian Parliament.[4] Likewise, the USSR boasts that women comprise half of its labor force and 58 percent of its certified specialists —including 72 percent of its doctors, 68 percent of its teachers and cultural workers, and 63 percent of its economists.[5]

Much, indeed, has been achieved by and on behalf of Soviet women, and it is with good cause that the USSR acclaims the feats of its female cosmonauts, jurists, engineers, teachers, and physicians. Nonetheless, on balance, the Soviet Union's 130 million women still appear to find themselves disadvantaged because of their sex.[6] Soviet sociologists, demographers, and journalists openly question whether Soviet women are truly emancipated, whether Soviet laws governing women's labor are observed, whether Soviet working wives and mothers have been able to cope with the stress of their dual roles, and whether the Soviet government has done enough to help women surmount the obstacles preventing them from accomplishing the heavy tasks which society has assigned them.

Soviet commentators decry the continuing underrepresentation of women in the managerial levels of all Soviet professions, even in professions where women comprise the vast majority of the total employment. And at the bottom rung of the social ladder, progress in relieving women of the burden

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, New York, International Publications, 1943, p. 494.

[2] John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, 4th ed., Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 239.

[3] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 15, 1958.

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[4] *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR* (Women and children in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, p. 16.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

[6] On January 1, 1970, there were 130.3 million females and 111.3 million males in the Soviet Union. *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1970 godu* (The USSR in figures in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 8.

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of performing heavy manual labor in industry and agriculture has been slow, despite efforts at tightening enforcement of existing legal safeguards for working women. Soviet women generally remain locked in lower-paid professions and apparently have fewer chances than men to acquire the education, skills, and experience necessary to advance to the most remunerative and responsible positions.

Before turning to a more thorough examination of the situation of Soviet women, it might be useful to ask why these inequities persist some 50 years after the Bolshevik Revolution allegedly emancipated Soviet womanhood. A number of explanations can be advanced. First, the accepted institutional channels of upward mobility in Soviet life—the educational system, the party and youth league (Komsomol) apparatuses, the army and secret police, and active public organizing and propaganda work—seem to afford women less opportunity than men because of a number of factors inherent in these institutions and in the nature of women. Elite educational establishment such as engineering institutes (as opposed to pedagogical institutes) give preference in admissions to army veterans, urban dwellers, and persons with acknowledged practical experience in industry or science. Since women do not serve in any numbers in the military or security services, and since they tend to dwell in suburban or rural settlements and generally work in the less-skilled categories of the economy, they find themselves at a marked disadvantage in this respect.

Man's World

More important, the Bolsheviks from the outset, whether consciously or unconsciously, have idealized the party activist as a soldier of the revolution—engaged totally and forcefully in a very hard, crafty, punishing, and physically exhausting struggle. The arena is the factory, the mine, the railway, the forced labor camps, and the tough Siberian construction project—in a word, a brutal, man's world. Despite official party commitment to equality, the requirement of mobility and flexibility implicit in the Bolshevik image of the activist clearly militates against women, who, because of their traditional role of homemaker and the biological function of childbearing, are much less mobile and much less apt than men to be committed in a total manner to their profession, come what may.

The orientation of Soviet centralized planning—with its emphasis on production and growth—likewise contributes, indirectly and unintentionally, to the inferior position of women. In the quest for economic growth, the central planners have traditionally assigned high priority to investment in capital goods at the expense of investment in urban transportation, food marketing, the production of household appliances, the construction of child-care centers, and the development of service facilities. Decades of relative neglect in these spheres have weighed most heavily on Soviet housewives, particularly that large portion of them who have chosen to assume the "double burden" of outside employment and running a household. And though, in recent annual economic plans and the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan Directives, the regime has given a slight preference to growth of light industry over growth of heavy industry, the lag in consumer goods and service facilities will continue to burden working wives disproportionately and curtail their opportunities to advance their careers and engage in self-betterment programs.

The production ethic so central to Soviet society contributes to women's inequality in another, related manner. Since the time spent in childbirth and infant-rearing (especially where there are inadequate state-run creches and nurseries) reduces the productive years a mother actually spends on the job, production-conscious managers tend to invest less in training working wives to perform skilled operations. Likewise, it does not seem desirable to the authorities to base long-term organizational plans on the promotion of married women to positions of great responsibility.[7]

If, despite the above limitations and frustrations encountered in employment, Soviet women do not withdraw from the labor force, it is because both the women and the regime are united, although for very different reasons, in wishing to maintain a high rate of female participation in the labor force. Very strong economic pressures draw wives into productive employment: as one Soviet researcher discovered, "professional work is a necessity for women, above all for material reasons," *i.e.*, the "wish to improve the economic situation of the family." [8] For its part, the regime, while having overcome the

[7] The author is indebted to Dr. Zev Katz of Harvard University, who, in an exchange of correspondence, provided a number of insights into the sociological factors underlying the inequality experienced by Soviet women.

[8] A. G. Kharchev and S. I. Golod, "Production work of women and the family," in G. B. Osipova and J. Szczepanski, Eds., *Sotsialnye problemy truda i proizvodstva* (Social problems of labor and production), Moscow, Mysl, 1969, p. 444, 456.

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severe male deficit created by the purges of the 1930's and the losses of World War II, still must reckon with a tight labor market and a dearth of untapped manpower sources. It clearly does not wish to aggravate the situation with an exodus of women from the labor force—hence, the considerable efforts to expand child-care facilities and the decision to boost production of light industry. For these reasons, the rate of participation of women in the economy is likely to remain high, and because of the "double burden" and the other factors mentioned, this participation will likely tend to be more at middle and lower levels than at managerial levels.

A final, intangible factor which, Soviet observers admit, continues to block the all-round advancement of women is the tenacity of lingering male prejudices. Since these attitudes touch the psychological and historical roots of Russian behavior (and that of other Soviet nationalities), analysis of them is bound to be speculative. But they evidently affect women's status in society, particularly within the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). While it may be tantamount to choosing sides in the debate over the historical precedence of the chicken or the egg, one is tempted to suggest that the trivial role accorded women in the party may itself underlie and explain the difficulties they experience elsewhere in Soviet society.

Women's Place

Despite the party's commitment to female emancipation—a policy which has unquestionably improved the lot of Soviet women in many spheres—leadership of the CPSU itself is unquestionably a male affair. This may reflect the impact on the party of what has been called Stalin's "strangely oriental attitude" toward women.[9] Or it may be evidence of the persistence of the prejudices noted by Lenin in a 1920 letter to Clara Zetkin:

Yes indeed, unfortunately, it is still true to say of many of our comrades, "Scratch a Communist and find a philistine. Of course, you must scratch the sensitive spot, their mentality as regards women . . . the old master-right of man still lives in secret." [10]

Whatever the reason, there are no women in the CPSU Politburo, the apex of the CPSU hierarchy. Also, of the 467 members elected to the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission at the 24th Party Congress this April, just 18 (3.7 percent) were women.[11] Only 2 of the 26 persons on the current ruling Buro of the Komsomol—the Soviet youth organization—are women.[12] In reality, very little has changed since 1956, when Premier Khrushchev complained to the 20th Party Congress that "many party and soviet [*i.e.*, government] bodies exhibit timidity about putting women in executive posts. Very few women hold leading party and soviet positions, particularly as party committee secretaries." [13]

Although the disparity is not as marked as in the top party echelons, women are also under-represented in the CPSU rank and file. There are 19 million more women than men in the USSR, and women labor alongside men in many occupations; yet there are only a little over 3 million women among the 14.5 million members of the Soviet Communist Party—about 21 percent.[14] The proportion of women in the party has oscillated in a narrow range since 1932, when the Bolshevik organization had completed in the main its conversion to a mass party. The proportion of women members was 16 percent in 1932; 14.9 percent in 1941; 20.7 percent in 1950; 19.4 percent in 1956; 19.5 percent in 1959; and 18.6 percent in 1968.[15] One can only assume that the persistent and marked numerical disadvantage which women experience in the party adversely affects their overall status in the society. How it is that Soviet women have assumed the extra burdens and obligations of productive economic life without keeping pace in party duties and work remains moot.

Turning from the party, in which fundamental policymaking power resides, to the top levels of government, we find that women have little voice in executive bodies. The duties of Ye. Furtseva—Minister of Culture and the only woman among 95 men in the powerful USSR Council of Ministers—appear to have been limited in recent years to ceremonial duties such as opening festivals and competitions.[16] Women fare slightly better in the govern-

[9] Maurice G. Hindus, *House without a Roof*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1961, pp. 283-84.

[10] Clara Zetkin, *Lenin on the Woman Question*, New York, International Publishers, 1934, pp. 18-19.

[11] *Pravda*, April 10, 1971.

[12] *Ibid.*, May 21, 1970.

[13] *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1956.

[14] I. V. Kapitonov, "Report of the Credentials Commission to the 24th CPSU Congress," *Ibid.*, April 3, 1971.

[15] *Ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1956 and Jan. 30, 1959; Norton Dodge, *Women in the Soviet Economy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, p. 213; and V. Bilshay, in *Kommunist* (Moscow), February 1968, p. 85.

[16] It might be recalled that Furtseva was also the *only* woman to rise to the top decision-making organ of the CPSU—she served as an alternate and then full member of the CPSU Presidium (the Khrushchev-era equivalent of the Politburo) during the years 1956-60.

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ments of the USSR's 15 constituent republics as can be seen in Table 1, compiled from a close reading of the Soviet press.

As noted earlier, the representation of women in the elected legislatures (soviets) is a source of great pride for the regime. As a result of 1970 elections, some 30 percent of the deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet are women, and Ya. Nasriddinova, a Central Asian functionary of some distinction, was made chairman of one of that body's two chambers —the Council of Nationalities—in July 1970. What the Soviet boasts do not discuss is the reality that the USSR Supreme Soviet is less an organ with true legislative functions than an assemblage of notables summoned briefly twice a year to unanimously approve edicts tabled by party and government, and that its elections are ritualistic. The possibilities for women deputies to affect policy or amend legislation, even in the working commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, are no greater or less than possibilities for men deputies—in both cases they are practically nil. In addition, only seven percent of women deputies are *bona fide* party or state officials able to bring political pressure to bear in their own career bailiwicks. The others are the USSR's so-called "best daughters"—honorific, party-picked, one-term deputies from various professions and production sectors, the arts, and other areas of Soviet life.

Table 1: Women in the Councils of Ministers of the 15 Union Republics

Republic	Total No. Chairmen and Dep. Chairmen	Of which women	Total of other members	Of which women
Armenia	7	1	35	3
Azerbaidzhan	7	0	41	2
Belorussia	7	1	38	2
Estonia	6	0	31	1
Georgia	8	1	41	1
Kazakhstan	8	0	42	1
Kirgizia	7	1	32	2
Latvia	6	0	34	1
Lithuania	8	0	38	0
Moldavia	7	0	30	3
RSFSR	11	2	31	1
Tadzhikistan	7	1	36	1
Turkmenia	7	2	35	0
Ukraine	10	0	37	0
Uzbekistan	8	0	37	3
USSR Total	114	9	538	21

Women fare somewhat better in the legislatures (also called "supreme soviets") of the 15 republics, where they account for 10 of 55 deputy chairmen, according to a current tally. However, none serves as chairman of a republic supreme soviet. It would appear that it is only at the lowest levels—the territory, region, town, and village soviets—that women deputies (comprising 43 percent of the total)[17] have a real opportunity to affect decisions. Here the "showcase" function of serving on an elected body is much less in evidence than at the political summit, and women deputies—in close communication with their constituents—show considerable zeal in correcting local abuses.

Inequality in Employment

Outside the party and government, women are also conspicuously absent from higher-echelon positions, although they are heavily represented in middle-level jobs in many professions. The Soviet observer M. Sonin wrote in 1969:

Even given an equal level of professional preparation, representatives of the stronger sex as a rule hold the managerial posts. How does one explain that while men comprise 15 percent of all medical personnel, they are 50 percent of all chief physicians and executives of medical institutions . . . ? In the overwhelming majority of cases, it is men who head departments, enterprises, and administrative agencies.[18]

Regardless of the profession examined, female representation declines as the rank or level of the position rises.

This rule of thumb is particularly true for politically sensitive positions. In 1966, women comprised a mere 12.3 percent of the membership of the USSR Writers' Union, even when counting that organization's numerous female translators and minor poetesses.[19] Among 573 Soviet radio, press and TASS commentators (a notch above the ordinary journalist) active in the same year, only eight were women.

In the field of science, Soviet women have made great strides since the days of the Bolshevik Revolution. By 1969 they comprised 39 percent of persons employed in scientific occupations, a proportion which is truly creditable by world standards. Yet in that year, only 10 percent of all professors, academi-

[17] *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR*, p. 6.
[18] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), April 16, 1969.
[19] Personal communication from a resident of the USSR.

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cians and corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences; 13 percent of all doctors of sciences (a super-Ph.D.); and 27 percent of all candidates of sciences (roughly equivalent to a Ph.D.) were women.[20] No woman has ever held the post of president, vice-president, chief scientific secretary, or member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, nor has any woman served as a secretary or member of the ruling *buro* of any of the Academy's divisions.[21] Moreover, the scholarly productivity of women scientists appears lower, judging from their proportional output of articles.[22] Only one in seven women scientists defends a candidate dissertation, compared with one in three men scientists, and only one in 250 women scientists obtains a doctor of sciences, compared with one in 28 men scientists.[23]

Likewise in industry, Soviet women have made significant gains but still find themselves disadvantaged in comparison with their male colleagues. Thus, at the end of 1963 women comprised 34 percent of the production leaders and specialists of industrial enterprises, but as shown in Table 2, they were heavily concentrated in such categories as technician, economist, and rate-setter, and accounted for only six percent of enterprise directors. It should be noted that this table reflects the Soviet Union's own order of importance. Rate-setters, bookkeepers, planners, and economists in industry are predominantly clerical types with virtually no decision-making prerogatives.[24] More recently, on Women's Day 1967, G. Ronina stated:

Although they make up one-half of the industrial labor force contingent, women are employed as supervisors, shop chiefs, and in comparable leadership positions one-sixth to one-seventh as frequently as men.[25]

This suggests that there had even been some downgrading of women in the four-year interim.

Such inequality appears to be even greater in rural areas, where *man*power has been chronically short and maldistributed. According to M. Gafarova, a woman heading a faculty of the Dushanbe Pedagogical Institute, "In many instances, work demanding manual labor falls to women, while the men work as accountants, section leaders and farm managers."[26] Data from 1966 also revealed no women among the collective farm chairmen of such important regions as Leningrad, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and Omsk.[27] As former Premier Khrushchev candidly admitted at a regional agricultural conference, "It turns out that it is the men who do the administrating and the women who do the work!"[28]

Table 2: Share of Women in Responsible Positions in Industry: December 1963
(in percent)

Position	Share of Total
Enterprise directors	6
Chief engineers	16
Shop chiefs and their deputies	12
Chiefs of shifts, factory bays, sectors, shop labs, and their deputies	22
Chiefs of sections, offices, groups of plant services, workshops, labs, and their deputies	20
Engineers (with exception of engineer-economists, and engineer-rate-setters)	38
Technicians (except technician-rate-setters)	65
Foremen	20
Engineer-rate-setters, technician-rate-setters, rate-setters	62
Chief and senior bookkeepers	36
Engineer-economists, economists, planners, statisticians	70
All of above combined	34

SOURCE: *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR* (Women and Children in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, p. 102.

Admissions Bias

How does one balance such facts against Soviet claims that as of November 1966 women comprised 58 percent of all specialists with higher or secondary specialized training? Accompanying Table 3 shows that women are heavily concentrated in the medical and educational professions, fields which enjoy less prestige than engineering or agronomy in the USSR.[29]

[20] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu* (National economy of the USSR in 1969), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, pp. 694-95.

[21] G. Froment-Meurice, *Annuaire de l'URSS* (USSR Yearbook), Paris, Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1968, p. 70.

[22] Dodge, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[23] Ye. Poliakova in *Novyi mir* (Moscow), December 1969, p. 195.

[24] See source reference in Table 2.

[25] *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), March 8, 1967.

[26] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1969.

[27] S. Yarmoliuk in *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 26, 1967.

[28] *Izvestia*, Dec. 26, 1961.

[29] As in Table 1 above, the ranking is in descending order of significance according to Soviet standards.—Ed.

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The differential career patterns of Soviet women and men obviously reflect differential schooling, a phenomenon which still persists. True, Soviet women have made great strides in the area of education. For example, in the 1968-69 academic year, they accounted for 47 percent of all students of higher schools compared with only 28 percent in 1927-28. However, behind these impressive figures there still lurks a distinct bias against women in actual admission policies. Thus, in 1968-69 women comprised only 35 percent of students of higher schools of industry, contruction, transportation, and communications, and 27 percent of students at higher schools of agriculture.[30] The US economist Norton Dodge in 1966 documented the existence of discrimination against women applicants to science faculties of Moscow University and identified one economic rationale underlying such a policy—the shorter productive life of women (because of early retirement, maternity, and domestic concerns), which makes it more rational to train a male than a female of the same aptitudes.[31] S. Berezovskaia confirmed this discrimination in 1969: ". . . for young women, it is harder to gain entrance to higher educational institutions, even though they study and pass examinations just as well as young men."[32] Similarly, M. Sonin noted:

In institutes, for example, there are more male than female students, even though, as we recall, among secondary school graduates there are far fewer boys than girls. . . . The social consequences of such a disproportion are extremely negative.[33]

As a result of the differential training of women and their continued high rate of participation in productive employment, a large segment of Soviet women end up in tedious manual jobs. Some 77 percent of the 56 million women employed in the Soviet labor force at the time of the 1959 Soviet census were engaged in the category of "physical" (as opposed to "mental") labor.[34] The majority of these were employed in agriculture, where some 90 percent of unskilled labor is female, according to one Soviet report.[35] *Izvestia* of November 26, 1967, admitted that "the hardest and most monotonous" rural chores fall to women, and G. Ronina pondered why it was that women "haul feed bags or break up the sod with heavy crowbars while the men tally the output."[36] The situation is hardly better in industry. Women are widely used as steel puddlers, coal

Table 3: Women Specialists as a Percent of Total Specialists: November 1966

Category	Number	Share of total
All Specialists	7,540,000	58
Specialists with higher education	2,717,000	52
Of whom:		
Engineers	545,000	30
Agronomists, zoo-technicians and veterinarians	129,000	40
Economists	209,000	63
Doctors (except dentists with only secondary education)	375,000	72
Teachers and university grads (except geologists, doctors, economists, and lawyers), library and cultural workers	1,332,000	68
Specialists with secondary education	4,823,000	63
Of whom:		
Technicians	1,197,000	38
Agronomists, zoo-technicians, veterinary feldshers and veterinary technicians	229,000	46
Planners and statisticians	478,000	75
Medical workers	1,423,000	93
Teachers, librarians, cultural workers	1,114,000	84

SOURCE: *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR* (Women and Children in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, pp. 97, 98, and 100.

[30] *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR*, p. 56.
[31] *Op. cit.*, pp. 113, 116-18.
[32] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Jan. 22, 1969.
[33] *Loc. cit.*
[34] *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: SSSR—svodnyi tom* (Results of the 1959 all-union census of the population: USSR—summary volume), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 130. The category "physical labor" covers anyone involved in the production, transportation, sale, or servicing of goods, and thus does not of itself imply manual labor. According to unpublished estimates of the US Bureau of the Census, women continue to comprise roughly 50 percent of the total labor force, or upwards of 62 million. There is no current breakdown of this figure into "physical" and "mental" labor.
[35] V. Besedina and T. Mamonova in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, May 27, 1966.
[36] *Loc. cit.*

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shovelers, stevedores, cement workers, loggers and woodcutters, drillers, plasterers, snow removers, streetsweepers and ditchdiggers. Khrushchev himself complained: :

It is painful to see . . . our women, armed with crowbars, tamping down road ballast by hand.[37]

Soviet men stubbornly defend "previously-won positions" in higher-paid, mechanized, skilled occupations of industry and agriculture. A hopeful sign of progress for women in this area was the February 1969 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Wider Enlistment of Women to Participation as Skilled Labor in Agriculture." The measure specifically ordered modification of certain agricultural machinery for use by women and the designation of particular skilled agricultural jobs which are suitable for female employment.[38]

Despite such gains, it is likely that Soviet women will continue to perform heavy and hazardous jobs in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of Article 68 of the 1970 USSR Labor Code, which states:

It is forbidden to employ women in heavy work, in work with harmful working conditions, or in jobs underground except for certain ones (non-manual labor and work in health and other services).[39]

Existence of such legislation is apparently no guarantee of enforcement. As one Soviet woman charged, such laws are "not always strictly observed, and public organizations frequently do nothing about it."[40]

A clear example is provided in the area of mining. Karl Marx himself noted a hundred years ago that use of female labor in the mines had been forbidden in capitalist Great Britain prior to his writing of *Capital*.[41] It is therefore ironic that in socialist Soviet Russia, where such use of women was outlawed in 1922, the practice still lingers. The official newspaper of the Soviet trade unions, *Trud*, reported on March 4, 1969, that some 20,000 women had "recently" been transferred to surface work in the Donbas and promised that in the "near future" all women "working in the mines" would be similarly shifted above ground. D. Shumsky indicated in 1966 that several thousand women were working in the ore mines of the Karaganda Basin and that many more were employed in other arduous or unhealthy jobs.[42] One suspects that, although the 1970 Labor Code reiterates the 1922 proscription of the practice, women will continue to labor in Soviet mines, in part because of shortages of manpower for underground shifts.

Even the existing legislation safeguarding female labor appears to be deficient. One Soviet brewer can apparently require each woman laborer to shovel 15 to 16 tons of fermented barley a day, as long as he does not compel her to exceed a single-load norm of 20 kilograms (44 pounds)—there is no norm limiting the total labor for a given shift.[43] Soviet labor specialists have noted numerous other shortcomings in existing work norms and regulations,[44] and there is no guarantee that all these deficiencies were corrected by the 1970 Labor Code.

EXCESS EMANCIPATION?

The sticky grey mass of warmed-up concrete steams in the cold air. The huge formless heap of it will lie along the slope of the hydroelectric station in a smooth, ironed-out sheet. No lumps or hollows. When it dries out, it will look like a polished slope. In the meantime, it is steaming, lumpy dough. Then women concrete workers wielding shovels start to work. They form up along the slope in a clever ladder and start "ironing." The blade, then the edge once again. That's it. Clang, scrape. Gradually, the colors fade, the excavation is covered in mist. More and more concrete pours down. The women's hands work tirelessly.

—L. Kuznetsova in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 15, 1967.

Communications lines are being laid on a noisy Leningrad street. In the trench are two dozen women's backs, bent over. Women's hands in canvas gloves are tugging at an unyielding cable in sticky wrapping. From a loudspeaker a bass voice resounds over the whole street: "Once more, once more." Pedestrians stream past, except for a crowd of gapers. Quite normal and ordinary. There is no need to produce more such present-day pictures for they are familiar to anyone who has seen a construction site, a peat bank, or a highway under repair.

—Edward Shim, in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 1, 1967.

[37] *Pravda*, May 11, 1962.

[38] *Izvestia*, Feb. 6, 1969.

[39] "Principles of labor legislation of the USSR and the union republics," *Ibid.*, July 17, 1970.

[40] T. Vecheslova in *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1969.

[41] *Women and Communism: Selections from the Writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1950, p. 29.

[42] In *Pravda*, July 11, 1966.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] For example see L. Kuznetsova, in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 15, 1967, and G. A. Slesarev and Z. A. Yankova, "Women at the Production Enterprise and in the Family," in Osipova and Szczepanski, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-26.

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Table 4: Female Participation and Wage Scales in Soviet Labor Force Branches: 1967

Branch	Women as % of total employment	Rubles per month
Science and scientific service	45	122.1
Construction	28	119.4
Transportation	24	115.5
Apparatus of government and economic administration and of cooperative and public organizations	58	112.7
Industry	47	112.0
Nationwide Average	50	103.4
Education	72	96.4
Credit and Insurance	75	93.3
Health	85	82.2
Trade	74	82.2
Housing and Municipal Economy	51	78.7
Communications	66	78.1

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1969), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, p. 654.

Women are drawn to hazardous and strenuous occupations by the supplemental pay and other fringe benefits accruing to these normally male jobs. One Soviet observer noted that wages in professions which are "specifically suitable for women" are so low that this is often a necessity.[45] In general, however, women predominate among employees of the lowest-paying professions, as can be seen in Table 4. Wage conditions in education have apparently further deteriorated: in 1971 it was reported that the average monthly wage in education was 102.8 rubles while the national average wage had increased to 117 rubles a month.[46] (The reader should also be reminded that the relatively large percentage of women in the category of "Apparatus" in Table 4 gives a misleading impression, for, as we have seen above, men predominate in the positions of true authority in the party and state apparatus, whereas women are concentrated in clerical jobs such as statistician, rate-setter, or even secretary-typist.)

Even when women work in higher-paying professions, they seem to find themselves at an economic disadvantage compared with men. A.G. Kharchev reported that the average wage of women in industry is well below that of men, a condition which he denounced as "economic and moral inequality."[47] The veteran Soviet feminist V. Bilshay also noted that women in the economy earn lower salaries than men, and attributed this to the inferior skills of women.[48]

Not only do women appear to end up in lower-paying branches of the labor force and lower-paying job categories, but many also end up working in piecework occupations where their earnings fall below the Soviet minimum wage of 60 rubles a month. *Komsomolskaia pravda* of June 17, 1970, printed a letter from a village hairdresser who earned 40 rubles a month—and that only because she was fortunate enough to work in a populous area. Publication of such letters is usually designed to draw attention to a widespread abuse. One may therefore infer frequent *de facto* violations of the minimum wage standard.

The burden of the wage disadvantages experienced by working women looms large when juxtaposed with the forces which drive women into the Soviet labor market in the first place. A railroad worker reported:

There are five children in our family. There are plenty of cares. But my wife goes to work. She works because my earnings do not provide for all the needs of our family. No, today work is not yet a spiritual need of women. It is a material necessity.[49]

A survey of working women in Leningrad who are married and/or have children revealed that their earnings were "extremely important" to the family budget and that "material need" outweighed "broadening of horizons" or "civic satisfaction" as the motivation for working.[50]

The Weight of the "Double Burden"

This brings us back to a problem briefly noted above—the phenomenon of the "double burden"—which is causing increasing concern. Many Soviet sociologists foresee deterioration of the physical and mental health of Soviet working women as a result of this "double burden" and are concerned about the contribution of this situation to a declining Soviet birth rate. In a 1969 survey of Leningrad working

[45] Kuznetsova, *loc. cit.*

[46] Harry Trimborn report in the *Washington Post*, June 6, 1971.

[47] *Byt i semia v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* (Daily life and the family in a socialist society), Leningrad, Znanie, 1968, p. 23.

[48] *Loc. cit.*

[49] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 12, 1967.

[50] Kharchev and Golod, *loc. cit.*

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women, 70 percent admitted they often felt fatigue on their jobs. Their illness rate was twice as high as that of working men. To the question, "Is it difficult for you to combine family obligations with work on the production line?" 44 percent answered "bearable," 31 percent answered "hard," and 25 percent answered "very hard." [51] A.G. Kharchev and S.I. Golod summarized the implication of the "double burden":

Research has convinced us that the possibilities for liberating women from the "double burden" are being realized only in small degree. As a result of women's entry into production, negative consequences have accompanied the positive ones: worsened physical and psychological condition, lowered general tone of conjugal and family life, restriction of social and cultural contacts. Society bears great economic and social losses, since women can manifest themselves completely neither in production nor in their family roles.[52]

One of the most serious consequences of the "double burden" from the Soviet point of view is a declining birth rate. Sociologists D. Valentei and G. Kisleva reported in 1969 that "the overwhelming majority of families try to have one or a maximum of two children." As a result, they state, the birth rate fell from 24.9 per thousand in 1960 to 17.3 per thousand in 1968.[53] Professor Kharchev was one of the first in the post-Stalin era to draw the link between the difficult conditions of Soviet women's lives and the lowered birth rate.[54] More recently, R. Sagimbaeva, an associate of the Central Research Laboratory of the State Committee on Utilization of Labor Resources of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, explicitly stated:

In the USSR, the fertility of working women is half that of the housewife. It is very difficult for women to both work and raise children. And often, if the choice is between working and raising children, women choose work.[55]

Since 1955, when the Soviet government legalized abortion in response to an alarming number of illegal abortions, this practice has clearly played a significant role in the declining birth rate, although specific figures are not available.[56] To counter the dropping birth rate, the authorities have steadily improved maternity benefits, most recently (in the 1970 Labor Code) giving a working mother, in addition to 56 days of paid leave both before and after giving birth, permission to take leave without pay until the child reaches one year of age, without prejudice to the mother's job rating.[57] However, a whole nexus of

[51] Slesarev and Yankova, *loc. cit.*

[52] *Loc. cit.*

[53] *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1969. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu* reported that the rate declined to 17.0 births per 1000 in 1969 (p. 31).

[54] *Brak i semia v SSSR* (Marriage and family in the USSR), Moscow, Mysl, 1964, pp. 219 ff.

[55] In *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 26, 1969.

[56] It was estimated that in 1958-59 the annual number of abortions in the USSR exceeded that of live births and that the abortion rate for working women was 2.5 times as high as for non-working women. See E. A. Sadvokasova, "Some social hygiene aspects of the study of abortion (from materials of a special study in a number of cities and rural locales of the RSFSR for 1958-59)," *Sovetskoe zdravookhranenie* (Moscow), March 1963, pp. 45-50 (cited in Dodge, *op. cit.*, p. 22).

[57] *Izvestia*, July 17, 1970. Norton Dodge devotes considerable space to a discussion of earlier legislation affecting women workers on pp. 57-75 of his work (cited above).



Signs: "Hairdresser, Women's Salon."
Caption: "I want your advice. Is a place in the line to the hairdresser a good gift for my wife for March 8?" (March 8 is designated Women's Day in the USSR.)

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 6, February 1970, p. 2.

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other factors operates to discourage the raising of large families.

For example, Soviet experts make clear that men share the homemaking chores of women only slightly and that the government has been either unwilling or unable to develop sufficient appliances, consumer services, retail outlets, or child-care facilities to significantly ease this burden. According to one study, men spend 1 hour and 15 minutes daily on household-related matters compared to 4 hours and 20 minutes for women. The average Moscow woman spends "a minimum of 50 percent of her [off-job] time shopping for groceries and cooking.[58] Numerous commentators concur in the judgment that working women simply lack the time for civic work, personal development, improvement of job qualifications, or satisfaction of spiritual needs.[59] The upshot is that the working woman "turns into a worn-out woman after 15-20 years of married life," according to A. Valentinov.[60]

Lack of Services

The state of Soviet consumer services and transportation and its impact on *all* Soviet citizens were described by A. Rubinov:

Fruitless complaints about how much time people spend standing in line, how much their nerves are affected by the confusion of rental outlets, shops, and dressmaking or tailoring establishments, have now become commonplace. But as yet no one has calculated the losses we sustain from this. They are gigantic losses, perhaps our greatest, and they are irreparable . . . . Right now everyday services constitute the most backward branch of the national economy. Their form is almost amateurish, and their equipment, primitive. . . . The country has been paying for this pennywise economizing in billions of hours that workers, scientists, and physicians spend standing in line. Lost time can be calculated in hours, but what units can be used to measure shattered nerves and sour dispositions.[61]

Housewives encounter shortages of everything from cutting boards to children's furniture. In the highly industrial cities of Leningrad, Moscow, and Penza reportedly only 13 percent of all working women possess washing machines, 20 percent own vacuum cleaners, and 38 percent own refrigerators.[62] It requires little imagination to picture the situation in less-developed cities or rural areas! As one exasperated economist put it:

We've long since needed not "technological wonders" but cheap, reliable appliances, not for exhibitions but for the home, not for engineers and futurologists but for housewives![63]

Food shortages also plague the housewife—*e.g.*, just last year Premier Kosygin publicly admitted that the government was unable to meet all the public's needs for meat and other livestock products.[64]

In the matter of child-care facilities, the Soviet Union has made considerable progress since 1960, when the 4.4 million places in state-run nurseries and kindergartens (roughly comparable to the 1914 statistics!) could accommodate only 13 percent of Soviet children aged 1 to 6.[65] By January 1970 the available places had more than doubled—to 9 million—but the existing capacity still fell short of meeting the needs of urban working mothers and, to an even greater extent, of working mothers in the countryside.[66] The quality of existing creches and nurseries is also a cause of some concern. Only 23.7 percent of working mothers canvassed in Leningrad sent their children to such facilities for the superior "social upbringing" they offered; most did so out of necessity.[67] There is evidence that some families and husbands clearly disapprove of sending children to state nurseries.[68]

A final aspect of the Soviet women's scene—one which can only be touched on briefly within this article—is the status of women in the Muslim areas of Soviet Central Asia. It is almost axiomatic that the

[58] Poliakova, *loc. cit.*

[59] For example see Besedina and Mamonova, *loc. cit.;* Sagimbaeva, *loc. cit.;* A. Zamtsov in *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 4, April 1965, p. 65; and *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1967, pp. 153-55.

[60] *Izvestia*, March 6, 1966.

[61] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 29, 1967.

[62] Slesarev and Yankova, *loc. cit.*

[63] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 4, 1969.

[64] *Izvestia*, June 10, 1970.

[65] Kharchev, *Brak i semia v SSSR*, pp. 274-75.

[66] "Report of the Central Statistical Administration on Fulfillment of the 1969 Economic Plan," *Izvestia*, Jan. 25, 1970. The Directives for the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan set a 1970 goal of 12,000,000 preschool places, which would meet the urban need "in the main" and "improve" the situation in rural areas (*Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1966). A Soviet survey in 1966 revealed that only 61 percent of children under age seven from families of mothers working in industry (*i.e.*, predominantly in urban areas) attended preschool, with the comparable figure for children of white-collar working mothers at 71 per cent. Of the 8,534,000 places available in 1966, 6,835,000 were in the cities compared with only 1,649,000 in the countryside (*Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR*, p. 126). It is against this background that one must read the 1969 results.

[67] Slesarev and Yankova, *loc. cit.*, p. 434.

[68] Kuznetsova, *loc. cit.*

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Soviet system, with its heavy emphasis on education and production and on participation of women in production on an equal footing with men, has gone far toward liberating Muslim women from "feudal bey" attitudes and customs. A few facts should suffice. Table 5 indicates the advances registered in the education of Central Asian women.

As for participation in the labor force, women comprised 40-46 percent of the working population in the Central Asian republics in 1967 compared with as little as 8 percent in Tadzhikistan and 11 percent in Kirgizia in the year 1928.[69]

Despite the prodigious efforts of the Soviet regime to bring Muslim women into the 20th century and the impressive gains actually registered, all has not been resolved on this front. Thus, in May 1970, the Uzbek Communist Party condemned "serious shortcomings" in the treatment of women in Uzbekistan, as evidenced by heavy turnover of women workers, insufficient attention to improving the skills of women workers and mechanizing their work, low representation of women in the republic party organization, a lack of women in leading or managerial positions, and failure to improve the everyday life of women. Local party organizations were specifically criticized for ignoring these problems.[70]

[69] *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR*, p. 85.
[70] *Pravda vostoka* (Tashkent), May 22, 1970.

Table 5: Proportion of Women with At Least Some Secondary Education
(in percent)

Nationality	1939	1959
Turkmen	.3	20.5
Kirgiz	.3	15.0
Tadzhik	.4	15.7
Kazakh	.6	13.3
Uzbek	.6	16.5

SOURCE: *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR* (Women and Children in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, p. 55.

Caption: "From the Viewpoint of a Feudal Lord." Below: "What a wife I have! Her face is covered, and she earns money!"

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 6, February 1968, p. 5.

Whither Soviet Women?

What conclusions may one draw from this survey about the current status and the future situation of women in the Soviet Union? It might be useful to examine the matter in three aspects: equality of participation in the economy, equality of occupation, and equality of authority. With regard to the first, it would appear that the women of the USSR have, indeed, achieved *equality of participation* with men in gainful employment—they now comprise 50 percent of the Soviet labor force. This equality may, however, be a mixed blessing; in fact, one may even suggest that Soviet women are "over-emancipated" in this respect. One need only cite the evidence that many Soviet wives are forced to work out of material need rather than for reasons of self-advancement or self-realization. Such employment has resulted in a declining birth rate and in deterioration of the health and peace of mind of many working wives. Since the strains which wives everywhere experience as a result of the "double burden" are compounded in the Soviet case by the regime's failure to provide adequate child-care, consumer goods, transportation, and service facilities, equal participation of women in the labor market hardly amounts to "liberation."

When we turn to the question of *equality of occupation*, we discover that this has been an elusive target for Soviet women. It is true that they have made very considerable gains in this respect—Soviet women have been able to enter and prosper in a broad range of professions. Owing, however, to their

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PLUS ÇA CHANGE

Since women work more cheaply and, in these branches [the 19th century English textile industry], better than men, they take their [men's] places. . . .

—F. Engels, *Condition of the Working Class in England*, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1950, p. 141.

An abnormal ratio of women to men is characteristic of the majority of the country's [USSR] centers. . . . How did this demographic problem arise? . . . It is customary nowadays to speak of the textile industry as a "women's" industry. Yet it became so not very long ago. The Ivanovo-Voznesensk textile workers who established and defended Soviet rule under the leadership of M.V. Frunze were *men*, not women. Then why does one need a searchlight in daytime to find a male textile worker nowadays? Because in the 1930's the textile industry was reduced to such wage standards (second category!) that even today men do not want to work in it. And even now pay is comparatively low in the textile industry. . . .

—V. Perevedentsev, "Concerning Demographic Ignorance and the Problem of the Birth Rate," *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 13, 1966, p. 2.

late start and also the persistence of systemic, psychological, and inherent obstacles, women are still outnumbered significantly in the most prestigious and remunerative occupations. They find themselves bunched in lower-paying professions or at the lower end of the job spectrum in the more remunerative professions.

The same factors clearly prevent Soviet women from achieving *equality of authority* with men. Soviet claims in this area are clearly exaggerated. When Soviet propagandists proudly point to the high proportion of women in the USSR Supreme Soviet as evidence that women do participate in the nation's leadership in large numbers, they are engaging in sophistry. A more meaningful assessment of women's access to Soviet corridors of power is the fact that they are totally absent from the Politburo and comprise less than four percent of the combined membership of the CPSU's Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission. This may be contrasted with the genuine leadership functions exercised by such non-Communists as Mesdames Bandaranaike, Gandhi, and Meir.

The overall impression which emerges from our examination of the status of women in the USSR is that, despite significant gains and even the achievement of genuine equality with men in some areas, there remains a wide gap between the myth of equality fostered by Soviet propagandists and the reality of women's life in the Soviet Union. In contemplating the possibilities for narrowing this gap, Soviet women must be aware that all the gains which they have registered to date were granted by the regime as pragmatic steps to increase efficiency and productivity, *not* in response to any effective articulation of demands by women themselves. Like all other Soviet citizens, women in the USSR have little chance to voice their complaints and demands, much less have a meaningful impact on the solution of everyday problems. In order to gain full equality, they must, in the words of one Soviet observer, become able "to insist on their legal rights and implement them." [71] In today's Russia, as in Marx's Prussia, "complete emancipation is a *conditio sine qua non* for any partial emancipation." [72] Much that impedes progress toward full liberation of women in Soviet Russia will be swept away only when all Soviet citizens gain full democratic rights.

[71] E. Shim in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 11, 1967.

[72] Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, tr. and ed. by T. B. Bottomore, New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 57.

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Polish Perspectives, Past and Present

By A. Ross Johnson

On December 14, 1970, dockworkers and students in Poland's coastal city of Gdansk marched on the regional headquarters of the (Communist) PUWP—Polish United Workers' Party—to protest announced increases in the price of foodstuffs and fuels. The militia's attempt to disperse the protesters erupted in a clash, setting off a chain reaction of intermittent rioting, looting, work stoppages, and protest demonstrations against the regime in several Polish cities over the next five days. The unexpected climax—announced December 19, following emergency sessions of the party Politburo and Central Committee—was the ouster of the veteran Communist Wladyslaw Gomulka as PUWP First Secretary and his replacement by the Silesian party leader Edward Gierek. Subsequent weeks witnessed a wholesale shakeup in the leadership of the party and state apparatuses and a move toward equally dramatic innovations in a number of areas of party policy.

Several times in the past—most notably in Poland itself when Gomulka came to power in 1956—mass demonstrations have resulted in important leadership and policy changes in Communist countries. Yet nowhere have demonstrations that were relatively limited, in the sense that they neither aimed at nor reached a level of revolutionary violence, led so quickly to such a comprehensive reshuffle of the top leadership as occurred in Warsaw in December 1970. To understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to consider both the immediate and the more fundamental causes of the Polish workers' protest; these can perhaps best be grasped by examining, first, a whole range of tensions that had long been building in relations between the Gomulka regime and Polish society, and second, a parallel range of intraparty conflicts and frictions that had consistently hampered the effectiveness of the political leadership.

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Regime-Society Tensions

The immediate causes of the demonstrations were clear—first among them, the announcement the preceding weekend of increases in the prices of foodstuffs and fuels ranging from 15 to 30 percent over previous levels.[1] It was already evident that even without price increases, the Polish consumer would have had to tighten his belt in 1971; two hard winters and massive floods—following on the longstanding relative neglect of the agricultural sector—had led to a sharp decline in agricultural output for the previous two years. The resulting shortages had already sparked public protests earlier in 1970; during the summer, for example, Gierek himself was confronted with a series of housewives' demonstrations—including the sacking of supermarkets—in Katowice, the capital of his Silesian bailiwick.

In this situation, the price increases would have been bitterly resented even had they been intended solely as a measure to meet current shortages by "rationing through the pocketbook." In fact, however, they were presented to the public in a more ominous light. In the framework of an economic reform program formulated in 1969-1970 (more on which shortly), the price increases were explained as a measure to force a permanent shift in consumption patterns from foodstuffs to manufactures—which

[1] *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Dec. 13, 1970.

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to the average Pole meant an effort to force him to cut down on food (especially meat) and instead purchase the shoddy consumer goods that had piled up unsold in the warehouses.

Adding insult to injury, the regime also displayed an astonishing insensitivity to popular feelings by announcing the price increases just ten days before Christmas—this in a country where holiday feasting is a living tradition.

Public apprehension over a new wage system was also partially responsible for the outbreak of the December demonstrations (and helps to explain their concentration in the coastal cities). The new system, adopted in May 1970 and re-endorsed at a party conclave just before the demonstrations (the Sixth Plenum of the CC), was to have been introduced in most of Polish industry in 1971. The crux of the scheme was a structure of bonuses intended to stimulate productivity through greater wage differentiation than obtained in the existing, strongly egalitarian remuneration system[2]—threatening to impose additional hardships on the less productive part of the labor force. The disquietude which spread among Polish workers was heightened by the complexity of the new system and by the fact that it was abruptly introduced and ineptly explained to the population. Workers' doubts were particularly strong in the coastal shipyards, which were already facing an uncertain economic future[3]; "obscurities and anxieties" about the new scheme, to quote a local party official,[4] reached such proportions in the Gdansk shipyards that in early December Stanislaw Kociolek, a Politburo member and Deputy Premier who had formerly been party boss of the region, was dispatched from Warsaw in an effort to calm the situation—an assignment of course doomed to failure.

There were, then, strong and immediate provocations to explain the December demonstrations. Yet it quickly became clear, both from the substance of protests of the participants and from the later statements of party leaders, that Polish workers were rebelling against more than the prospect of new economic hardships; they were venting their anger and frustration, in the first instance, against more fundamental deficiencies underlying the 1969-70 economic reform program, and in the final analysis, against the entire system of rule that had evolved under Gomulka since 1956. A concise admission of this fact was issued by Edward Gierek soon after his assumption of the leadership:

It is quite obvious that the sources of the December crisis should not be sought only in the bitterness caused by higher prices and the way they were introduced. The crisis had been growing for years and had deeper causes.[5]

The reform program developed in Poland in 1969-70 was a consequence of the strong conviction held by part of the political elite that the old economic system was an anachronism which had to be modified.[6] The trouble was that the program was launched without regard to certain economic, political and social factors that crucially influenced popular attitudes toward the reform and in effect foredoomed it to failure.

To approach the problem in terms of a theoretical model, the reform of any command economy, no matter how adroitly conceived and implemented, must inevitably signify greater relative disadvantage for the less skilled and less productive elements of the labor force, at least in the short run. A reformist Communist leadership might be able to mitigate the resulting unrest under certain conditions: if it could achieve a continuing, relatively high rate of overall economic growth (so as to allow the less productive worker to improve his economic position, even if more slowly than before); if it were to give the trade unions or workers' councils more power to function as institutions through which worker grievances could be articulated; or, failing the first two, if it could enhance the general view of the legitimacy of its rule—that is to say, attain a sufficient measure of popular support (through promises of a better future and appeals to such unifying sentiments as national self-interest, fear of external forces, etc.) to override discontent over immediate deprivations. In Hungary and Yugoslavia, the ruling regimes pursued all three of these objectives in recent years, with some (though not unlimited) success. In Poland in the years 1969-70, none of the conditions could be satisfied.

Insofar as the factor of economic growth was concerned, the relative progress achieved by Poland in the 1950's and early 1960's had degenerated into economic stagnation after 1965. The economic de-

[2] For details, see Antoni Marek, "The Draft of a New Wage System in Poland," Radio Free Europe *Research Report* (Munich), April 1, 1970.

[3] See Z. Z., "Poland's Maritime Industry," *ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1970.

[4] See report by a Gdansk party secretary in *Glos wybrzeza* (Gdansk), Nov. 19, 1970.

[5] Gierek's speech to the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP-CC, *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 8, 1971.

[6] For details see Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland Returns to Economic Reform," *East Europe* (New York), November-December 1969; Antoni Marek, "The Fifth Plenum of the PUWP-CC," Radio Free Europe *Research Report*, June 15, 1970.

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cline was widely attributed (by Polish economists as well as by foreign observers) to the long refusal of the Gomulka regime—burdened by the dogmas of forced industrialization and immobilized by bureaucratic inertia—to address itself seriously to the nation's economic problems. To review this dismal history briefly, back in 1956-57 Poland's economic future had looked bright. In the wake of October, Oskar Lange's Economic Council had formulated a far-reaching plan for the institutional reform of the economy—a harbinger of the many subsequent measures of economic reform formulated throughout Eastern Europe. Rather quickly, however—as the party reconsolidated its hegemonic rule and discredited "dogmatists" regained a measure of their former influence on the political stage—the Economic Council's proposals were abandoned. The initial measures of decentralization were reversed, a proposed comprehensive price and wage reform was discarded in 1958, and worker participation in economic management was, for all practical purposes, abolished. What remained was basically the same old centralized economic system, in which even minor reforms were introduced in hodgepodge fashion and then neutralized by bureaucratic inertia or counterpressure.

Mounting economic problems led to the elaboration of a second, far more limited reform program in 1964-65, but few of its features—*e.g.*, more rational criteria for investment allocation—were in fact implemented. By the time the situation drove the leadership to attempt the recent third reform effort, the rate of economic growth had declined to 3.5 percent—by far the lowest growth rate in the Soviet orbit in the year 1969. More important to the worker, the second half of the 1960's had brought a stagnation in real personal income; official statistics claimed a small increase of one or two percent, but in reality it was doubtful that there was any gain at all.[7]

The second condition for the successful implementation of a reform program was equally unattainable in Poland. The system of rule in the Gomulka era provided no really effective instrument for the expression of workers' grievances and for the translation of these grievances into policies affecting the economy. The "workers' councils" which had arisen spontaneously in October 1956, and which for a while seemed to have a genuine voice in factory management, were replaced in 1957-58 by the pale shadow of so-called "workers' self-government conferences"—factory organs controlled by the enterprises' party organization, subordinated to the principle of one-man management, and dedicated almost exclusively to raising production. The same subservience to regime interests characterized the trade unions, which by and large neglected even the most rudimentary practical concerns of labor; serving as a classic "transmission belt," to quote a Polish source,[8] they "functioned only in one direction, con-

WARNINGS—AND JUDGMENTS

. . . we should make it clear to the heroes of the past century, who are now trying to rest on their laurels, that if they refuse (although they can and know how) to achieve new skills, if they fail to be open to innovations, the slowly rising but already visible New Wave will sweep them from their positions in society.

—S. Bratkowski, "Sound the Alarm about the Future of the Country," *Zycie Warszaw* (Warsaw), June 4, 1970.

Dissatisfaction with economic and social policy, with the way the affairs of the party and state were being managed, has been growing and spreading for a considerable time. This dissatisfaction became a crisis of confidence in the leadership of the party and government. . . . However, the voices of criticism were treated as voices of malcontents and were rejected. . . .

Everyone of us bears a part of the responsibility for what happened, although, no doubt, the blame cannot be equally spread. . . . An appraisal of the previous leadership's policy calls for a longer passage of time. This applies particularly to an appraisal of the role of Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka. . . . Without in any way minimizing his personal achievements and work given to the party and state, we must state that unfortunately, somewhere in the mid-1960's, after the 14th [PUWP] Congress, the crisis in the leadership of the party and state became more and more apparent.

—Edward Gierek, speech to PUWP CC Plenum on Feb. 7, 1971, broadcast by Warsaw Radio.

Poland and the whole world changed, but Gomulka did not. His modesty and conciliatoriness, partymindedness and partriotism thus were transformed into obstinacy and a peremptory manner, into bureaucratism and pedantry. There are few historical figures who began so courageously and ended so disgracefully. Gomulka has no complaint that history did not give him a chance.

—Milovan Djilas, in *Kultura* (Paris), No. 3, 1971, p. 501.

[7] For surveys of the Polish economic situation at different phases of the Gomulka era, see John Michael Montias, *Central Planning in Poland*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 263-333; Michael Gamarnikow, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1968, pp. 23-42; Leon Smolinski, "Economics and Politics: IV—Reforms in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1966..

[8] L. Gilejko and L. Stanke, in *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 23, 1971.

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veying [to the workers] the directives and recommendations" of management.

Finally, the regime did not enjoy the degree of support from the population—and particularly from the workers—that would have permitted it to impose, even temporarily, the deprivations which were necessary to implement the 1969-70 reform program. By way of contrast, this was precisely the sort of support that had been extended to Gomulka in 1956, when a kind of consensus developed between the new regime and Polish society in the heady aftermath of the Poles' October bid for a greater measure of freedom from internal and external (*i.e.*, Soviet) controls. Rather quickly, however, Gomulka had moved not only to set distinct limits on Polish independence from the Soviet Union but—in accordance with his own autocratic proclivities—to return Poland to hegemonic one-party control. The result was what came to be widely known and ironically referred to as the "small stabilization" of the Polish political system, characterized by the degeneration of consensus into a mutually-sanctioned standoff between the party and society. From the people's point of view, the Gomulka leadership lost credibility as a reformist or even a modernizing body; since it was recognized that Soviet power and Communist rule were realities which could not be escaped, many segments of society simply resolved to have as little to do with the regime as possible.

For its part, the party hierarchy—although it regained control of all the "commanding heights" of power and liquidated most potential institutional challenges to its rule—generally refrained from efforts to mobilize the population, by force or persuasion, into active support of its policies. This fact is probably explained by weaknesses in the party structure itself. The PUWP continued to be controlled by apparatchiks unresponsive to societal interests; throughout the Gomulka era it remained numerically small, ideologically demoralized, and partially paralyzed by a high level of factional and interpersonal tension in the leadership. Thus, insofar as the party was concerned, respect for the considerable "distance" that existed between itself and society was perhaps necessary for it to rule at all. Such a standoff afforded it a temporary escape from the dilemma of either reconciliation with Polish society through genuine reform, raising the threat of an eventual challenge to party supremacy—or confrontation with the society, posing the specter of another mass upheaval and Soviet intervention.

Over the long run, however, the disfunctionality of Poland's system of rule could not be ignored; by the latter half of the 1960's, the handwriting was beginning to appear on the wall. In the face of mounting political and economic problems, the regime proved incapable of effective innovation at either the macro (national) or the micro (enterprise) level. It put off policy decisions whenever possible and—when the pressure of events demanded action—took half-measures. In consequence, the "small stabilization" began to disintegrate: the ruling elite remained at odds with itself, and its sense of commitment to a common ideology was weakened; the top leadership could no longer offer a credible definition of the purpose of the political system in relation to society or—least of all—permit the expression of such a purpose in effective institutional terms.[9]

The Countdown to Crisis

Many of the symptoms of this systemic crisis were eventually summarized in a frank and free-wheeling discussion in the Polish press in mid-1970.[10] The dominant view of participants in the discussion was that, as a result of all-pervasive economic, social, and political stagnation, Poland was losing a race against time to keep in step with the ongoing scientific-technical revolution; worse, the prospects for improvement were so bleak that Poland might well face a renewed threat to its fundamental national interests in the altered European environment of the 1970's (a reference to the possibility that the boom of East and West Germany's economies would diminish the importance of Poland's faltering economy to the USSR). While reversing the tide would require new policies and—some discussants broadly hinted—new leaders, it was also necessary to recognize basic deficiencies in the structure of rule. In the words of one commentator:

. . . the amount of energy expended on and, even worse, the hopes attached to [societal] organizations are small. Why? I think it is because their activities have been largely formalized, subjected to a single model, and hence somehow bureaucratized. As a result, many organizations have lost their character as initiative groups, as characteristically socialist

[9] The discussion here utilizes concepts elaborated by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his notable analysis of the possible future degeneration of the Soviet system, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1966, p. 14.

[10] The discussion, published under the title, "New Tasks for Poland," in the journal *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), was ably reviewed by Michael Costello in "The Poles Look at Their Country and at Themselves," Radio Free Europe *Research Report*, Sept. 16, 1970.

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"pressure groups" seeking the realization of their demands. . . . This is connected with a broader problem, that of transmitting initiatives arising from the masses. . . . It often seems that many of the conduits . . . above all, social and civic organizations, are blocked, buried under a mountain of paper, devoid of independence or effectiveness.[11]

Well before such views identified a crisis in the whole system of rule, it had become apparent that not only the party leadership but various elements in Polish society were coming to find the mutual standoff of the "small stabilization" increasingly uncomfortable. In terms of age categories, probably the most frustrated group was the relatively large generation which had been born in the immediate postwar era, just coming to maturity in the middle to late 1960's—whose proportionate size made Poland demographically the "youngest" nation in Eastern Europe. These youths found their aspirations blocked not only by the general problems of a sick economy and a repressive political structure but more specifically by an obsolete educational system, a grave housing shortage, intense competition for suitable jobs, and a very low rate of personnel turnover at all levels of the bureaucracy.

In terms of social as opposed to age groupings, the most persistent and articulate source of protest was the Polish intellectual community. As early as 1964, censorship restrictions, coupled with the artificial limitation of newsprint and the harassment of nonconformist writers, led many of Poland's prominent nonparty literary men to issue an eloquent protest in the form of the so-called "Letter of the 34." [12] This was the first of several demonstrations over the years by groups of the humanist intelligentsia against the restrictive cultural policies of the regime. In 1966, for example, the noted philosopher Leszek Kolakowski—a party member—publicly lamented the reversal of the 1956 promises of democratization. His consequent expulsion from the PUWP was protested in turn by 22 prominent party writers—many of whom likewise lost their party cards.[13]

Intellectual discontent also surfaced at the universities. A dramatic indication of prevailing sentiments was provided in 1968, when the militia's forceful dispersal of a peaceful demonstration at Warsaw University sparked three days of student rioting in the capital and protests in every provincial university center. The meeting had been called in reaction against the authorities' attempts to crack down on dissident students and faculty and to impose new restrictions on cultural freedom (epitomized by the banning of Adam Mickiewicz's national classic *Dziady* [Forefathers] from the stage of the National Theater).[14]

Meantime, another more subtle but nonetheless effective display of discontent came from the Roman Catholic Church. In 1966—following upon a series of measures by which the party violated the Church-party understanding of 1956 (including elimination of religious instruction from the public schools and the drafting of seminary students into the army)—the Church took advantage of the millenium of Christianity in Poland to demonstrate its own "Polishness" and the broad allegiance it still commanded from the population. The PUWP organized counter-demonstrations, resulting in a sort of competition for a popular judgment as to which institution—Church or party—best represented the traditions of the Polish nation. If the size of crowds was a measure, this was a contest that the Church clearly won.[15]

A year later, in a reaction against the state's attempt to deal with a rising demand for meat through rationing instead of encouraging greater supply, Poland's private peasantry (which still farms some 85 percent of the land) slaughtered its livestock. As in the case of a similar protest back in 1958, the peasants' action represented a spontaneous display of resentment against the Gomulka regime's reneging on its initial promise not merely to tolerate but to strengthen the structure of peasant farming.[16]

In 1970, industrial workers added their voices to the chorus of mounting dissatisfaction over the "post-October" system. Periodic "work stoppages" had occurred for years (one well-publicized case was the strike at the Zeran auto works in Warsaw in 1963), but now worker unrest assumed qualitatively different proportions. In terms of repercussions on the party leadership and the political system, the protest of the industrial workers proved easily to be the most effective of all. It was one thing for the Polish United Workers' Party to neutralize or suppress intellectual dissent. But—in the absence of

[11] K. T. Toeplitz, in *Zycie Warszawy*, July 22, 1970.

[12] *Dziennik Polski* (London), April 11, 1964.

[13] See this author's "Warsaw: Politics and Intellectuals," *East Europe*, July 1967.

[14] See this author's "Poland: End of an Era?" *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1970, pp. 28-29.

[15] See Hansjakob Stehle, *Nachbar Polen* (Neighbor Poland), Frankfurt-am-Main, S. Fischer Verlag, 1968, revised edition, pp. 139-68.

[16] See Marek Celt, "Another Round: Peasant and Party in Poland," *East Europe*, February 1968; also, the recent account by W. Bienkowski (a disgraced ex-confidant of Gomulka) published abroad as *Crisis in Agriculture or Crisis of Agricultural Policy* (in Polish), Paris, Institut Literatcki, 1970.

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SOUNDS OF DECEMBER

EDITORS' NOTE: The Soviet Union has no monopoly on ballads of protest and dissent (see Problems of Communism, *November-December 1970). During and after the December 1970 riots in Poland, a number of strident, irreverent ballads were heard in that country, sung in the raucous and earthy style for which Polish workers are famous, to the tunes of traditional Christmas carols, popular songs, and ditties. Three are presented here in translation.*

1.

Compatriots from the coast, your carols air.
Let the songs of workers echo everywhere
That petty bosses bring oppression and despair.
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

The mighty forgot their roots lie with the rest;
Once they'd seized power, the people repressed.
They spread false rumors, exploited with zest.
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

The potentates finally grew so outrageous,
They dared to raise prices while lowering wages.
The CC arranged it—didn't try to assuage us.
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

When the strikers marched forth in processional ranks,
They were met by clubs, by tear gas and tanks,
And the blood flowed like water. Dear party, our thanks!
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

They sent tanks and 'copters, but to no avail,
For the people handled the killers quite well.
May the clique of mad fools all go to hell!
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

Today, the workers sing songs with verve
Of how their seacoast comrades had the nerve
To break in and burn the party's preserve.
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

Before tanks and clubs a Pole does not quail,
Nor do Gomulkas, Kocioleks [1]—that bunch—make him fail.
They scorn the people? We'll make them turn tail!
Sing carols, sing carols, hey!

2.

Lend an ear, ye people, to a very strange tale,
The horror of which makes most listeners pale.
On the 12th of December of this fateful year,
The price of meat grew exceptionally dear.
All the workers in seaports decided to strike
And were fired on by army, police, and the like.

Oh, People's Poland, what was it all for?
Why, long years after the war, still so poor?
Prices are rising, while wages go down.
The rest of the world thinks the Poles are all clowns
For condemning the West in a self-righteous fit,
Backing Vietnam, while themselves eating s _ _ t!

[1] Stanislaw Kociolek was ousted from the PUWP Central Committee in February 1971.

From time to time the Polish nation arises,
And Gomulka makes promises to the crowd.
But Poland's government clique grew so proud
That it dared once more to raise food prices.
The people, made desperate, turned out in the street,
Burned party headquarters, threatened the clique.

Gomulka, the leader, trembling in fright,
Resigned from his party post, vanished from sight.
Before there was s _ _ t, and that's still what's in store;
Once it was cheap, but now it costs more—
The legacy which past regimes left o'er.
Enough, this is where our sad ballad closes.
We'll see soon enough what the future exposes!

3.

Eenie, meenie, minie, rover.
Our Gomulka's sure hung over.
Eenie, meenie, minie, pest.
The S.O.B. is having a rest.

Eenie, meenie, minie, scar.
They finally went too far.
Eenie, meenie, minie, hair.
Sweep Bald Joe right out of there.[2]

Eenie, meenie, minie, lout.
Kociolek's burned his candle out.
Eenie, meenie, minie, chump.
Toss him on the garbage dump.

Eenie, meenie, minie pashek.
We flushed out that guy Walaszek.[3]
Eenie, meenie, minie, denim.
He'll no longer dish out venom.

Eenie, meenie, minie, poacher.
They're also throwing out Moczar.[4]
Eenie, meenie, minie, bull.
He'll be bounced on his stupid skull.

Eenie, meenie, minie, smirkers.
Whoever dares to shoot at workers—
Eenie, meenie, minie, muss—
Shall no longer govern us!

[2] Reference to Jozef Cyrankiewicz, who was removed from the Premiership of Poland on December 23, 1970.
[3] Antoni Walaszek was removed from the First Secretaryship of the Szczecin Province Committee of the PUWP after the riots.
[4] This was a premature claim. Polish secret-police chief Mieczyslaw Moczar actually was promoted to full membership on the Politburo after the riots though he has since been relieved of his post in the Secretariat.—Ed.

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Stalinist repression—worker violence directed at a party claiming to understand the interests of the working class and to assure their realization by "building socialism" was bound to shake the foundations of the system of rule. In 1956 bloody rioting in Poznan had resulted in Gomulka's return to power and the fleeting liberalization of the Polish "October"; in 1970 rioting in Gdansk and Szczecin led to Gomulka's downfall and the apparent end of the "small stabilization."

A House Divided

In the same years that societal tensions were gradually pushing to the surface, a parallel set of tensions was festering within the party, helping to move it toward the climax of the December riots and the overhaul of the political leadership. Over a period of time, the leadership structure of the PUWP—dominated by Wladislaw Gomulka and his associates—was challenged from several directions by new forces and coteries: the so-called "Partisans" grouped around Mieczyslaw Moczar; the technocrats associated with Edward Gierek; and finally, a grouping of younger, better-educated and more pragmatic apparatchiks (including the aforementioned Stanislaw Kociolek). Although an analysis of these party groups appeared recently in this journal,[17] a brief recapitulation is in order.

After his return to power, Gomulka utilized his authority as the most prominent party victim of Stalinist repression in Poland and as the defender of Polish sovereignty in 1956 to manipulate and dominate opposed factional groupings and mutually hostile individuals in the PUWP leadership. However, he made no attempt to purge these elements. Hence, there was a high level of intergroup and interpersonal tension in the leadership—as noted above, an important factor contributing to the dearth of policy initiatives in the 1960's.

At the outset of that decade, a challenge to Gomulka's power was mounted by the faction that has called itself the Partisans, led by secret police chief Moczar. Establishing a firm organizational base in the secret police apparatus, the veterans' organization (ZBoWiD), and some of the mass media, the Partisan group—the hard core of which was composed of "old soldiers" who had fought in the Communist underground in Poland during World War II—successfully attracted to its banner, through largely demagogic (including nationalist) slogans, many ambitious young Poles who found their careers blocked by the bureaucratic deadweight of the Gomulka regime and who wanted, somehow, to see Poland "moving again."

Gomulka contained the Partisans until 1968, but the student unrest that spring provided Moczar with the opportunity to make a major bid for power. Provoking a fierce anti-intellectual and especially anti-semitic witchhunt in the party, the Partisans succeeded in cutting down many of their enemies (including the remaining ex-"liberal" leaders of Jewish origin who had risen with Gomulka in 1956, as well as others of his supporters) by forcing their ouster from top and second-level party and state positions. Yet although the Partisans were able to precipitate a party purge, Gomulka managed to rebuff Moczar's bid to assume leadership—even before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia strengthened his hand.

Gomulka's victory was, however, a very qualified one. He defeated the Partisan challenge only by accepting the enhanced power of the regional party bosses (the *wojewodztwo* first secretaries) and by sanctioning the emergence in the party leadership of the "pragmatists"—younger, better-educated men largely uninvolved in the factional battles of the late 1950's and the early 1960's. In 1969, the ambitious "post-purge rationalizers," demanding repayment of the debt Gomulka had incurred to them in 1968, began to move ahead politically on their own. The appearance of this new political force in the Polish Communist leadership signified a crumbling of past intraparty battlefronts—especially the polarization between Gomulka's supporters and the Partisans.

During 1969 the younger apparatchiks appeared to have an important voice in determining major policy shifts in Poland. One such departure was the adoption of a more realistic and more Polish-centered —as opposed to slavishly pro-Soviet or pro-GDR— approach to the German question, a modification which ultimately led to the signing of a border and renunciation-of-force treaty between Poland and West Germany in Warsaw on December 7, 1970 (note that this orientation emerged in Poland before the thaw in Soviet-West German relations).[18] Other policy innovations included the establishment of better relations with the dissident Romanian and Yugoslav parties and, domestically, the assumption of a somewhat more conciliatory attitude towards

[17] See footnote 14.

[18] See this author's *The Warsaw Pact's Campaign for "European Security"*, Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, November 1970, R-565-PR, pp. 55-59.

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the Roman Catholic Church, a limited return to toleration of cultural unorthodoxy, and—most important—the aforementioned futile effort to reform the Polish economic mechanism.

The sources and motivations that inspired the economic reform program of 1969-70 point up a certain irony in the course of events that led to Gomulka's fall. The chief architect of the reform was Boleslaw Jaszczuk (elevated to the Politburo in mid-1968), whose first-string advisors were such "reformist" economic theoreticians as Jozef Pajestka and Stanislaw Majewski.[19] Since Jaszczuk and some of his advisors were pilloried following Gomulka's ouster, it must be emphasized that he was not one of Gomulka's close associates and that "his" reform program was supported, indeed inspired—if not in all its details, then in general outline—by the younger "pragmatists" in the party leadership. Their fear, eventually voiced rather openly at the Politburo level by the pragmatist Jozef Tejchma,[20] was that Poland would not be able to defend its national interests in the 1970's unless it could (1) pursue a "qualitatively different," more activist foreign policy towards Western Europe, especially the FRG, and (2) simultaneously assure its economic strength and social cohesion through a far-reaching modification of the economic mechanism.

After the question of a new economic reform emerged as a serious issue at the Fifth Congress of the PUWP in November 1968, Gomulka and his supporters began to espouse such a transformation of the economy; subsequently the First Secretary publicly advocated, and on occasion was the first to announce, specific features of the pending reorganization. But these were not Gomulka's innovations; belatedly—and probably halfheartedly—he was endorsing conceptions which he had stubbornly rejected throughout the 1960's and some aspects of which he had fiercely denounced as "revisionism" as late as the first part of 1968. In retrospect, the events of December 1970 suggest to what extent Gomulka's personal position in the PUWP leadership had been undermined and how much—in advocating new economic measures and otherwise displaying uncharacteristic political flexibility in 1969-70—he had submitted to the influence of new forces within the party leadership. In the end, Gomulka and his close associates were of course the primary victims of the leadership shake-up; with notable exceptions, the "pragmatists," who were in fact most responsible for the new reform conceptions, survived. After December the new leadership endeavored to assign to Gomulka (along with Jaszczuk) full responsibility for the immediate causes of the riots, as well as for their more fundamental origins rooted in 14 years of his rule. Gomulka was certainly to be blamed for the latter, and he was perhaps responsible as well for the mishandling of the reform endeavor (*e.g.*, the timing of the price increases). But the substance of the reform program itself could hardly be laid at his door, and it ought to be recognized that in this sense he was made the scapegoat for his colleagues.

Whatever his precise responsibility for the outbreak of the December demonstrations, Gomulka was indisputably to blame for the decision to sup-

[19] See Jaszczuk's programmatic article, "The Policy on Intensive Development" (in Polish), in *Zycie gospodarcze*, (Warsaw), June 1, 1969; for a retrospective comment, see Pajestka's self-critical remarks in *Trybuna ludu*, Jan. 8, 1971.

[20] See his statement quoted in *Kultura* (Warsaw), Oct. 4, 1970.

OF VILLAINS AND HEROES

. . . just as the source of many political tensions was the practice of departing from the Leninist standards of intraparty life, especially in the field of inner-party democracy and personnel policy . . ., so the primary reason for economic tensions and difficulties and the idling of Poland's great production potential was the infringement of the objective economic laws discovered by Marx and evolved by Lenin. In practice, [the problem] consisted in the voluntarism of the former leading group, which formulated, according to its "whim," *incorrect* methods of implementing the *correct* program assumptions. It should be stressed that the resolutions [on economic reform] adopted at the Fifth Party Congress . . . were and remain correct. They could not yield results . . . because of the voluntarism of the then party leadership, which . . . by its concrete practice . . ., its disregard of objective Marxist economic laws, and its underestimation of the needs of the working class, frustrated [the Congress'] intentions, to the great detriment of the national economy.

Society . . . knows and remembers that Edward Gierek, mindful of the real needs of the working class and the necessary conditions for the country's harmonious development, together with [some other] members of the former leading group, has systematically engaged in bold party discussions—that, . . . with the dignity of a statesman and simultaneously a Communist and a patriotic Pole, he . . . has always tried to promote . . . the indispensable decisions dictated by the most urgent needs of our economy and society. Unfortunately, in most cases, in the face of the autocratic methods of the then First Secretary, this was a proverbial Sisyphean task.

—Maciej Szczepanski, Editor-in-Chief of *Trybuna robotnica* (Katowice), in No. 22, Jan. 27, 1971.

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press them by force. This act—together with his apparent physical collapse (he was hospitalized on December 19, at the height of the rioting)—resulted in the formation of an anti-Gomulka consensus in the top leadership and Edward Gierek's assumption of the position of First Secretary.[21]

The New Leadership

Long regarded as the leader of the third major, potentially anti-Gomulka force in the party—the "Technocrats"—Gierek had built up a reputation in Silesia, Poland's most industrialized province, not as an economic "reformer" but as a capable, knowledgeable, pragmatic manager more interested in "getting the job done" than in elaborating theories and models concerning reform. In the course of the 1960's, Gierek and his Silesian party associates—standing on the performance of Silesian industry (which was better than the Polish average) and their own successful innovative methods at the province level—clashed repeatedly with the central authorities over economic policy, especially over the percentage of total investments allotted to Silesia. Indeed, Gierek seemed dedicated to the proposition that what was good for Silesia was good for Poland.[23]

Gierek played an ambiguous role in the party infighting of 1968. Thereafter, as the younger "pragmatists" advanced, and as Jaszczuk (an enemy of long standing) took over control of economic matters, his personal political fortunes seemed to decline. In 1969-70, still strongly advocating the modernization of the Polish economy, Gierek indirectly but unmistakably opposed aspects of Jaszczuk's reform scheme.[23] In retrospect, given the reputation he had acquired earlier, it was precisely the fact that Gierek was on the sidelines of the new economic reform effort and opposed elements of the conception (including its de-emphasis of consumption) that accounted for his taking over leadership of the party in December 1970.

Assuming the first secretaryship, Gierek quickly saw to the promotion of several functionaries who had worked with him in Silesia, as well as other supporters, to top party and state bodies. Initially the younger "pragmatists" retained their proportional representation at the apex of leadership (the ouster of Boleslaw Jaszczuk as director of the economy was counterbalanced by the promotion of other pragmatists). The Partisans, too, were included in the new leadership, with Moczar finally realizing a long-standing ambition to sit on the Politburo. There was thus substance to Gierek's early emphasis on the importance of "collective leadership."

To review briefly the most crucial changes in personnel, the emergency Central Committee Plenum in December announced the immediate removal from the party Politburo of Gomulka and his longtime associates Zenon Kliszko (chief ideologist) and Marian Spychalski (titular head of state), as well as Ryszard Strzelecki (the party's cadre chief) and the hapless Jaszczuk. They were replaced by the "Silesians" Edward Babiuch (head of the CC Organizational Department) and Jan Szydlak, together with Piotr Jaroszewicz (Deputy Premier and Poland's chief representative on Comecon), the "pragmatist" Stefan Olszowski and the "Partisan" Moczar—all of whom were already CC Secretaries. In a parallel reshuffle of the CC Secretariat, Gomulka, Kliszko, Strzelecki, and Jaszczuk were replaced by Gierek, Babiuch, Kazimierz Barcikowski (regional first secretary in Poznan), and—initially—Stanislaw Kociolek.

It was a measure of the Polish situation that, at the Eighth CC Plenum six weeks later in February, Kociolek lost both his Politburo and Secretariat posts as a result of worker dissatisfaction with his role in suppressing the December demonstrations in Gdansk. Another figure ousted from the Politburo at this time was Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, a close associate of Gomulka, who survived at first by backing Gierek but who was subsequently replaced as head of the trade union organization and demoted within the party in direct response to worker sentiment (more on which shortly). The February Plenum also imposed further demotions on Kliszko and Jaszczuk, removing them from the Central Committee, and simultaneously announced the "suspension" of Gomulka from the CC in view of "the state of his

[21] A satisfactory account of the transfer of power had not emerged at the time this article was completed. According to one report, by December 16 or 17 Gierek had already organized a new leadership at a villa near Warsaw: see "O.K." (Alexander Korab) in *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Jan. 21, 1971. As early as December 18, political commentators began to legitimize the demonstrations (*e.g.*, J. Jakrzewski's commentary on Radio Warsaw, 1800 GMT). The decisive factor leading to Gierek's takeover may have been the effort undertaken by Klizko—acting for Gomulka and consciously invoking the Kronstadt precedent—to suppress the demonstrations by brutal military force (note hints to this effect in Gierek's Eighth Plenum speech, *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 8, 1971; in W. Machejek's articles, *Zycie literackie* [Cracow], Jan. 24 and Feb. 12, 1971; and in Jakrzewski, *supra*).

[22] See Antoni Marek, "Edward Gierek—Opinions and Facts," Radio Free Europe *Research Report*, April 3, 1967.

[23] *E.g.*, at the Fifth Plenum (May 1970), Gierek's supporters A. Merlich and T. Pyka opposed Jaszczuk's incentive scheme (*Trybuna ludu*, May 21 and 22, 1970). Gierek himself reportedly told a workers' assembly in August that the scheme was "completely incomprehensible to the honest worker" (*Na antenie* [London], December 1970, p. 34).

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health." The Plenum also endorsed the wholesale replacement of *wojewodstwo* (regional) party leaders which had begun in December and was to continue into the spring.

In the state apparatus, Gomulka's ouster was paralleled by the replacement of Jozef Cyrankiewicz by Jaroszewicz as Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Cyrankiewicz was "kicked upstairs" to replace Spychalski. In January Kazimierz Switala was removed from the position of Minister of the Interior in response to worker protests against the violence which had been used against demonstrators by the security police (and the army) in December. In February a session of the Sejm (Parliament) approved further changes in a number of ministerial and other state posts, including a thoroughgoing reshuffle of the Planning Commission.

Switala's replacement as Minister of the Interior was Franciszek Szalachcic, a former deputy in that ministry and a longtime associate of Moczar—a fact that, together with Moczar's political promotion, invites a brief comment on the status of the Partisans on the post-Gomulka scene. It is true that Moczar ascended to the Politburo while initially retaining at least nominal control in the Secretariat over military and security matters. Also, his spokesmen and supporters (including at least one silenced by Gomulka after the Partisans' 1968 challenge) began to issue comprehensive, pro-Partisan interpretations of the December events in the wake of the crisis.[24] Yet on balance, there was nothing to indicate that the Partisans had made political headway. For one thing, they showed no signs of re-establishing the discipline, elan and support that had characterized their movement up to 1968. In the past they had enjoyed a virtual monopoly in criticizing Gomulka and also exploiting antisemitism within the party; but after 1968, no Jewish scapegoats remained—and the younger "pragmatists" (some of whom may once have thought Moczar could best advance their interests) had proved capable of moving ahead on their own. Further, Moczar's victory in a power struggle had long been assumed to require an alliance with cadre chief Ryszard Strzelecki—who was now replaced with a Gierek confidant. Most important, with the flood of public criticism of the past that followed Gomulka's ouster, the *sub rosa* carping at which the Partisans had excelled became irrelevant. Hence, it came as no great surprise that, later in the spring, the Partisans' spokesmen were again silent and Moczar himself faded from the public scene. (As this issue went to press, it was reported that Moczar had been relieved of his post in the Secretariat—Ed.)

In the first months following Gomulka's downfall, there were hints that a power struggle of unclear dimensions was continuing within the PUWP[25]—a process that could have been expected in what has historically been one of the most faction-prone Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Yet, because of the crucial role played by the public—and especially the workers—in challenging the fundaments of the "small stabilization" over which Gomulka had ruled, the overwhelming odds were that political conflicts in Poland in the 1970's could no longer be confined to personalized confrontations within the party.

More important than personnel changes, of course, were the policy innovations of the new Gierek leadership. Upon assuming power, Gierek's immediate problem was to prevent further rioting, defuse the explosive situation on the coast, and gain a measure of popular confidence. Toward this end, Gierek imitated Gomulka's performance in 1956 with respect to the Poznan demonstrations: the day after his appointment, he reversed the party's initial condemnation of the riots (which earlier had been called "irresponsible actions" fomented by "hostile, anarchist, and criminal elements" and an exhibition of the workers' "lack of reason and sense of responsibility"[26]), and declared instead that they were, in the main, a manifestation of legitimate working-class grievances.[27]

Several days later, the new regime announced that it would undertake a fundamental reappraisal of the former strategy of economic development and a revision of the yearly and five-year plans, with the intention of assuring a more "harmonious" economic course that would take into account the "needs of the working people" and avoid the past error of "production for production's sake"; among specific improvements, it promised better market supplies, more (and more justly allocated) housing, and a revision of the bonus scheme.[28] At the same time, the regime granted the workers limited eco-

[24] See, *e.g.*, K. Kakol, in *Prawo i zycie* (Warsaw), Jan. 1, 1970; W. Machejek, in *Zycie literackie*, Jan. 24, 1971; and R. Gontarz, in *Prawo i zycie*, Feb. 7, 1971.

[25] *E.g.*, R. Wojna's reference to "an acute struggle between the old and the new" in the leadership, in *Zycie Warszawy*, Feb. 19, 1971.

[26] See radio and television address by Cyrankiewicz on December 17 (*Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 18, 1970); unsigned editorial in *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 17, 1970.

[27] Address by Gierek on December 20, in *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 21, 1970; editorial in *Nowe drogi (Warsaw)*, January 1971.

[28] Gierek's speech to the Sejm on Dec. 23, in *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 24-27, 1970.

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nomic concessions in the form of a two-year price freeze and the immediate distribution of allowances totalling seven billion *zloty* to low-income families.

With the avowed aim of establishing "a close link with the working class and the entire nation," Gierek launched a so-called "dialogue" with the workers by organizing a series of "consultations" with workers' representatives to discuss implementation of the regime's concessions. More broadly, the new leadership sought to reduce the gap between party and society by adopting new approaches to several areas and elements of the national life. Perhaps most notably, the regime sought to improve relations with Poland's strong Roman Catholic Church. The Church was promised formal title to its properties in ex-German territories (which the state had retained since 1945); Jaroszewicz met personally with Cardinal Wyszynski—the first such Church-state "summit" conversation since 1960; and preparations were resumed for a Papal visit to Poland, a proposition Gomulka had vetoed in 1966.[29]

Declaring the need to adopt a "new style" in political life, Gierek and his associates also initiated a number of reforms affecting the party. To back up their promise of "collegiality" in political decision-making, they began to schedule regular meetings of both the Politburo and the Secretariat. Unprecedented publicity was given to the activities of these and other organs, as the press and radio became both more informative and more critical. The party was told to redress the balance of "democratic centralism" in favor of the democratic element and to abstain from interference in the routine work of state bodies, which were to assume greater importance in the polity.[30] Party figures even began to talk of adopting a statutory limitation on terms of office at the next PUWP Congress.[31]

In contrast to these domestic innovations, the new leadership strove for continuity in foreign policy. Seeking to reassure the Soviet Union—which in the course of one week had seen a display of heretical workers' "spontaneity" and the ouster of a staunch allied leader—Gierek and Jaroszewicz traveled to Moscow (and later to East Berlin and Prague) to plead Poland's stability and loyalty, and also to request economic assistance. Other members of the PUWP Secretariat were dispatched to all Warsaw Pact capitals to offer similar assurances. Formal Soviet endorsement of Gierek as "a sincere friend of the Soviet Union, a convinced Communist and internationalist," [32] was quickly forthcoming, as were pledges of minor aid (later, as Gierek was subjected to mounting domestic pressure for further economic concessions, Moscow was moved to grant Warsaw a substantial long-term loan).

While the effort to reassure Moscow had first priority, the Gierek regime also acted quickly to express support for the detentist policy vis-a-vis Western Europe which had been reactivated toward the end of Gomulka's rule. Most important, it assured West Germany—publicly and through diplomatic channels—that it remained vitally interested in the normalization of bilateral relations initiated by Gomulka.[33] Pending ratification of the Warsaw Treaty, mutual visits of prominent politicians of the two countries continued, as did the repatriation of ethnic Germans from Western Poland to the Federal Republic.

Pressures from the Workers

Just how far Gierek and his associates originally intended to go with their domestic policy innovations quickly became a moot point, for the initial concessions—while putting an end to violence—failed to curb the workers' unrest. Their revolt proved to be more than a transitional phenomenon—the clearest sign of all that more than immediate economic issues were at stake.

Prior to the December demonstrations, leaders of the protest movement had gained the recognition of fellow workers outside the channels of the factory trade union and party organizations; in some places (notably the Szczecin shipyards), strike committees had been formally constituted. With the end of the violence the strike committees transformed themselves into workers' committees.[34] During January, the Szczecin and Gdansk shipyard workers, headed by their chosen leaders, repeatedly engaged in new strike actions; in February textile workers in Lodz followed suit.

Continuing mass actions made the workers the

[29] Vatican dispatch, *The New York Times*, March 7, 1971.

[30] Gierek's speech to the Eighth CC Plenum, *loc. cit.*

[31] Kociolek's speech broadcast on Radio Gdansk, Jan. 8, 1971.

[32] Telegram from Brezhnev, in *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 22, 1970.

[33] For details see Radio Free Europe *Polish Situation Report No. 70*, Dec. 21, 1970.

[34] Illuminating accounts based on personal conversations with workers are given by Bernard Margueritte, in *Le Monde* (Paris), Jan. 29, 1971, and by Charlotte Saikowski, in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Feb. 8, 1971. For a penetrating and sympathetic analysis of the significance of the workers' protest, see K. S. Karol's articles in *New Statesman* (London), Feb. 5, 1971, and *Le Monde* (Paris—weekly editions in English), Feb. 24 and March 3, 1971).

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most dynamic element on the Polish political scene in the first two months of 1971. The strength of the workers' movement was the more remarkable because of the absence of clear-cut political and intellectual "revisionist" forces. The link between such elements of the elite and the workers had accounted for the major eruptions of unrest in 1953 and 1956 in Eastern Europe. The assertiveness of the workers, standing alone, represented not merely a new element on the Polish political scene but a unique phenomenon in the Communist world.

Under the force of this pressure, the party leadership made a series of further economic concessions which it had originally rejected as "unrealistic" [35]: the subsidy to the lowest-paid workers was increased by an additional 1.5 billion *zloty;* the new bonus system was shelved rather than revised; and most important of all, with the help of the aforementioned Soviet loan, the December price increases were rescinded, effective March 1, 1971.

But the workers' grievances were by no means solely economic. As formulated in numerous statements, leaflets, and an open letter to Gierek, their demands also included the release of all demonstrators still under arrest and a moratorium on further sanctions against strikers; the punishment of officials responsible for the use of violence in December; the improvement of public information on state policies; the transformation of the trade unions into genuine channels for the institutionalized expression of workers' interests; and in the latter connection, the free election of local union representatives.[36] The party continued to maintain that these demands did not challenge the "existing system"—and it is true that the workers did not raise the question of the validity of "socialism" or of Communist party rule itself. Yet, in fact, the workers' protestations represented a devastating critique of the whole post-1956 system.

Besides making further economic concessions, the new leadership was compelled to satisfy some of these political demands, at least in part. While the fate of a number of the demonstrators arrested in December remained unclear, further sanctions were abjured. As noted earlier, it was in direct response to worker pressure that Kociolek lost his top party position because of his justification of militia violence on the coast in December—and that Switala was replaced as Minister of the Interior for transmitting Gomulka's order to fire on the workers (ironically, although Moczar was the real target of the workers' wrath, another former Moczar associate succeeded to the job).[37] Not only was the flow of official information improved, but the top party leaders, including Gierek himself, attempted to placate the workers by meeting them on their own ground—the shop floor—in Szczecin, Gdansk, Lodz and elsewhere; these meetings, intended as good will gestures, turned into extended and sometimes acrimonious discussions in which the party leaders were forced to justify their actions and make new promises.

Meantime the workers began to reshape the trade unions—not from above, as had happened in Hungary and Yugoslavia, but exclusively from below, by their own actions. As noted, Loga-Sowinski was ousted as head of the trade unions under worker pressure. A groundswell of complaints about the ineffectiveness of the central union organization led to a further shake-up of its leadership at a session of its

[35] See unsigned editorial in *Trybuna ludu,* Jan. 16, 1971.

[36] See Radio Free Europe *Polish Situation Report No. 5,* Jan. 22, 1971; news agency reports in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* Jan. 20, 1971; reprint of a Gdynia shipyard leaflet in *The New York Times,* Jan. 28, 1971; and Gierek's oral reply in Szczecin to an "Open Letter," in *Glos Szczecinski,* Jan. 26, 1971.

[37] Kociolek's tough television speeches defending the violence were reprinted in *Dziennik Baltycki (Gdansk)* and *Glos wybrzeza* on Dec. 16 and 17, 1970, respectively. For details on Switala's ouster, see Margueritte in *Le Monde,* Jan. 26, 1971.

VOICE OF THE WORKERS

The faces of the talkers change, new themes come up, new pains and problems appear. For years there has not been a cafeteria in the mechanical section, although more than one "highly placed" man promised it; one has to wait too long for a modest apartment; no one thought of a bus for the second shift; someone neglected the sausage supply; someone this, someone that. . . . And suddenly, in the morass of these painful, irritating matters, appears the common denominator—the trade unions.

The unions should really be the defender of the workers, and not institutions to distribute cinema tickets. What good is there in bureaucratized unions which have little to say on social matters and living conditions? What good is there in one more rigid administration, in activists enmeshed in routine, who have long since forgotten what a shop and factory hall look like . . .?

Let the unions defend us against the meanness of large and small petty chieftains, let them defend us against ossification, against the underrating of our basic needs. And also let the unions really help to build socialism; let them remember that you do not patch up socialism with glue. . . .

—*Glos Wybrzeza* (Gdansk), Jan. 30-31, 1971.

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Central Council in late February. The new union leadership, struggling to maintain party control over the organization, issued a resolution promising to satisfy some of the workers' demands; potentially most important, it resolved to see to the speedy passage of a Labor Code incorporating a limited veto right for the factory-level union organization, along the lines of the model adopted in Hungary.[38] But the resolution of the Central Council did not go far enough for the workers; it was criticized in Szczecin for devoting "too little attention" to workers' complaints.[39]

Ferment for Further Change

At the same time—again in a reversal of past experience in Eastern Europe—the workers' protest movement sparked the expression of dissatisfaction and the articulation of political claims by other elements of Polish society. The Roman Catholic Episcopate welcomed the party's announced intention of improving relations with the Church and joined Gierek (just as it had joined Gomulka in 1956) in appealing for calm to avoid Soviet intervention.[40] But the Episcopate made clear that its interest was in a Church-state reconciliation which respected the Church's interests, not one dictated by the party. It raised its own institutional demands—some of which amounted to a return to prewar status (*e.g.*, the right to publish a religious press and to carry on charitable activities)—while simultaneously making more directly political appeals for "freedom of speech and information," "true democracy," and respect for Poland's "Christian culture." [41]

Societal aspirations were also expressed in other, less institutional forms: for example, a precipitous increase was reported in the volume of letters to editors—many of which, according to *Polityka* editor Mieczyslaw Rakowski, were politically too sensitive to print.[42] *Tygodnik powszechny* (a lay Catholic weekly which, while still subject to censorship, is the closest thing to a free press organ in Poland) appealed editorially not just for atmospheric changes but for a "new model of mutual relations" between party and society, and for a "dialogue" which would "not be fearful of controversial views and demands." [43]

Such appeals were also to be found in muted form in the more orthodox mass media—though it was uncertain which represented the new leadership's genuine intention to satisfy societal demands, which were voiced to defuse immediate social tensions, and which reflected the possible articulation within the party elite of demands for further liberalization. (Conversely, there were periodic assertions of the need for definite limits to far-reaching change,[44] but it was difficult to say to what extent they represented the view of the Gierek leadership or to what extent they emanated from "hardline" elements.) In any event, by the end of February, most organizations and institutions of the political system—from the Sejm to the Socialist Youth Union [45]—had been subjected to public criticism from one source or another.

All of this political pressure from below seemed likely to be reinforced by the impact of the Warsaw Treaty, which hopefully deflated Polish fears of German "revanchism." The treaty, signed just before Gomulka's ouster, incorporated West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier—desired by the entire Polish nation for the past 25 years—and "finally ended the problem of frontiers" for Poland (to use the ex-First Secretary's words).[46] For many years the PUWP had justified its rule to the nation at large with the argument that it was the only Polish political force acceptable to the USSR as a partner in an anti-West German alliance guaranteeing Poland's territorial integrity. As Gomulka himself had put it after the outbreak of student unrest in 1968: "Whoever takes up a struggle against our party . . . undermines the foundations of Poland's national existence" [47]—a form of political blackmail that the Polish leadership was in a better position to employ than any other East European Communist regime.

[38] Feron, in *The New York Times*, Feb. 26, 1971; *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 25 and 26, 1971. Veto powers were strongly advocated by J. Urban, in *Polityka* (Warsaw), Jan. 30, 1971.

[39] Radio Szczecin, March 2, 1971, 1600 GMT.

[40] ". . . order and calm . . . are the best guarantee of our independence," (resolution of the Episcopate Conference, broadcast by the Vatican Radio in Polish, Feb. 1, 1971, 1930 GMT).

[41] These demands were raised in Cardinal Wyszynski's sermon of Dec. 24, 1970, at St. Anne's Cathedral; in a Pastoral Letter of Jan. 1, 1971; in Wyszynski's Epiphany sermon of Jan. 6, 1971; in his sermon of Jan. 15, 1971; and in an Episcopate Appeal of Jan. 27, 1971 (as reported in the Rado Free Europe *Polish Situation Reports* and broadcast in part by the Vatican Radio in Polish).

[42] Issue of Jan. 23, 1971.

[43] Unsigned editorial, Jan. 3, 1971; editorial signed by J. T. (Jersy Turowicz, editor-in-chief), Jan. 17, 1971.

[44] *E.g.*, an editorial in *Glos Szczecinski*, Jan. 9, 1971, warning—in a rare linking of the Polish and Czechoslovak situations—of the danger of a "second" or "third" stage of crisis.

[45] See, *e.g.*, speech of Tejchma to the Sejm, in *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 14, 1971; report of a self-critical session of the PUWP Sejm deputies' club, in *ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1971; "Music and Actualities" discussion on Radio Warsaw, Feb. 12, 1971, 1750 GMT. See also the critical "Periscope" discussion on Radio Warsaw, Feb. 21, 1971, 1320 GMT (during which the SYU was called an "Office for Youth Affairs" which had "organized nothing but mushroom hunts and dancing soirees").

[46] Speech in Zabrze on Dec. 3, in *Trybuna ludu*, Dec. 4, 1971.

[47] *Trybuna ludu*, March 20, 1968.

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Authoritative party sources publicly conceded last December that the *"raison d'etat"* argument had been "often abused." [48] Even though Germanophobia will not soon disappear in Poland, the German bogeyman is losing much of its political utility for justifying external dependence on the Soviet Union and internal orthodoxy. Ratification of the treaty in Bonn can be expected to reinforce this tendency.

To sum up the situation in Poland at the time of writing, it is quite evident that the nation is still in a state of uncertain transition. The "small stabilization" seems to have come to a decisive end, but the shape of the political system that will replace it (and Gierek's own political future) depends on the still uncertain resolution of a number of issues. The economic concessions made to the workers have heavily mortgaged the future; if the debt is to be repaid, the economy—and the workers—will have to respond with significantly greater productivity. More fundamentally, the Gierek leadership will have to demonstrate its ability to conceive and implement a "more harmonious" economic strategy that can initiate modernization without aggravating social antagonisms. Modernization seems to dictate the need for greater wage differentiation in some form, and—as in the past in Poland, in Czechoslovakia in early 1968, and in Yugoslavia—"hardliners" can be expected to exploit resulting worker dissatisfaction. The party as a whole faces the task of rejuvenating itself and reconciling its hegemonic rule with the demands of the workers and the Church for institutionalized representation and with the more general aspirations of the population for greater political freedom.

Finally, Gierek will have to maintain the confidence of the Soviet Union, an imperative not easy to reconcile with the dynamics of the internal situation, given the Soviet leadership's interests in Eastern Europe as defined in the Brezhnev Doctrine. In the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, Moscow did not hesitate to resort to outright invasion to protect its sphere of influence when it deemed the Dubcek reform was getting out of hand. In the Polish crisis of 1970, the Soviet course was less drastic but no less firm in the pursuit of self-interest: Moscow showed that it would abandon an ally overnight—no matter how loyal an "internationalist" or orthodox a "Marxist-Leninist"—if he was unable to maintain order at home. Thus Gomulka went down in disgrace, and Moscow proclaimed its confidence in a new Polish overlord. Yet despite its support of Gierek, the Soviet leadership could hardly be happy about some aspects of the Polish scene—including the legitimization of workers' "spontaneity," the use of aid from Moscow to subsidize a higher living standard for Polish workers than that of Soviet workers, and last but not least, the continued pressure emanating from within the party elite (though not necessarily from Gierek himself) to obtain a more self-assertive role for Poland in the international arena.[49] All of these developments must be viewed with serious reservations in Moscow.

By late spring, Gierek appeared to have made considerable headway in consolidating his personal position in the party and curbing societal pressures for additional measures of reform. What lies ahead for Poland is an open question. For the moment, all that can be said with reasonable certainty is that its new leadership still faces a precarious task, for many months—and perhaps years—to come, in promoting Poland's economic recovery while at the same time steering a course between the Scylla of internal pressures for further change and the Charybdis of Soviet limits to that change.

[48] Unsigned editorial in *Zycie Warszawy*, Dec. 22, 1970.

[49] On the latter point see, *e.g.*, the stress on Poland being an "equal partner" to the USSR in *ibid.*; also, the emphasis on Poland's special ties with Western Europe (A. Micewski, in *Zycie Warszawy*, Dec. 27, 1970).

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Books

A Pole Views His Country

By Adam Bromke

JAN SZCZEPANSKI: *Polish Society*. New York, Random House, 1970.

WHEN A SCHOLAR with the international reputation of Jan Szczepanski, one of Poland's most distinguished sociologists, publishes a book in English presenting a studious, non-polemical appraisal of the state of Polish society under Communist rule, what he has to say merits careful attention.

For many years on the faculty of the University of Lodz, Professor Szczepanski was honored with the presidency of the International Sociological Association from 1967 to 1970 and is currently Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. As a sociologist, he is well known for his fundamental studies of industrialization and urbanization in postwar Poland. In addition he has been active since 1956 on the fringe of Polish politics, serving for four years (1957-61) as a nonparty deputy to the Polish parliament. On June 4 last year, an article by Szczepanski criticizing the stagnation in Poland appeared in *Zycie Warszawy* and provoked a nationwide debate that proved a harbinger of the political changes which followed near the close of the year.

Though his book is based on many years of research in Poland, Professor Szczepanski wrote it during his residence in 1967 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. The book, published in Random House's sociological series, is addressed explicitly to an English-speaking audience; it will not appear in Polish. The work fully satisfies the methodological standards of Western scholarship and is singularly free of ideological cliches. It does not praise or blame, but only analyzes; and by and large it presents a well-documented and fairly balanced picture of contemporary Poland.

The book contains two major theses. The first is that World War II and the political changes which followed have brought about, in Poland, a society which displays a high degree of egalitarianism. "Although still far from absolute egality as depicted in many socialist utopias," claims Szczepanski, Poland today has at least moved "closer to the ideal Marxian image of a classless society" (p. 146). He supports this argument with an elaborate and, in many respects, profound analysis of the transformation of Poland's social structure, which he says now differs fundamentally from that of the interwar years. The landowning and upper-bourgeois classes, he points out, were already weakened greatly by the war, and with the expropriation of estates and industrial enterprises by the Communist regime, they have completely disappeared. The petty bourgeoisie, composed of craftsmen and small entrepreneurs (there are over 300,000 small private enterprises in Poland today), has survived, and there is no attempt to liquidate it; but its influence on the mainstream of Polish economic life is marginal.

The three main classes in Poland today are the intelligentsia, the workers, and the peasants. Although the intelligentsia suffered tremendous losses (amounting to some 35 percent) during the war, it has not merely recovered its strength with the expansion of the educational system in the postwar years, but has expanded very considerably. The number of white-collar workers increased from 700,000 in 1938 to more than 2.5 million in 1965, and the number of people who received higher education between 1945 and 1965 reached 405,000 compared with 85,000 for the entire interwar period. As Professor Szczepanski points out, however, the new intelligentsia is quite different from the old. Whereas before the war the intelligentsia came mainly from among the landowners and bourgeoisie, its pres-

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ent members are now largely of peasant and worker stock. Moreover, as the intelligentsia has grown in number, it has become highly differentiated internally. Differences in the type and level of education received, as well as increasing specialization of work, have led to a division of this class into various smaller groups: intellectuals, engineers, economists, enterprise managers, bureaucrats, etc. Thus, it can be said that the structure of the Polish intelligentsia has undergone modernization, becoming much more like the highly differentiated intelligentsia of advanced Western societies.

By comparison with the intelligentsia, Poland's working class came through the war relatively unscathed and has since expanded enormously as a result of rapid industrialization. During 1950-65, the number of workers employed in mining and industry increased from 2 million to over 3.5 million and in construction from 500,000 to almost 900,000. At the same time, differences between the workers and other classes have narrowed. On the one hand, many former workers have obtained education and joined the ranks of the intelligentsia. On the other hand, the members of the new industrial proletariat come mainly from the peasantry and have retained their close ties with the village, almost a million of them still cultivating small farms while working in industry. As in the case of the intelligentsia, rapid growth has led to an internal differentiation of the working class based on types of work. At the same time, the gap between blue- and white-collar workers is steadily closing, as is also the gap between workers and intelligentsia. Not only are the more skilled workers better paid than some groups of the intelligentsia—for example, lower-level officials—but their social status is often higher, too.

Least affected by the great social changes has been the Polish peasantry. It was relatively little damaged by the war, and its economic position was strengthened soon afterward by land reform. All attempts during the Stalinist years to change its social structure through collectivization met with determined resistance from the peasants, and after 1956 those attempts were abandoned with 85 percent of the arable land still remaining in private hands. Nevertheless, the peasant class has also changed, and the distance separating it from the other classes, Professor Szczepanski finds, has been reduced. Large numbers of peasants have joined the ranks of the workers and the intelligentsia. The remaining rural population, too, has undergone a deep transformation thanks to the spread of education. The new generation of peasants, trained in modern agricultural methods, is gradually "farmerizing" traditional agriculture: instead of regarding his family plot as "patrimony," the younger peasant of today sees it as a commercial enterprise from which maximum profit is to be extracted. Such attitudes lead to greater specialization and to internal differentiation of the class.

In contemporary Polish society, then, traditional class differences have become considerably attenuated. With the continuing process of internal stratification, there is a growing overlap between the various classes, and social divisions are generally beginning to follow occupational rather than class lines. Professor Szczepanski does not anticipate any major reversal of this trend towards egalitarianism, at least not in the near future. He rejects Milovan Djilas' thesis of the inevitable formation of a "new class" in a Communist system. He points out that in present-day Polish society—differentiated along occupational rather than class lines—power, prestige, and income are separated. A member of the Politburo, for example, has political power but enjoys less prestige than a university professor, and his income is smaller than that of an entrepreneur. His privileged position is strictly related to the function he performs, and personnel changes in the higher echelons of the party hierarchy are quite frequent. Moreover, the author claims, there is no mechanism whereby the privileges of the parents can be passed on to their children, and education is accessible to all.

But while Professor Szecepanski is undoubtedly correct in claiming that the social structure in Poland is much more egalitarian today than it was before the war, his view that there is no mechanism for the formation of a "new class" in Poland seems too sanguine. Some writers even claim that such a class—labeled the "apparatus bourgeoisie"—already exists in Poland. Certainly there are various means by which the privileges of higher-echelon party functionaries can be effectively preserved. For instance, the practice of protecting inefficient bureaucrats by shifting them from one responsible post to another was widely used under the Gomulka regime. And it is also well known that the children of party dignitaries find it easier to get into university—an advantage that is formalized by granting extra credits to applicants whose parents have high state decorations! One might add here that, so far as continuing inequalities of educational opportunity are concerned, Professor Szczepanski will now have an opportunity to do

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something to correct them, for early this year he was appointed chairman of a Committee of Experts to advise the cabinet on reform of the educational system.

THE SECOND and perhaps more important thesis of Professor Szczepanski's book is that the model of Communist totalitarian society evolved by Western political scientists does not correspond to the realities of contemporary Poland.

The monolithic model of the Communist system has, of course, been subjected to attack even in the West for quite some time; but the case made against it by Western scholars has frequently been poorly documented because of the difficulty of obtaining data on the Communist countries. This is probably the first time that a scholar from the Communist orbit as knowledgeable and sophisticated as Professor Szczepanski has directly challenged the validity of the totalitarian model. The author rebukes Western students of East European affairs for overestimating the role of political institutions and underestimating the importance of actual political processes:

Some political scientists, fascinated by the importance of political and government institutions, have been inclined to believe that the introduction of Communist political institutions in East European societies has transformed these societies into Communist ones in a very short time. But a society can be completely transformed only by developing a new microstructure that corresponds to the new macrostructure (p. 174).

It is not that Professor Szczepanski has any illusions about where real political power in Poland resides. He sees the minor political parties and the various Catholic political groups as little more than pressure groups. He acknowledges that the parliament, though performing a useful function in examining bills, has no real political authority, while the Council of Ministers is merely a central administrative organ. Real political power is, in fact, exercised by the top leadership of the Communist Party. During the Stalinist period, the party's usual methods of rule were pressure and coercion. Since 1956 the situation has been changing, but the author admits that to say "changing" does not mean "changed."

Yet, with all their power, the Communists have not been able to remold Polish society to their desired ideological image. Professor Szczepanski points out that the social transformations in postwar Poland, radical as they have been, are still by no means complete, and that remnants of the old classes and old attitudes have not only survived but found ways and means of influencing the new social strata. As a result, continuity as much as change is a factor in shaping Poland's social mosaic.

As a consequence of long years of foreign rule, the author explains, the Poles are adept at frustrating the objectives of any authority. When denied other means of political opposition, they withdraw into tight circles based on family or friends and there preserve their own traditional system of values; yet, such informal groups remain extremely influential because they make the "content" of everyday life. Thus, in postwar Poland there have been two different value patterns existing side by side—the traditional and the revolutionary (the latter based on the Soviet model), and Professor Szczepanski maintains that "the majority of citizens limited themselves to paying some lip service to the new principles, although still keeping to the old patterns" (p. 179). He also sees "essential differences" between the Polish and Soviet societies "stemming from differences in their traditional national and religious cultures . . ., the role of the individual accepted in each country, and the long period of Stalinism in the USSR" (p. 196), and he believes that in these respects not that much has changed in postwar Poland. The new generation of Poles, he claims, is still being brought up on such traditional Polish literary classics as the works of Sienkiewicz, Kraszewski, and Zeromski, and it is from such staples that they derive their cultural values. These values, he says, are above all ". . . individualism, sense of honor, pride in national military glory, a cult of national heroes, and patriotism in the sense of dedication to national interests" (p. 199).

The social stratum which remains the most conservative is, as might be expected, the peasantry. Their way of life and outlook have changed little from what they were in the prewar period, and even those who have moved into other social strata since the war (as pointed out earlier, a majority of the workers and a large proportion of the intelligentsia today stem from the peasantry) have clung to many traditional values. In the case of the intelligentsia, the conservatism of those of peasant origin has merged with the traditionalism of the prewar intelligentsia recruited from the landowning classes and the bourgeosie, with the result that the new intelligentsia has largely adopted the system of values and the life-style of the old. The author observes:

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Through this mechanism of social continuity, many elements of the traditional gentry culture were accepted by the new intelligentsia, new economic managers, and new political officials in their roles of "cultured men." . . . Thus the cultured heritage of the landowning class left its mark in the first postwar decades and will be only slowly transformed by new customs and habits (p. 111).

Professor Szczepanski goes on to show that the old traditions have even retained an institutional outlet because of the unique position still held by the Roman Catholic Church. In the Stalinist period the Communist regime tried to break the Church's power by coercion, but these attempts not only failed but had the opposite effect of "strengthening the religiosity and the attachment of the masses to the Church" (p. 166). Since 1956, there has been a kind of "truce" between the Communist regime and the Church, and the author believes that coexistence between Marxism and Catholicism has now become a permanent element in Poland's national life that will grow stronger as time goes on.

Professor Szczepanski views even Polish emigre organizations abroad as constituting a pressure group "which can interfere indirectly in the nation's politics by means of their press and broadcasting in the Polish language" and "can be regarded as a substitute for an opposition party" (p. 63). He thinks that the role of the emigres has considerably diminished with the attenuation of the cold war, the stabilization of the new order in Poland, and the change of generations, and that the emigres themselves are now working to liberalize rather than to overthrow the socialist order in Poland. Nevertheless, he asserts that "they remain a factor in political life, as the Polish government takes into consideration the political influence that the Poles exercise in their host countries" (p. 68).

It is for all these reasons that Professor Szczepanski holds the model of totalitarian society long subscribed to by many in the West to be inapplicable to contemporary Poland. He maintains that the influence of pressure groups is at least in some degree effective, and he reminds us that even during the Stalinist period in Poland "unorganized political forces" were able to resist the collectivization of agriculture and maintain the independence of religious life, and that in 1956 they were able to bring about major changes in party policies and methods of political activity (p. 63). If anything, the events of December 1970 in Poland, which led to the fall of Gomulka and the granting of new concessions to the Polish people by the Communist government, have bolstered Professor Szczepanski's thesis.

PERHAPS OF greatest interest are Professor Szczepanski's speculations about the future. Here again the author avoids abstract discussion of what Poland ought to be like and offers instead a concrete analysis of present trends from which one gets a fairly clear picture of the future direction of the country's social and political development. Today's Poland, he asserts, is already a people's Poland. Not only the ruling elite but the great majority of the intelligentsia came in the first generation from among the peasantry and the workers, and they are not against the system that elevated them to this higher social stratum. As for the younger generation, claims the author, its members have been "educated in the new order and regard it as natural. They have, of course, many ideas about improving or perfecting the system, but no thought of its replacement by another" (pp. 74-5).

With regard to the kind of improvements the younger generation would like to see in the existing system, Professor Szczepanski does not go into any detail, but his general observations are especially interesting in the light of the political changes that have occurred since his book appeared. Polish youth, he writes, is fascinated "with the new technological civilization, with mass media, films, abstract art, and the mass-consumption society of the West." The young people value high professional qualifications, attach great importance to having interesting work, and therefore would like to see the sort of political changes that would offer greater scope for the exercise of their talents and initiative. They rebel "against the rigid bureaucratization . . . and against the irrationalities of an ideological education which disregards the discrepancy between the ideal of socialist society and its reality" (p. 171). In line with their aspirations, they would, above all, like to see in Poland government by the enlightened.

Professor Szczepanski is convinced that the Polish ruling elite itself is undergoing changes that are gradually bringing it closer into line with the aspirations of the society as a whole. These changes are mainly the result of the replacement of the older generation by the younger in the higher echelons of the Communist Party. The author observes that as a rule every new political elite starts out with a rigid ideological position, but that over a span of two or three generations it devel-

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ops its own political culture and leadership skills and in the process becomes more flexible. At the same time, he claims that the new ruling elite in Poland is not a closed but an open one, access to which is determined primarily by educational achievement. It is in "the rapidly growing number of graduates from institutions of higher education in responsible posts of command in the party apparatus," he writes, that ". . . there is an accumulating potential for organizational modernization of the political order" (p. 75).

The struggle between the old and the new in Poland has not yet run its course, concludes Professor Szczepanski, but with the passage of time and the changeover of generations, the conflict seems to be losing its sharp edge. Both sides have modified their positions and have made a number of concessions. This process, predicts the author, is bound to continue, and it appears probable that there will not be a clear-cut victory for either the old or the new set of values, but rather that "a new cultural configuration will emerge from the contest" (p. 171).

A New Approach to Soviet Politics

By Jan F. Triska

H. GORDON SKILLING and FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS, Eds.: *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971.

BECAUSE OF THE importance of the book under review as an innovative approach to the study of Soviet politics and Communist politics in general, it was made the subject of a panel discussion at a joint meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Western Slavic Association at Denver, Colorado, in March 1971. In addition to the co-editors of the book, Professors Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, of the University of Toronto, the participants on the panel were Professors Jeremy Azrael, of the University of Chicago; Andrzej Korbonski, of the University of California in Los Angeles, presently with the Ford Foundation; John Lewis, of Stanford University; Dennis Pirages, of the University of Georgia; and Maurice Simon, of Williams College. The reviewer was the organizer and chairman of the panel.

The roundtable discussion proved interesting and exciting, with the co-editors responding on the spot to the criticisms offered by the panelists. It therefore occurred to the author that it might be useful to offer here not the usual singlehanded review but a composite one summarizing the panel discussion—of course, with the consent and approval of the participants. Specific comments are identified as to their authors by the insertion of their names in parentheses.

It was the consensus of the panel that the Skilling-Griffiths study is an important contribution to Soviet (and Communist) studies which merits the attention that it has received since its appearance. Professor Skilling has been working on the interest-group approach for a number of years now, and the co-editors have assembled contributions by a number of distinguished colleagues endeavoring to test that approach in relation to a number of specific groups.

The volume is telling evidence of the increasing pluralism of conceptual approaches to the study of Communist politics, which is a healthy departure from the scholarly uniformity of the 1950's. Dynamic, process-oriented and policy-relevant, the newer studies tend to view the Communist polities as complex industrial or industrializing societies which, while functioning within distinctive political cultures, are undergoing many of the conflicts and tensions characteristic of all industrial societies (Simon). Thus, the book under review also signals the end of the simple, monolithic model of Soviet politics (Pirages).

Or does it? Does the interest-group approach really represent change from, more than continuity with, the totalitarian model of Soviet politics? After all, that model did recognize the existence of groups in the Soviet polity, and these groups have received varying amounts of attention from

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Western scholars in the past. The assumption in the Skilling-Griffiths volume is that groups have not received *enough* attention, and that the interest-group approach makes the study of Soviet politics *more comparative*. Perhaps so. But the group approach does not tell us anything about either the genesis of interest groups or about the future of such groups in the Soviet setting. What emerges is merely a trend analysis based on an unarticulated theory of modernization (whereby functional differentiation implies the existence of more self-conscious groups) and on the empirical observation that the Soviet press was a lot more interesting under Khrushchev than under Stalin because more varying opinions were voiced. But does it follow that there was in fact a *greater* diversity of opinion under Khrushchev, and if so, that this climate was brought about at least in part by modernization? We really do not know. Neither do we know whether groups became more influential in Soviet society, whether they were consulted more by the decision-makers, and whether they spoke and reported more honestly. Also, which were the politically salient groups? No criteria of political saliency are spelled out in the book; instead, several occupational groups are assumed to be highly influential, but we are not told why. Also, nowhere in the book do we find a discussion of questions such as how groups are mobilized, and around what issues; what the patterns of access utilized by the groups are; and what are the key arenas for articulation of group demands. And there is no propositional inventory to enable one to talk about specific groups in specific situations (Azrael).

Moreover, the reader is presented with a simple value judgment: namely, that the interest-group approach is a useful tool for the study of Soviet politics. But he is not given any idea of how or where the parts fit into a whole. Interest groups are treated as phenomena outside of the top command, and the observer looks at the system from the top down. The outcome is a perception of a political system which is both formalistic and static. Homogeneous groups are presented as behaving in a vacuum. For the purpose of the approach, conflicts without and cleavages within are non-existent. There are neither competition and engagement nor coalitions and bargaining. And there is no indication of relationships between force and interest —that is to say, how interest is translated into political reality (Lewis).

Rather than looking at Soviet politics mechanistically from the top down, it would be more rewarding to study it from the bottom up, empirically, as the scholars of Chinese politics do. One may begin identifying groups operating at the local level: in villages, towns and cities; how they are involved; where the sources of their support in the localities are; and what power is at their disposal. How do they interact with groups on other levels, including the national level, and what kind of cooperation - competition is there among the groups? (Lewis)

Mr. Griffiths' attempt to develop a macro-systemic or system-dominant approach to Soviet politics is refreshingly innovative and a significant contribution to empirical theory-building. He seeks to view policy and decision-making as "the product of conflicting tendencies of the whole with respect to specific issues: instead of a multitude of bits of activity, there is the interaction of the limited number of tendencies of the whole polity; the performance of the whole may be considered in terms of conflicting macro-political tendencies in the handling of individual policy problems." As development proceeds, certain very broad issue-areas take social precedence. A limited number of policy alternatives appear, leading to "tendency conflicts." The salience of these alternatives and conflicts for individual actors produce group activities directed towards the selection and implementation of certain alternatives. Thus, Griffiths places emphasis on how situations and issues affect coalition processes, bargaining, and attempts for influence. Unlike Skilling, Griffiths asks the analyst to view group interaction in terms of the overarching policy questions and situational context. There is less of a temptation to see occupational and institutional groups in isolation from each other, bargaining with the party bilaterally on parochial matters (Simon). Griffiths also shows that groups are not rigid; that shifts within and among groups are continuously being made; and that changing coalitions are built around issues and not *vice versa* (Pirages).

Thus, Griffiths' chapter in the book actually constitutes a thoughtful and thought-provoking critique of the interest-group approach and at the same time offers a different and positive frame of analysis. It stole much of the thunder from our collective criticism of the book and presented us with an alternative scheme of a highly imaginative character.

Still, both approaches face major empirical hurdles. Data limitations and research methodologies make it difficult to test both approaches empirically. How can we examine the common charac-

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teristics of members of various groups without better biographical sources? Can we analyze the organization and cohesiveness of these groups without more knowledge of the structures and internal workings of the Soviet bureaucracy, and without interview or survey data on the group members? Detecting patterns of interaction between groups is a particularly thorny problem. And what issue-areas have been most critical from the standpoint of this interaction? It will be difficult to determine whether the same coalitions emerge with respect to the same issues, and it will be a complex task to assess what techniques of exerting influences are used by groups from issue to issue (Simon).

The respective case studies of the seven occupational groups covered in the volume are uniformly excellent. Individually they are distinguished contributions to scholarship on Soviet politics; collectively they represent a productive alternative lens through which to observe the Soviet political scene. But the individual authors' success in coping with the overall task of the book is uneven.

Jerry Hough's chapter on "The Party Apparatchiki" is an intelligent, thorough, well-documented study that is actually more persuasive on the negative side—*i.e.*, that the professional politicians act more as a collection of subgroups—than on the side of a more homogeneous interest group. The many internal divisions and deep-seated cleavages within the *apparat,* as Hough himself points out, make for a poor interest-group assessment (Korbonski).

The high point of the chapter by Frederick Barghoorn on "The Security Police" is the author's exciting story of his own personal experience in Lubianka prison at the hands of the KGB in 1963. There is little in this case study, however, that supports the central thesis of the book.

Roman Kolkowicz's essay on "The Military" is a polished, insightful, well-documented contribution. Although far from a monolithic and homogeneous institution, the Soviet military is, in the author's view, "a guild-like organization" and as such "may indeed be described as an interest group." With only limited reservations, we agreed.

John Hardt and Theodore Frankel's "The Industrial Manager" is a superbly researched study focusing on the articulated interests of industrial managers. The authors see the managers as essentially a cohesive, integrated group; yet there is much evidence they are badly divided (Azrael).

"The Economists," by Richard W. Judy, is an articulate and perceptive essay on Soviet coalition politics produced by interaction among subgroups within the "economists" and other groups. It shows how "economists" seek to influence policy and describes the nature and significance of their activity.

Ernest Simmons' treatment of "The Writers" offers a useful descriptive analysis along the Skilling line of thought. Unfortunately, the author pays scant attention to the question of issue-linkage (the precise links between issues and the attitudes and concerns of decision-makers), does not consider broader societal trends, and does not include the problem of coalition-building between the writers and other groups (Simon).

"The Jurists," by Donald Barry and Harold Berman, is an intellectually stimulating effort to deal with the theme of the assignment, and the fact that it is rather heavy going is not the authors' fault. What emerges from the chapter is that professional affiliation in itself does not make for an interest group. The authors show how subgroups among jurists have dominant interests of their own (Pirages).

Gordon Skilling argues (in the book) that a group approach "sensitizes the observer to a realm of political activity that has gone almost unnoticed and thus facilitates our understanding of Soviet and other Communist systems." However, he also acknowledges that this approach does not afford more than a partial view. "I do not assume that political interest groups are the principal feature of Soviet politics or that these groups are the dominant factors in the political process," he states. "They are, however, an important element, the neglect of which makes the picture of Soviet politics incomplete and distorted, and the inclusion of which renders it richer and more authentic." Indeed, it is important that we fill in gaps in our descriptive knowledge of Soviet politics. And it is equally essential to understand how individuals who share common characteristics may come to develop similar attitudes on public issues and even proceed to make definite demands on political authorities (Simon).

The respective case studies proved both these points quite well. Indeed, they showed that the more we know about a political system, the more groups we can identify and the better we can describe them in terms of their activities and actions. But that is all. The seven occupational groups may or may not act as interest groups; it depends on the particular issue at hand. Other groups may act that way, too—even *ad hoc* groups, or coalitions of groups. Some groups may be more

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homogeneous than others but may have deeper cleavages and thus be less united when it counts.

An approach is not a theory. In this sense, the book is both rudimentary and transitional (Skilling). It is a good summary of where we have been, but except for the Griffiths chapter, it is not an innovation (Azrael). But given these reservations, the volume has appeared at an interesting time for the development of group theory. As Griffiths pointed out, working on the book proved to be an important learning process for the two editors. If they had to do it all over again, he said, they would attempt to build a different conceptual framework. They would examine alternatives over time; they would search for the sources, rather than the outcomes, of articulated cohesiveness in Soviet politics (the principal question here being: What makes people seek common goals?). They would examine both subsystem interaction, looking for trends reflecting on the behavior of the group, and situational variables, *e.g.,* the shape of the harvest. But above all, they would organize the book not on an interest-group basis but on an issue-by-issue basis.

And here may lie the answer to the study of Communist politics employing the interest-group approach.

Rural Servitude

By Abraham Brumberg

ANDREI AMALRIK: *Involuntary Journey to Siberia.* Trans. by Manya Harari and Max Hayward; introduction by Max Hayward. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970.

ANDREI AMALRIK, the 33-year-old Russian playwright and historian who was recently arrested for the second time and sentenced to three years at hard labor for writing and disseminating "anti-Soviet" works (including the book under review), is surely one of the most impressive figures in what has come to be known as the "Democratic Movement" in the USSR. In his previously published *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (New York, Harper & Row, 1970), he revealed himself as a brilliant social critic, albeit perhaps one given to occasional sweeping prognostications. In *Involuntary Journey to Siberia,* actually written two years earlier, he emerges as the chronicler and observer *par excellence*—cool, realistic, committed yet dispassionate, with a flawless eye for both the detail and the essence of every phenomenon he describes, unobtrusively witty, and finally, modest without being in the least self-effacing. Above all, he is a man who has clearly lived up to his own prescription that the only way to survive under what he has called elsewhere a regime marked by "degradation and growing decrepitude" is to "insist on one's rights to an independent existence"—to "stand up for one's dignity and not give way to fear" (p. 32).

The present volume bears out the accuracy of his analysis of Soviet society as well as the wisdom of his rule of conduct. Judging by Amalrik's description, the Soviet regime has progressed since Stalin's day to a point where it may now be compared to the regime that existed in Russia around the turn of this century. The arbitrariness of the Stalin era, more pervasive and more savage than that of the despotic reign of Nicholas I, is gone. The present Soviet bureaucracy, as Max Hayward notes in his splendid introduction, is forced to "take some account of the law, such as it is, in dealing with people who have fallen foul of it"; and it shows signs of an emergent "pluralism," of overlapping functions and jurisdictions. Had Amalrik been arrested for the same crime—the formal charge against him was "parasitism," or lack of regular employment, but the real reason lay in his nonconformist views—not in 1965 but twenty years earlier, he might well have vanished without a trace. At the later date, however, the police was no longer wholly beyond—or above—the law. A "case," however absurd by the standards of Western jurisprudence, had to be made, "evidence" had to be produced in court, and Amalrik was given the

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opportunity to hire a defense attorney. Also, it soon became apparent that the regular police took a more lenient attitude towards Amalrik's "transgressions" (contacts with foreigners, an interest in "abstract" paintings, and the like) than did the KGB. Amalrik, his friends, and eventually his defense counsel did their best to exploit these differences, not by cringing admissions or by attempting to play one against the other (which would have been futile), but by insisting on Amalrik's constitutional rights and exploring every legal avenue of defense available to Soviet citizens. True, their efforts succeeded only after Amalrik had already served nearly half of his 1965 sentence of three years. And now, his second arrest and conviction clearly demonstrate anew how tenuous the Soviets' vaunted "socialist legality" remains today, all the changes and reforms notwithstanding. Yet if Amalrik has not beaten the "system," neither has he been beaten by it. By refusing to "give way to fear," he has at least shown that it is possible to oppose the regime and thus retain a sense of personal integrity, of faith in oneself and in the future.

Involuntary Journey to Siberia consists of two parts. The first depicts the circumstances that led to Amalrik's 1965 arrest, the trial, and the journey to his place of exile—a collective farm near Tomsk, Siberia. The second deals with the author's experiences on the Kolkhoz and presents fascinating glimpses of peasant life and rural conditions in general. Politically, the Soviet Union today may, as suggested before, be comparable to Tsarist Russia *circa* 1900. Yet, if the village of Guryevka is even partially typical, then socially a good part of rural Russia is still the same as it was in the days of Gogol and Saltykov-Shchedrin half a century earlier. Some of the scenes described by Amalrik would be amusing (in the same sense that the scenes in Gogol's *The Inspector General* are), if they were not so appalling in their revelations.

To put it bluntly, the life of the Russian peasant remains nasty, brutish, and short. More than a century after the abolition of serfdom, the peasants are still—or rather again—little more than serfs of the State, unable to move to the cities or to manage their own affairs, deprived of the minimal legal guarantees enjoyed by urban dwellers, and totally at the mercy of the authorities—from the chairman of their kolkhoz, appointed from above, to the militia—who regard them as little more than chattel. (During an impromptu speech on Soviet law, Amalrik relates, the local prosecutor informed the peasants, "much to their pleasure, that the [kolkhoz] chairman and foreman were not entitled to beat them. In another kolkhoz, he [the prosecutor] said, the foreman had beaten up some of the kolkhozniks and locked one woman in his office without food for a couple of days, but he would shortly be brought to trial for this.")

The peasants are uninformed, addicted to vodka, and almost unbelievably primitive. During a lecture on the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Amalrik writes, "hardly anybody listened . . . since they were busy with their work, or if they did listen, it made no sense because they didn't even know what CPSU meant." As for the district hospital, "all kinds of terror stories were told: somebody, for instance, swore he had seen a patient suspended by hooks from the ceiling to be roasted by doctors on a slow fire."

Living in squalor, the peasants, in Amalrik's opinion, no longer retain any interest in—or memory of—individual farming even though they jealously guard their wretched "private plots," and their attitude towards their master varies from sullen resentment to complete lethargy.

"I think that these are people," says Amalrik, "with whom you can do anything." His observations have the indisputable ring of truth, but his conclusions may not be altogether correct. However atomized the Soviet peasantry may be, however meekly it may accept its miserable plight, it still bears the scars of countless indignities and thus constitutes, at least potentially, a vast repository of grievances against the Soviet regime. One can only wonder, uneasily, what will happen if one of these days these subterranean feelings should burst forth into the open. Unless certain basic social, economic and political reforms—such as those which Andrei Amalrik has advocated—are put into effect, Russia may yet see an explosion far more elemental and far more bloody than anything that country has experienced during its long and tortured history.

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The Intelligence Factor

By Lothar Metzl

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK: *The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet Versus Western Intelligence, 1921–1939.* Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1969.

ASSUMING THE ROLE of detective-historian, Mr. Blackstock reappraises several Soviet and Western intelligence operations during the troubled 1920's and 1930's in Europe and posits that an intelligence battle which contributed to the outbreak of World War II occurred in this era. The battle, if it can be called that, seems to have been rather one-sided. The author's version of a number of well-known cases of clandestine Soviet actions against White Russian emigres in Europe and elsewhere (which makes up three quarters of the book) indicates that the Soviet side was highly professional and operated quite freely in the West. It penetrated, entrapped, kidnapped, and murdered its potential opposition, apparently at will. The other side was quite amateurish, and the anti-Soviet activities of the exiled White Russian generals, as well as those which the book ascribes to Western agencies, generally came to a bloody end when they reached Soviet soil.

Here is a provocative theme, and Mr. Blackstock's effort to do it justice is commendable. But his observations are, in his own words, "tentative value judgments drawn from incomplete data—from which other, quite different conclusions may be drawn." True enough.

In a number of instances, the author has failed to make adequate use of all the information at hand. Take, for example, his treatment of the so-called TRUST episode. In 1922—the year, according to the author, that marked the official joining of the intelligence battle—the GPU (*Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie,* or State Political Administration) created a commercial organization known as TRUST. This enterprise (of a type sanctioned by Lenin's New Economic Policy) functioned as a cover for a sham underground "monarchist" movement in the USSR which was actually controlled by the police. The movement was used as a means to identify and entrap oppositionists and at the same time to discourage anti-Soviet pressures from abroad by disseminating to gullible Russian exiles and Western intelligence operatives the fairy tale of a monarchist revival and the impending collapse of the Bolshevik regime. The venture, labeled "unique" by the author, was exposed in 1927, and it quickly collapsed.

Mr. Blackstock's discussion of the affair is debatable on several counts. First, it appears that Soviet activities of this nature began as early as 1921, when the Foreign Department of the Cheka (*Chrezvychainaia Komissiia po Borbe s Kontrrevolutsiei i Sabotazhem,* or Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counterrevolution and Sabotage), the GPU's predecessor, was organized. Second, TRUST was far from unique. It had been anticipated 100 years earlier by a similar entrapment operation undertaken by Napoleon's secret police against France's royalist emigres. More to the point, credible accounts have it that the GPU, which took a rather broad view of what constituted state security, ran about 40 other cover operations, which were never exposed. Hence, the demise of TRUST may not have been as severe a setback for the Soviet government as Mr. Blackstock asserts.

All too frequently, furthermore, the author, in his exuberant preoccupation with case detail and the operational and personal problems of Soviet and anti-Soviet agents alike, does not consider—let alone rebut—alternative interpretations of events. His handling of the affair of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky provides a good illustration. In many respects, his account merely revives previous ones. According to him, a double agent planted information with the Nazi intelligence service about Tukhachevsky's plotting with German generals, and the Nazi intelligence service in turn fleshed out the story with forged documents. Soviet intelligence then picked up these documents and played them back into Stalin's hand via the head of the Czechoslovak government.

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Why Stalin, with his purge apparatus in high gear in 1937, should have needed such evidence is still not clear. How could he have foreseen that the Nazi intelligence service would do his homework for him—only about two months before the trial of Tukhachevsky at that? How is it that the enormous collection of captured Nazi documents in the National Archives in Washington, DC, contains not a single document testifying to the involvement of Nazi intelligence at all? These and other questions remain.

More important, serious questions can be raised about whether an intelligence battle ever actually took place. The author argues, for example, that the West launched an intelligence offensive in 1927–28, but the evidence that he adduces is less than conclusive. It consists mainly of a statistical tabulation of brief and often vague accounts in the Soviet press during 1927 of the arrest or execution of about 190 English, Romanian, Polish, Latvian, and Estonian spies and saboteurs. In view of what is known about the *modus operandi* of the Soviet secret police—the quota system (under which the secret police were required to make a prescribed number of arrests in a specified period), forced confessions, fabricated evidence—these data do not really prove the existence of a Western offensive.

The supplemental evidence for this particular claim is also weak. It consists of Mr. Blackstock's "findings" in the archives of the Russian emigre scholar and journalist Sergei Petrovich Melgunov. These, according to the author, establish that Melgunov was the hitherto undetected master operator of undetected agent nets in the Soviet Union that were amply backed by equally undetected Western intelligence services. Emigres who knew Melgunov well have stated flatly to me that this prolific writer would have been out of his depth as the organizer of large-scale subversive operations. Moreover, a researcher who has studied the Melgunov archives has also pointed out to me that an important "organizational report" which Mr. Blackstock attributes by implication to an alleged Melgunov net (p. 189) was actually made under the auspices of another emigre organization, *Krestianskaia Rossiia,* probably headquartered in Prague at the time. Consequently, the "evidence" of the Melgunov archives needs to be reviewed more critically.

Even if Mr. Blackstock's interesting thesis about a Soviet-Western intelligence battle happens to be true, he does not elucidate clearly the historical-political impact of the conflict. One can build a persuasive case that the incredible political climate of intrigue, illusion, and self-deception prevailing in the West during the interwar period helped to bring on another war, but the author does not pin down what role a Soviet-Western intelligence battle might have played in generating the new hostilities.

In view of these problems and the importance of the theme, a revised edition of the book would be desirable. Should Mr. Blackstock undertake such a task, he might in the process eliminate several disturbing inconsistencies in the chronology of his cases. On p. 24, for example, the "hero" of the TRUST operation is arrested by the secret police in November 1921; on p. 29, the arrest occurs in November 1922. Similarly, on p. 22, the "hero" is released by the end of March 1922, but on p. 29, he is released by the end of February 1922.

A clarification of the author's use of Soviet sources would be worthwhile too. His account of the TRUST episode is based largely on a Soviet novel even though in the footnotes he correctly characterizes its author as a Soviet propagandist.

While Mr. Blackstock has not proven his thesis of a Soviet-Western intelligence battle, his book is educational, for it shows how Russian exiles and Western intelligence services underestimated the vigor and dimensions of the Soviet counterintelligence effort, including its capability for provocation and misinformation in peacetime.

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Reviews in Brief

Disgruntled Elder Statesman

ANASTAS I. MIKOYAN: *Mysli i vospominaniia o Lenine* (Thoughts and Reminiscences about Lenin). Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1970.

WITH ITS CRUDE distortions and outright inventions, this volume is no more reliable a historical source than, say, *Khrushchev Remembers.* Unlike that unauthorized compilation, however, it is a genuine and important contribution to the dialogue over high policy that has been going on among the Soviet elite in recent years.

To understand the content of the book, it is vital to know something of the personal and political background. Born in 1895, Mikoyan joined the Bolsheviks on their march to power and later helped to consolidate the party's shaky rule in the provinces. He became a nonvoting member of Lenin's Central Committee in 1922, attained the same status in the Politburo—already dominated by Stalin—in 1926, and from 1935 to 1965 held full Politburo membership. Though certainly loyal to Stalin during the dictator's lifetime, Mikoyan is reported to have opposed Stalin's militant posture toward the Western democracies after World War II, and during the post-Stalin period he openly urged a conciliatory line at home and abroad. Such an "old fighter" is apt to have been deeply hurt by the decision of the present Brezhnev leadership to keep him around as one of the 195 full members of the Central Committee but to oust him from the 11-man policymaking Politburo.

This book makes it clear that Mikoyan, like Nikita Khrushchev, was pushed to the sidelines of Kremlin life for more than reasons of health. At the very outset, Mikoyan alerts the reader to the topicality of his material by stating that a key purpose is "to recall certain moments which are important for our times." He then goes on to voice, in thinly veiled language, the dissent of an elder statesman from the Politburo consensus favoring the pursuit of conformism rather than socio-political reform at home, and expansion of the regime's influence abroad at the expense of a slowdown of the costly arms race with the United States.

In Mikoyan's fond recollection, Lenin stands in marked contrast to the men who now rule Russia. Mikoyan portrays him as a bold innovator who decried timidity in the determination of policy guidelines, as a leader who was trustful of the peasantry and minority ethnic groups, who urged that the authority of the political police should be curbed and legal safeguards established to protect individual rights, and who advocated tolerance toward those in governing councils who think for themselves and sympathize with the mood of neglected segments of the population. It is easy to discern in this picture of Lenin an implicit yet unmistakable criticism of the neo-Stalinist backsliding that has increasingly marked the public conduct of Khrushchev's heirs.

In accordance with the latest twist in the party line, Mikoyan gives Stalin his due, chiefly as the defender of the supremacy of the party apparatus against the challenge of Leon Trotsky. But, slyly, he also rakes the coals of anti-Stalinism by lavishly praising the talents of Sergei Kirov and pointing up the close ties between Lenin and this natural rival to Stalin, who was strangely murdered in 1934. Similarly, Mikoyan alludes to the intimacy between Lenin's family circle and Nikolai Bukharin, the champion of reform communism, who perished in Stalin's Great Purge of 1936-38. He recalls still another victim of the terror, Ivan Smirnov, as "erudite" and "charming."

The publication of this pithy memoir serves to remind us of the continuing vitality of those forces within the Soviet leadership which would like to channel the evolution of the system along a more humane path. That historical lies and innuendos have to be used for the sake of accomplishing such a worthy purpose is part of the ongoing tragedy of the Soviet experience.

Sidney I. Ploss

Russia and the US

ALBERT L. WEEKS: *The Other Side of Coexistence.* New York, Pitman Publishing Co., 1970.

PROFESSOR WEEKS, of New York University, has put together an admirable rundown of the factors that have dominated US-Russian relations through history. It is a solid résumé with a stimulating speculative conclusion which should make the book very popular for university courses on foreign affairs. At the same time, thanks to the author's tight and lucid style, the volume will also be attractive to general readers interested in foreign policy. It is not, however, a book for the specialist comparable with a volume such as Adam Ulam's *Expansion and Coexistence.*

Professor Weeks comes down rather heavily on the side of those who believe that Khrushchev was on balance a force for genuine détente in the East-West struggle. While he does not omit Khrushchev's extremist adventures such as the Berlin ultimatum of 1959 and the Cuban missile crisis, he clearly considers the Soviet Union under Khrushchev to have been less antagonistic to the US than it is under the current regime. Occasionally, as for example when he ignores Khrushchev's responsibility and Mikoyan's role in the events of 1956 in Hungary, he is even guilty of im-

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portant inaccuracies in his favorable comparison of Khrushchev's stewardship with Brezhnev's.

On the other hand, the author provides valuable insight into the internal Soviet struggle over the allocation of resources. Khrushchev's battle with the "metal-eaters" is certainly one of the most fascinating aspects of his regime—and one where most would agree with Weeks' relatively positive interpretation of Khrushchev's objectives.

Going farther back in history, the author includes a fascinating review of Russian support for the Union side in the US civil war. This support was a significant counterweight to British assistance for the South and may even have had a decisive effect on the outcome of the war.

In this reviewer's opinion, the author's lengthy treatment of Soviet policy regarding Germany rests on several basic assumptions of dubious reliability. Mr. Weeks takes at face value the unproven allegation that Khrushchev, with his son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei out in front, would have resolved the German problem had he not been overthrown. The almost continuous Berlin crisis resulting from unilateral Soviet pressure during the Khrushchev era suggests that his initiatives, including the Adzhubei maneuver, were solely designed to cement Soviet hegemony in Central Europe rather than to settle the issue of Germany on terms that would facilitate a détente with the US. The author, like many others, also falls into the trap of crediting East European leaders Ulbricht and Gomulka with wielding considerable influence on political developments in Moscow, even to the point of having had a part in the overthrow of Khrushchev himself. Not even in our own relationship with the United Kingdom could we imagine British views influencing a decision by the Democratic Party to drop Lyndon Johnson—and the suggestion that Ulbricht or Gomulka could exert a comparable influence on internal party events in Moscow is frankly incredible to this reviewer.

Professor Weeks does present a very persuasive treatment of the Vietnam conflict as seen from Moscow. It is hard to argue with his picture of the clear advantages to Moscow of the present situation there: it debilitates US resources and erodes the American internal political fabric; it exposes Peking as a paper tiger and at the same time blocks China's own expansion into Southeast Asia; and it increases Hanoi's reliance on Soviet support. All in all, it is a pretty attractive situation from the Soviet viewpoint, making it clear why Moscow has not been exerting much pressure on Hanoi to achieve a cease-fire over the past few years.

Kempton B. Jenkins

Aid to Trade

SAMUEL PISAR: *Coexistence and Commerce—Guidelines for Transactions Between East and West.* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1970.

TRADE RELATIONS between Communist and non-Communist nations seem destined for expansion in the 1970's. While many capitalist firms welcome the promise of new commercial opportunities in the Communist world during the coming decade, the Communist regimes, too, are motivated to expand trade with the West by a growing awareness that their economies have reached or soon will reach the point where they cannot modernize, adapt and progress without greater interaction with the more advanced capitalist economies. As Mr. Pisar states in the introduction to his major study of the problems and prospects of East-West trade:

Cooperation with the outside world is viewed [by Communist leaders] as a continuing necessity, an eminently desirable method of stimulating and sustaining economic and technological progress at home.

Expansion of cooperation and trade, as Mr. Pisar makes amply clear, will not be a simple matter, although the appearance of his lucid and exceedingly comprehensive study should facilitate the process. The author not only outlines the dimensions of the major problems in East-West trade but also offers practical guidance. For example, in his brief account (pp. 219-21) of so-called "compensation" or "return-delivery" transactions (in which the seller is required to accept goods instead of cash in payment), the author provides useful guidelines for avoiding what is one of the greatest pitfalls in East-West trade. Also of interest are his sections on pricing methods employed in the centrally-planned Communist economies, on the US policy dilemma over controls on trade with these economies, and on the difficulties faced by capitalist firms in establishing themselves in "socialist" markets.

Mr. Pisar's discussion of marketing practices and problems in Communist nations is somewhat too narrowly focused on the USSR and does not pay enough attention to developments in Eastern Europe. Although all economic systems in the East European Communist states are fashioned after the Soviet model, the ongoing economic reforms in these countries have introduced sufficient variations to warrant closer examination of trade practices on a country-by-country basis. Particular attention needs to be paid to the differences in the methods of decision-making in the import field and to the identification of key organizations and personalities. The Soviet Union is not always in the lead in the quasi-regenerative process of economic reform; and even in that country the authority to decide on the acquisition of new technology is often more diffuse than is apparent on the surface, involving the participation of scientists, researchers and other professional people in addition to planners, managers and administrators. For the private businessman or economist interested in the operations of the market in Communist areas, the interrelationships between these different elements are becoming increasingly important as these various groups become more influential in the shaping of economic policy.

In the second half of his study, Mr. Pisar concentrates on his specialty—the legal aspects of East-West trade. A close reading of his exposition of the tangled web of trade laws and regulations in the Communist countries, so different from anything obtaining in the non-Communist world, may well frighten a prospective trader away. If so, the reader is advised that such legislation does not necessarily constitute a major obstacle to fruitful trade. As the author himself notes, the Communist regimes are perfectly capable and willing to cut through the tangle of red tape when they wish to settle a given dispute and get down to business.

For those interested in availing themselves of the trade opportunities opening

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up in Communist markets, Mr. Pisar's factual compendium and guide is indispensable. It is far and away the best work to appear on the subject to date.

James Ramsey

Artist in Mid-Passage

ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN: *For the Good of the Cause.* Trans. and ed. by David Floyd and Max Hayward; introduction by Mr. Floyd. New York, Praeger, 1970.

IN THE EIGHT months following the stunning success of his *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* which appeared in the November 1962 issue of *Novyi mir,* Alexander Solzhenitsyn published three additional short stories in that journal. Soviet critics totally ignored the first, "Incident at Krechetovka Station," while the second, "Matriona's Home," received an unfavorable review from Viktor Poltoratsky in *Izvestia.* The third—*For the Good of the Cause*—was published in July 1963 and received a disapproving review from Yuri Barabash in *Literaturnaia gazeta.* In October the story became the subject of an unresolved controversy in the pages of *Literaturnaia gazeta* and *Novyi mir* concerning its literary and social value.

In assessing the literary merit of *For the Good of the Cause,* the reviewer feels that Solzhenitsyn attempted too much. He tried to use a single incident—the arbitrary appropriation by local party and government authorities of a much-needed school building for use as a research institute—to portray both youth and elders, Stalinists and anti-Stalinists. In the process he lost the dramatic concentration and intimate characterization which made his earlier short works so powerful. The structure of the story did not allow him room to develop so many different characters, and his attempt to do so severely marred the unity and drama of the plot. Structurally, the story marked Solzhenitsyn's transition toward the full-length novel.

Thematically, too, Solzhenitsyn began here to expand beyond the framework of his earlier works, in a manner which was ultimately to lead him into confrontation with the regime. *One Day* had presented a shocking picture of Stalin's concentration camps, but it had shown only the limited world of those camps, with their own standards and morals. Soviet critics easily identified the prisoners as good and the camp as bad, and saw no further dilemma. Only in the last lines of "Matriona's Home" had Solzhenitsyn moved beyond a consciously self-limiting framework and referred to current Russia (and for this he received scathing criticism). In *For the Good of the Cause,* he turned to a contemporary Soviet town and contemporary Soviet people, and he showed them agonizing over current moral dilemmas. He asserted that an individual might define right and wrong for himself and disagree morally with the party. As he would at greater length in his novels, Solzhenitsyn here began to explore the personal courage and honesty of individual victims of oppression and to investigate the myriad bonds which link these victims to the rest of mankind and, in particular, to the developing Soviet society. He now posed social-political as well as personal questions in a direct form.

The interest of this story lies, then, less in its intrinsic merits than in its place in Solzhenitsyn's development and in the light which published reaction to it sheds on Soviet literary criticism and on the evolving official displeasure with the author. The editors have, helpfully, collected the principal Soviet reviews at the end of the volume. However, David Floyd's introduction to this second edition ignores the problems raised by the story itself and provides only a simplified account of Solzhenitsyn's controversy with Soviet political authorities. Furthermore, one wishes that the editors, in their effort to honor Solzhenitsyn for his Nobel Prize, had printed all three of the 1963 short stories, together with their reviews, in a single volume—thereby providing a complete link between the lauded *One Day* and the banned novels, *The Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle.*

Stafford Smiley

Reviewers in This Issue

ADAM BROMKE—Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; co-editor of *The Communist States in Disarray* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

JAN F. TRISKA—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University's Institute of Political Studies, author of *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York, Macmillan, 1968); editor of *Communist Party States: Comparative and International Studies* (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG—For many years editor of this journal; now in London preparing a study of political dissidence in the USSR under a grant from Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

LOTHAR METZL—Research Professor of International Affairs at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, Washington, DC.

SIDNEY I. PLOSS—Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University; editor of *The Soviet Political Process* (Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970). He will join the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, in September as a Research Fellow.

KEMPTON B. JENKINS—Assistant Director of the US Information Agency for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

JAMES RAMSEY—Private consultant to corporations trading in Soviet and East European markets.

STAFFORD SMILEY—Research Analyst at the US Library of Congress.

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Documents

EDITORS' NOTE: The following translations of articles dealing with the Soviet regime's use of confinement in mental hospitals as a means of suppressing political opposition were taken from Nos. 16 and 17 of *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events)—an unofficial bimonthly which has appeared in Moscow regularly since April 30, 1968. The excerpts are reprinted here by permission of Amnesty International Publications (Turnagain Lane, Farringdon Street, London, E.C.4), which offers annual subscriptions to translations of *Khronika*.

1. P. G. Grigorenko

Piotr Grigorevich Grigorenko is still being held in the special psychiatric hospital in Cherniakhovsk (see *Chronicle* Nos. 14 and 15).[1]

For the last few months the cell-ward in which Grigorenko is imprisoned has been fitted with a second lock, the key to which is kept by the warder on duty at the guardpost, far away from the cell. This makes using the toilet extremely difficult. Grigorenko's cystitis has become more acute. In agony, Piotr Grigorevich has not been sleeping at night.

There have been no answers to all his complaints. Only at the end of October [1970] was a slop-bucket placed in his cell.

The hospital administration is restricting P. G. Grigorenko's visits from his relatives.

[1] Major-General Grigorenko has figured in numerous protests since 1961, most notably public protests at the trials of Siniavsky and Daniel in 1966, at the trial of those who demonstrated on August 25, 1968, in Red Square against the Czechoslovak events, and on behalf of Crimean Tatars seeking to return to their homeland. On February 20, 1970, the Tashkent court concluded that Grigorenko was guilty of violating Article 70 (proscribing "anti-Soviet agitation" and "certain especially dangerous crimes against the state") and Article 190-1 (concerning "spreading of false information defaming the Soviet system") of the RSFSR Criminal Code while of unsound mind. He was exempted from criminal punishment and placed in a special psychiatric hospital until his recovery.—Ed. (See *Chronicle* No. 14, June 1970, as translated in *The Interment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals*, Cambridge, England, John Arliss Limited, n.d., pp. 6-10.)

2. Olga Yofe

The pardon [of I. M. Kaplun and V. I. Bakhmin] did not apply to Olga Yofe, whose case had been detached for separate legal proceedings as a consequence of her being judged to be of unsound mind by experts from the Serbsky Institute (*Chronicle* No. 15), and who had been sent by the decision of the court to the psychiatric hospital of special type in Kazan, where she remains to this day.[2]

3. N. Ye. Gorbanevskaia

On 1 October [1970] the appeal in the case of Natalia Yevgenevna Gorbanevskaia (*Chronicle* No. 15) was heard in Moscow. The sentence—compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital of special type—was confirmed. Gorbanevskaia is still in the hospital section of Butyrka prison [in Moscow].[3]

[2] Kaplun, Bakhmin, and Yofe were previously convicted for possessing and circulating anti-Soviet documents (*The Internment, supra*, pp. 22-23). The Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry is ostensibly run by the Ministry of Health, but acts as a tool of the KGB.—Ed.

4. Julia Vishnevskaia

Julia Vishnevskaia, who was apprehended on 9 July [1970] during the trial of N. Ye. Gorbanevskaia (see *Chronicle* No. 15), has been judged to be of unsound mind, with a diagnosis of "creeping schizophrenia." On 12 October she was released from the Serbsky Institute and placed in the care of her parents and under the observation of the District psychiatrist.

5. Algis Statkyavichus

Algis Statkyavichus, born 1937, a former official of the Sociological Research Bureau in the Ministry of Finance, was arrested on

[3] Gorbanevskaia was arrested August 25, 1968, in connection with the Red Square demonstration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Declared "non-accountable" for her actions, she was released to the custody of her mother, but she then published a book *Midday*, which denounced her trial. Reexamined at the Serbsky Institute, she was declared of unsound mind and was sentenced under Article 190-1 in July 1970 to confinement in a psychiatric hospital of special type.—Ed. (See *The Internment, supra*, pp. 10-12.)

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18 May 1970 in Vilnius. He was accused of being the author of the books, *A Critique of the Communist Manifesto* and *Results of Sociological Research in Lithuania.* A. Statkyavichus was judged to be of unsound mind, and by the verdict of the court he was sent for forcible treatment in a psychiatric hospital in mid-November [1970].

6. P. M. Egides

On 7-8 December [1970] the Rostov Regional Court, sitting behind closed doors, heard the case of Piotr Markovich Egides, Master of Philosophical Sciences and until the end of 1969 a lecturer at Rostov University.

His arrest and indictment under article 190-1 of the Russian Criminal Code was reported in *Chronicle* Nos. 13 and 14.

The chairman of the court was Alekseev, the prosecutor, Zaikin, and Egides was defended by Sarri. P. M. Egides was not himself present in court—a diagnosis commission at the Serbsky Institute had judged him to be of unsound mind. V. E. Davidovich (professor at Rostov University and deputy secretary of its party organization), Kovenko (professor), A. V. Potiomkin (Reader at Rostov University) and L. N. Diamant were questioned as witnesses.

Potiomkin testified that in 1969 he went to Davidovich and told him that Egides had in his possession drafts of some Party Rules and of a Constitution. Davidovich informed the KGB, who replied that they would go into the matter.

It was established in court that Egides had prepared his manuscripts in the Leningrad Region and in Rostov (in Diamant's flat). In early January 1970 the police arrested Diamant, carried out a search and confiscated a suitcase containing Egides' manuscripts (among them the Rules).

Witness Kivenko described Ediges' moral countenance.

Landau, an expert (from the Serbsky Institute), testified that Egides had a psychopathic personality with a cranial-cerebral trauma and arteriosclerosis, and that he had broken the law "while in a state of paranoid reaction, in the grip of delusions of grandeur and reforming zeal." (The commission had taken into account testimony from Egides' relatives about the mental abnormalities they had noticed in him.) At present, concluded the commission, Egides has not completely emerged from the reaction, in view of which he requires forcible treatment in a psychiatric hospital of general type.

The court judged the manuscripts, "Towards the Fundamental Trends of Socialism" and "The Only Way Out," to contain slanderous fabrications. It also judged Egides to be of unsound mind and delivered the verdict that he should be placed in a psychiatric hospital of general type for compulsory treatment.

At present P. M. Egides is in [Moscow's] Kashchenko hospital, in the section for violent patients.

ENOUGH, COMRADES!

. . . It is time to think clearly: the incarceration of freethinking, healthy people in mad-houses is *spiritual murder;* it is a variation on the *gas chamber,* but it is even more cruel—the torture of the people being killed is more malicious and more prolonged. Like the gas chambers, these crimes will *never* be forgotten, and all those involved in them will be condemned for all time, during their life and after their death.

In lawlessness, in the committing of crimes, the point must be remembered at which a man becomes a cannibal!

—From letter of Alexander Solzhenitsyn in *Khronika*, June 1970, protesting the confinement of Soviet biologist Jaures Medvedev in a psychiatric hospital for his political views (translated in *The Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals*, Cambridge, England, John Arliss Limited), Medvedev was subsequently released.—Ed.

7. G. I. Feigin

Girsh Isakovich Feigin, born 1927, a resident of Riga, has been trying for many years to obtain permission to emigrate permanently to Israel to join his mother and sister. On 4 May 1970, as a protest against the groundless refusals, Major G. Feigin publicly renounced the government decorations he had received during the Second World War. On 30 July 1970 Feigin and seven friends of his sent a statement of their renunciation of Soviet citizenship to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After this, G. Feigin was repeatedly subjected to didactic "conversations" by various Soviet organizations and threatened with being placed in a psychiatric hospital.

On 18 December [1970] Girsh Feigin was forcibly placed in the republic psychiatric hospital of Latvia at 1 Aptekas Street, Riga. The doctor who saw to his hospitalization told his [Feigin's] friends that Feigin was abnormal, because "normal people do not renounce government decorations." [According to Amnesty International, Feigin was released in January 1971 and was allowed to emigrate on February 10—Ed.]

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